Outsourcing the internal audit function with special reference to the UK public and private sectors by Yiannakas, A.
Yiannakas, A. (2000). Outsourcing the internal audit function with special reference to the UK 
public and private sectors. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London) 
City Research Online
Original citation: Yiannakas, A. (2000). Outsourcing the internal audit function with special 
reference to the UK public and private sectors. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University 
London) 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/8165/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
K 
Outsourcing the Internal Audit 
Function With Special 
Reference to the UK Public 
and Private Sectors 
II 
Aristodemos Yiannakas I 
Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy (PhD) 
CITY UNIVERSITY 
BUSINESS SCHOOL 
yI 
Department of Accounting and Finance 
;I 
June 2000 
Table of Contents 
Page 
List of Tables 
List of Diagrams 1 
List of Figures 12 
Acknowledgements 1; 
Abstract 14 
Chapter I: Introduction 10 
1.1 Introduction 17 
1.2 The Need for the Study 
1.3 Objectives 
1.4 Limitations of the Study 
-0 1.5 The Structure of the Research 7 
1.6 Final Thoughts for Chapter 1 -)8 
Chapter II: The Outsourcing Phenomenon 
- 
Conceptual Foundation 3O 
2.1 Introduction 31 
2.2 Organisation of Chapter II 
2.3 How Organisations have Evolved Over the Years 34 
2.3.1 Owner-Managed (1800s) 35 
2.3.2 Functional (1850s) 
--)'5 2.3.3 Divisional (1920s) 36 
2.3. 
-4 Matrix (1930s) 36 
2.3.5 Network (1980s) 37 
2.4 Vertical Integration 38 
2.5 What Lies Ahead 
- 
The Virtual Corporation 40 
2.6 The Transaction Cost Economics Approach 44 
2.7 Nature of Transactions 49 
2.8 The Transaction Cost Economics Approach and Outsourcing 51 
2.9 The Criticism 56 
2.10 Core Activities And Core Competencies 59 
2.10.1 The `Shamrock' Organisation 61 
2.10.2 The `Doughnut' Principle 61 
2.10.3 The `Flexible Firm ' 6 
2.10.4 Ialue Chain 68 
2.11 Is Outsourcing Necessary" 70 
2.12 The Reasons for Outsourcing 73 
2.12.1 The Top Five Tactical Reasons for Outs ourcing -4 
2.12.2 The Top Fivc Strategic Reasons for Outsourcing 75 
2.13 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) and Downsizing 
2.14 The Cultural Implications of Outsourcing and the Impact 
on Employee Morale 
2.15 The Legal Implications of Outsourcing 
2.16 Summary 
Chapter III: Outsourcing and Internal Auditing 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Organisation of Chapter III 
3.3 Establishing an Internal Audit Department 
3.3.1 The Traditional Approach 
3.3.2 The Non-Traditional Approach 
3.4 The Challenges Facing Internal Audit Today 
3.5 Potential Benefits From Outsourcing Internal Auditing 
3.5.1 Cost-Effective 
3.5.2 Specialised Expertise 
3.5.3 Supplementing Resources 
3.5.4 Transferring the Risk 
3.5.5 Management Pluses 
3.5.6 Cost Conversion 
3.5.7 Better International and Cultural Coverage 
3.5.8 Improved Quality 
3.6 Potential Costs From Outsourcing Internal Auditing 
3.6.1 The Risk of Quality 
3.6.2 The Issue of Confidentiality 
3.6.3 The Specialist's Unfamiliarity With the Organisation and 
its Culture 
3.6.4 Loss of Loyalty 
3.6.5 Loss of Training Ground 
3.6.6 Loss of the Continuous Presence 
3.67 Loss of Control 
3.6.8 The Organisation Becomes Too Dependent on the Service 
Provider 
3.6.9 Loss of Management Tool 
3.7 Potential Advantages From Retaining an In-house Internal Audit 
Function 
3.8 Outsourcing Options to Consider 
3.8.1 Full-Outsourcing 
3.8.2 Partial-Outsourcing 
3.8.3 Partnering/Cosourcing 
3.9 Independence 
3.10 Size of the Market 
3.11 Outsourcing Vs Insourcing 
3.12 Summary 
79 
8, 
88 
93 
95 
96 
97 
98 
98 
98 
99 
104 
104 
104 
105 
105 
106 
106 
106 
107 
107 
108 
108 
108 
109 
109 
110 
110 
110 
110 
113 
114 
115 
116 
116 
117 
121 
IN 
1; 1 
-I- 
Chapter IV: Research Hypotheses 1; 3 
4.1 Introduction 1 '14 
4.2 Group A: Core Vs Non-Core 13 ; 
4.3 Group B: Factors Influencing the Decision 140 
4.4 Group C: Impact 1; 
4.5 Summary 164 
Chapter V: Research Methodology 165 
5.1 Introduction 166 
5.2 Deciding on the Sample 167 
5.3 Questionnaire Design 170 
5.4 Pilot Testing 173 
5.5 Advance Notice of the Questionnaire 175 
5.6 Follow-Up Mailing 177 
5.7 Data-Description Phase and Hypotheses Testing 180 
Chapter VI: Descriptive Data Analysis 182 
6.1 Sample Size and Scenario Frequency 183 
6.2 When was Each Internal Audit Function Established and 
what are their Respective Sizes? 185 
6.3 The Outsourcing Experience 188 
6.4 Respondents' Perception of Internal Audit 190 
6.4.1 Internal Audit as a `Core 'Activity 190 
6.4.2 Internal Audit as an `Essential ' Activity 191 
6.4.3 Dealing with Core and Non-Core Activities 191 
6.5 Outsourcing the Internal Audit Function 192 
6.5.1 The Beginning of Outsourcing the Internal Audit Function 192 
6.5.2 The Presence of an Internal Audit Function Prior to 
Outsourcing 194 
6.5.3 The Outsourcing Contract 197 
6.5.4 Factors Affecting the Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function 199 
6.5.5 Audit Areas which are Partially Outsourced 200 
6.5.6 Have the Organisations with an In-House Internal Audit 
Function Considered at any Stage to Outsource the 
Function? 10I 
6.5.7 Is it Possible that in the Future the Organisations it-ith an 
In-House Internal Audit Function will have the Function 
Externally Provided? '0 
6.5.8 HT'hat is the Likelihood of Organisations IT "ithout an 
Internal Audit Function to Actually Outsource the 
Function Sometime in the Future? ý'05 
- 
6.5.9 The Main Factors Influencing the decision to Keep the 
Internal Audit Function In-House 2O5 
6.5.10 `Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment' 
(TUPF) and Outsourcing 207 
6.6 The Internal Audit Service Providers 210 
6.6.1 The Main Service Providers 
-110 6.6.2 How Satisfied the Organisations are with the Quality of 
the Provider 's Service 
-111 6.6.3 Overall Satisfaction with the Provided Service 21 3 
6.6.4 Terminating the Outsourcing of Internal Audit 214 
6.6.5 The Use of a Single Provider for Both Internal and 
External Audit 216 
6.6.6 The Issue of 'Independence' -' 17 
6.7 Organisations With No Internal Audit Function -. )I9 
6.7.1 Will they Consider the Possibility of having an 
Internal Audit Function in the Future? 219 
6.7.2 Some of the Factors that have Influenced these 
Organisations Against having an Internal Audit Function 219 
6.7.3 What is the Likelihood of these Organisations 
Establishing an In-House Internal Audit Function in the 
Future? '21 
6.7.4 Are these Organisations Aware of Any Internal Audit 
Service Providers? 221 
6.8 Conclusion ?? I 
Chapter VII: Hypotheses Testing 223 
7.1 Introduction 224 
7.2 Statistical Tests 224 
7.3 Hypotheses Testing 226 
7.4 Conclusions 279 
Chapter VIII: Summary, Conclusions and Areas for Further Research 281 
8.1 Summary 2 82' 
8.2 Conclusions 28 5 
8.3 Areas for Further Research 290 
Bibliography '194 
Appendices 312 
-4- 
List of Tables 
Page 
Table 3.1: Organisation of Internal Audit Departments 127 
Table 3.2: Organisation of Respondents' Internal Audit Functions 128 
Table 4.1: Summary Table of Research Hypotheses 164 
Table 5.1: Estimates of Times for Conducting, Sending, Completion, 
and the Return of the Questionnaire 176 
Table 6.1: Sample Distribution 183 
Table 6.2: Scenario Frequency 184 
Table 6.3: Scenarios/Sectors Crosstabulation 185 
Table 6.4: The Length of Time there has been an Internal Audit 
Function In-House 186 
Table 6.5: The Length of Time there has been an Internal Audit 
Function In-House/Sectors Crosstabulation 186 
Table 6.6: The Length of Time there has been an Internal Audit 
Function In-House/Scenarios Crosstabulation 186 
Table 6.7: The Number of Auditors Employed by the Organisations with 
In-House Internal Audit Functions 187 
Table 6.8: The Number of Auditors Employed by the Organisations with 
In-House Internal Audit Functions/Sectors Crosstabulation 187 
Table 6.9: The Number of Auditors Employed by the Organisations with 
In-House Internal Audit Functions/Scenarios Crosstabulation 187 
Table 6.10: Any Other Functions Outsourced? 188 
Table 6.11: Any Other Functions Outsourced? /Sectors Crosstabulation 188 
Table 6.12: Any Other Functions Outsourced? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 188 
Table 6.13: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? 190 
Table 6.14: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? /Sectors Crosstabulation 190 
Table 6.15: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 190 
Table 6.16: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? 191 
Table 6.17: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? /Sectors Crosstabulation 191 
Table 6.18: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 191 
Table 6.19: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities 192 
Table 6.20: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities/Sectors Crosstabulation 192 
Table 6.21: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities/Scenarios Crosstabulation 192 
Table 6.22: The Beginning of Outsourcing the Internal Audit Function 19 3 
Table 6.23: The Beginning of Outsourcing the Internal Audit 
Function/Sectors Crosstabulation 19 31 
Table 6.24: The Beginning of Outsourcing the Internal Audit 
Function/Scenarios Crosstabulation 193 
-1- 
Table 6.25: Did your Organisation have an Internal Audit Function 
Prior to Outsourcing? 194 
Table 6.26: Did your Organisation have an Internal Audit Function 
Prior to Outsourcing? /Sectors Crosstabulation 194 
Table 6.27: Did your Organisation have an Internal Audit Function 
Prior to Outsourcing? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 194 
Table 6.28: How Many Internal Auditors did your Organisation 
have Prior to Outsourcing? 19 
Table 6.29: How Many Internal Auditors did your Organisation have Prior 
to Outsourcing? /Sectors Crosstabulation 19 5 
Table 6.30: How Many Internal Auditors did your Organisation have Prior 
to Outsourcing? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 195 
Table 6.31: The Length of the Outsourcing Contract 197 
Table 6.32: The Length of the Outsourcing Contract/Sectors Crosstabulation 197 
Table 6.33: The Length of the Outsourcing Contract/Scenarios Crosstabulation 198 
Table 6.34: The Longer the Outsourcing Contract the more Difficult will 
be to Switch Between Providers 198 
Table 6.35: The Longer the Outsourcing Contract the more Difficult will 
be to Switch Between Providers/Sectors Crosstabulation 199 
Table 6.36: The Longer the Outsourcing Contract the more Difficult will 
be to Switch Between Providers/Scenarios Crosstabulation 199 
Table 6.37: Factors Affecting the Decision to Outsource the Internal Audit 
Function 200 
Table 6.38: Has your Organisation Considered, At Any Stage, to 
Outsource the Whole or Part of its Internal Audit Function? 202 
Table 6.39: Has your Organisation Considered, At Any Stage, to 
Outsource the Whole or Part of its Internal Audit 
Function? /Sectors Crosstabulation 202 
Table 6.40: Have you in the Past Outsourced the IA Function and then you 
Decided to Bring it Back In-House? 202 
Table 6.41: Have you in the Past Outsource the IA Function and then you 
Decided to Bring it Back In-House? /Sectors Crosstabulation 203 
Table 6.42: If Not at Present, do you Expect that in the Near Future at Least 
Some, if Not All, of your IA Function could be Provided by an 
Outside Service provider? 204 
Table 6.43: If Not at Present, do you Expect that in the Near Future at Least 
Some, if Not All, of your IA Function could be Provided by an 
Outside Service provider? /Sectors Crosstabulation 204 
Table 6.44: Factors Influencing the Decision to Keep the Internal Audit 
Function In-House 206 
Table 6.45: TUPE Awareness 107 
Table 6.46: TUPE Awareness/Sectors Crosstabulation 207 
Table 6.47: TUPE Awareness/Scenarios Crosstabulation 207 
Table 6.48: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the 
Internal Audit Function Easier? 208 
-6- 
Table 6.49: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the 
Internal Audit Function Easier? /Sector Crosstabulation 208 
Table 6.50: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the 
Internal Audit Function Easier? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 209 
Table 6.51: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? 209 
Table 6.52: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? /Sector Crosstabulation 209 
Table 6.53: The Main Service Providers 
. 
2110 
Table 6.54: The Main Service Providers/Sectors Crosstabulation 211 
Table 6.55: The Main Service Providers/Scenarios Crosstabulation 211 
Table 6.56: Satisfaction With the Quality of the Provided Service 
-112 Table 6.57: Overall Satisfaction with the Provided Service 21 
Table 6.58: Overall Satisfaction with the Provided Service/Sectors 
Crosstabulation 21 3 
Table 6.59: Overall Satisfaction with the Provided Service/Scenarios 
Crosstabulation 213 
Table 6.60: Despite being Satisfied With the Provided Service will the 
Organisations Still Consider Bringing the Function Back 
In-House? 214 
Table 6.61: Despite being Satisfied With the Provided Service will the 
Organisations Still Consider Bringing the Function Back 
In-House? /Sectors Crosstabulation 214 
Table 6.62: Despite being Satisfied With the Provided Service will the 
Organisations Still Consider Bringing the Function Back 
In-House? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 215 
Table 6.63: Does your Organisation Use the Same Provider for Both Internal 
and External Audit? 216 
Table 6.64: Does your Organisation Use the Same Provider for Both Internal 
and External Audit? /Sectors Crosstabulation 216 
Table 6.65: Does your Organisation Use the Same Provider for Both Internal 
and External Audit? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 217 
Table 6.66: Was the Potential Compromise of Independence Considered 
at the Provider Selection Process? 217 
Table 6.67: Was the Potential Compromise of Independence Considered 
at the Provider Selection Process? /Sectors Crosstabulation 217 
Table 6.68: Was the Potential Compromise of Independence Considered 
at the Provider Selection Process? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 218 
Table 6.69: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When 
Using One Provider for Both Services? 218 
Table 6.70: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When 
Using One Provider for Both Services? /Sectors Crosstabulation 218 
Table 6.71: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When 
Using One Provider for Both Services : '/Scenarios 
Crosstabulation 219 
-7- 
Table 6.72: Will they Consider having an Internal Audit Function in the 
Future? 
-)19 
Table 7.1: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities (Frequency Table for the Public Sector) 227 
Table 7.2: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities (Chi-Square Test for the Public Sector) 227 
Table 7.3: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities (Frequency Table for the Private Sector) 2' 8 
Table 7.4: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities (Chi-Square Test for the Private Sector) 228 
Table 7.5: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities (Frequency Table for Both Sectors) 228 
Table 7.6: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities (Chi-Square Test for Both Sectors) '29 
Table 7.7: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities/Sectors Crosstabulation 29 
Table 7.8: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities (Chi-Square Test) 2'9 
Table 7.9: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities/Sectors (Group Statistics) 2 30 
Table 7.10: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities (T-Test) 230 
Table 7.11: Summary Table of Statistics for Hi 231 
Table 7.12: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? (Frequency Table for 
the Public Sector) 234 
Table 7.13: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? (Chi-Square Test for 
the Public Sector) 234 
Table 7.14: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? (Frequency Table for 
the Private Sector) 234 
Table 7.15: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? (Chi-Square Test for 
the Private Sector) 235 
Table 7.16: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? (Frequency Table for 
Both Sectors) 235 
Table 7.17: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? (Chi-Square Test for 
Both Sectors) 235 
Table 7.18: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? /Sectors Crosstabulation 236 
Table 7.19: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? (Chi-Square Test) 2-36 
Table 7.20: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? /Sectors (Group Statistics) 2'37 
Table 7.21: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? (T-Test) -137 
Table 7.22: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? (Frequency Table for 
the Public Sector) -' 38 
Table 7.23: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? (Chi-Square Test for 
the Public Sector) 
Table 7.24: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? (Frequency Table for 
the Private Sector) '38 
-8- 
Table 7.25: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? (Chi-Square Test for 
the Private Sector) 
Table 7.26: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? (Frequency Table for 
Both Sectors) 
Table 7.27: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? (Chi-Square Test for 
Both Sectors) 
Table 7.28: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Table 7.29: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? (Chi-Square Test) 
Table 7.30: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? /Sectors (Group Statistics) 
Table 7.31: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? (T-Test) 
Table 7.32: Summary Table of Statistics for H2 
Table 7.33: The Importance of `Cost Savings' in the Decision to 
Outsource the Internal Audit Function 
(Frequency Table) 
Table 7.34: The Importance of `Cost Savings' in the Decision to 
Outsource the Internal Audit Function (Chi-Square Test) 
Table 7.35: The Importance of `Cost Savings' in the Decision to 
Outsource the Internal Audit Function/Sectors 
Crosstabulation 
Table 7.36: The Importance of `Cost Savings' in the Decision to 
Outsource the Internal Audit Function (Mean Ranks) 
Table 7.37: The Importance of `Cost Savings' in the Decision to 
Outsource the Internal Audit Function (Mann-Whitney U Test) 
Table 7.38: Summary Table of Statistics for H3 
Table 7.39: Organisational Size in Terms of the Number of Employees 
Table 7.40: Current Provision of Internal Audit/Size Crosstabulation 
Table 7.41: Current Provision of Internal Audit/Size (Chi-Square Test) 
Table 7.42: Summary Table of Statistics for H4 
Table 7.43: Current Provision of Internal Audit/Diversity of Operations 
Crosstabulation 
Table 7.44: Current Provision of Internal Audit/Diversity of Operations 
(Chi-Square Test) 
Table 7.45: Summary Table of Statistics for Hs 
Table 7.46: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the 
Internal Audit Function Easier? (Frequency Table for the 
ý' ,9 
240 
240 
240 
241 
`41 
241 
"'44 
244 
245 
245 
245 
246 
248 
249 
249 
250 
252 
252 
253 
Public Sector) 254 
Table 7.47: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the 
Internal Audit Function Easier? (Chi-Square Test for the 
Public Sector) 2-55 
Table 7.48: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the 
Internal Audit Function Easier? (Frequency Table for the 
Private Sector) '55 
Table 7.49: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the 
Internal Audit Function Easier? (Chi-Square Test for the 
Private Sector) I5 5 
-9- 
Table 7.50: 
Table 7.51: 
Table 7.52: 
Table 7.53: 
Table 7.54 
Table 7.55: 
Table 7.56: 
Table 7.57: 
Table 7.58 
Table 7.59: 
Table 7.60: 
Table 7.61: 
Table 7.62: 
Table 7.63: 
Table 7.64 
Table 7.65 
Table 7.66: 
Table 7.67: 
Table 7.68: 
Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the 
Internal Audit Function Easier? (Frequency Table for Both Sectors )2 56 
Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the 
Internal Audit Function Easier? (Chi-Square Test for Both Sectors) 256 
Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource 
the Internal Audit Function Easier? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource 
the Internal Audit Function Easier? (Chi-Square Test) 
Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource 
the Internal Audit Function Easier? /Sectors (Group Statistics) 
Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource 
the Internal Audit Function Easier? (T-Test) 
Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? (Frequency Table for the Public Sector) 
Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? (Chi-Square Test for the Public Sector) 
Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? (Frequency Table for the Private Sector) 
Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? (Chi-Square Test for the Private Sector) 
Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? (Frequency Table for Both Sectors) 
Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? (Chi-Square Test for Both Sectors) 
Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? (Chi-Square Test) 
Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? /Sectors (Group Statistics) 
Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? (T-Test) 
Summary Table of Statistics for H6 
The Length of Time an Organisation had an In-House Internal 
Audit Function/Current Provision of Internal Audit 
Crosstabulation 
The Length of Time an Organisation had an In-House Internal 
Audit Function/Current Provision of Internal Audit 
56 
"57 
? 57 
257 
28 
258 
28 
259 
259 
259 
260 
260 
260 
261 
261 
263 
(Group Statistics) 263 
Table 7.69: The Length of Time an Organisation had an In-House Internal 
Audit Function (T-Test) 264 
Table 7.70: Summary Table of Statistics for H7 264 
Table 7.71: How Important were the 'Many Alternative Sources of Supply' 
in your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the Internal Audit 
Function'? /Sectors Crosstabulation 26( 
-10- 
Table 7.72: How Important were the 'Many Alternative Sources of Supply' 
in your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the Internal 
. -audit Function? (Mean Ranks) 2'66 
Table 7.73: How Important were the 'Many Alternative Sources of Supply 
in your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the Internal Audit 
Function? (Mann-Whitney U Test) 266 
Table 7.74: Summary Table of Statistics for H8 267 
Table 7.75: Satisfaction With the Quality of the Provided Service (Statistics) 269 
Table 7.76: Satisfaction With the Quality of the Provided Service 
(Mean Ranks) 270 
Table 7.77: Satisfaction With the Quality of the Provided Service 
(Mann-Whitney U Test) 2 71 
Table 7.78: Summary Table of Statistics for H9 272 
Table 7.79: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When Using 
One Provider for Both Services? (Frequency Table for the 
Public Sector) 274 
Table 7.80: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When Using 
One Provider for Both Services? (Chi-Square Test for the 
Public Sector) 274 
Table 7.81: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When Using 
One Provider for Both Services? (Frequency Table for the 
Private Sector) 274 
Table 7.82: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When Using 
One Provider for Both Services? (Chi-Square Test for the 
Public Sector) 275 
Table 7.83: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When Using 
One Provider for Both Services? (Frequency Table for 
Both Sectors) 275 
Table 7.84: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When Using 
One Provider for Both Services? (Chi-Square Test for 
Both Sectors) 275 
Table 7.85: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When Using 
One Provider for Both Services? /Sectors Crosstabulation 276 
Table 7.86: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When Using 
One Provider for Both Services? (Chi-Square Test) 276 
Table 7.87: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When Using 
One Provider for Both Services? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
(Group Statistics) '177 
Table 7.88: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When Using 
One Provider for Both Services? (T-Test) -'77 
Table 7.89: Summary Table of Statistics for Hio 277 
Table 7.90: Summary Table of Acceptance/Rejection of the Research 
Hypotheses 2 79 
List of Diagrams 
Page 
Diagram 2.1: The Evolution of Organisations Over the Years 3.4 
Diagram 2.2: Williamson's Model of Transaction Cost Analysis 
-; 
-l Diagram 2.3: The `Doughnut' Principle 62 
Diagram 2.4: The `Flexible Firm' 64 
Diagram 2.5: The Value Chain 68 
Diagram 2.6: Consequences of a Transfer of an Undertaking 88 
Diagram 3.1: The Challenges Facing Internal Audit Today 100 
Diagram 3.2: Sourcing Options for the Internal Audit Function 115 
Diagram 4.1: Research Hypotheses 136 
Diagram 5.1: Sample Selection 169 
List of Figures 
Page 
Figure 3.1: Areas in which Outside Contractors were Used 122 
Figure 3.2: Percentage of Organisations Outsourcing Some Internal Audit 
Work in the US and Canada 124 
Figure 3.3 : Percentage of Internal Audit Directors not Currently Using 
Outsourcing but Expecting to do so in the Future 125 
Figure 3.4: Internal Audit Outsourcing (1995 
- 
1998) 126 
Figure 6.1: Sample Distribution 183 
Figure 6.2: Scenario Frequency 184 
Figure 6.3: Functions Other than Internal Auditing that are 
Currently being Outsourced 189 
Figure 6.4: What has Happened to the In-House Internal Auditors 
when the Function was Outsourced 196 
Figure 6.5: Audit Areas which are Partially Outsourced 201 
Figure 6.6: Potential Internal Audit Providers 205 
Figure 6.7: Factors that have Influenced the Organisations Without an 
Internal Audit Function Against having Such a Function 220 
- 
12 
- 
Acknowledgements 
It has been a privilege and a great pleasure to be supervised by Professor Georges ýýlim. 
Meetings with him have always been challenging. stimulating. and his comments and 
suggestions incisive and constructive. He has been unfailingly positive and encouraging 
throughout my time at City University Business School. I am also grateful for his constant 
interest, his confidence in me, and his assistance whenever I needed it. 
I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to all those who made it possible to carry out 
this thesis successfully. Particularly, I would like to thank all the Finance and Audit Directors 
who gave some of their valuable time in order to complete my questionnaire. Their participation 
enabled me to come up with some important findings which no doubt contributed immenscl\ 
towards a better understanding of the issues surrounding the outsourcing of the internal audit 
function in the United Kingdom and the eventual completion of my thesis. 
As always, I am enormously grateful to my remarkable parents. Words are not enough to 
express my true feelings for them. They have been endlessly supportive, both morally and 
financially, not only during the last nine years I have been studying abroad, but also throughout 
my whole life. For this reason, I would like to dedicate my work to them. Last but not least. I 
would like to thank my wonderful wife. Without her support doing a PhD would have been a 
lonely process. Her love, devotion, and patience kept me going all these `ears. Apolo`(ic,, for 
forgetting at times that we also have a social life, but hopefully I will be able to make it up to her 
in the coming years. 
-1ý- 
Abstract 
Although not a new phenomenon on the business scene. outsourcing nowadays is occurring on a 
much broader scale and usually encompasses a wide variety of traditionally in-house activities. 
There is no doubt that in many cases outsourcing has created new ways and opportunities for 
growth. It has given organisations the chance to secure high quality services at a lower cost and 
it has even enabled them to concentrate on their core activities instead of devoting their, at 
times, scarce resources on peripheral ones. Having to compete in an increasingly global market 
amid growing antagonism, has forced organisations to harness the benefits of outsourcing while 
at the same time mitigate many of its potentially damaging effects (e. g. low employee moral, 
loss of control over the outsourced activity, etc). 
Evidence suggest that outsourcing has been extensively used in a plethora of activities which are 
often closely allied with or supporting the organisation's core business. One of the activities that 
has recently become a target for outsourcing is the internal audit function. This thesis 
incorporates a comprehensive literature review on the subject of outsourcing in general and that 
of internal audit in particular. It also includes a detailed analysis of data from a survey that was 
carried-out in the UK between May and July 1999. In this survey, a number of Finance and/(>r 
Audit Directors from both the public and private sectors took part. From the survey results it is 
clearly evident that the outsourcing phenomenon is not only limited to the private sector alone. 
In fact, the public sector has not been left untouched by the outsourcing frenzy either. 
Apart from looking at the factors acting as the main driving force behind the decision to 
outsource the internal audit function, the thesis also examines how internal audit is percci\ cd 
- 
14- 
and the likely impact an outsourcing decision may have on auditors' independence and the 
quality of internal audit service. Results indicate that the respondents consider internal audit to 
be both a `core' and an `essential' activity. What is also apparent from the results is the 
perceived value of internal audit, with the clear majority of organisations either haavin an 
internal audit function in-house or receiving the service from an outside provider. The main 
motivating factor behind the decision to outsource the internal audit function has been identified 
to be the `access to internal auditors with specialised skills. While an auditor with specialist 
skills may be needed in many cases, adding such a person to the permanent staff is often quite 
expensive, particularly if his/her skills are required for only a short period of time c\ e rv v car. 
The research also shows that organisations are, in general, satisfied with the quality of the 
provided service. One third of the organisations with an in-house internal audit function. stated 
that in the future at least some, if not all, of their internal audit function could be provided by an 
outside service provider. Despite showing their preference towards the services of the 'big five' 
public accounting firms, a significant number of organisations may still consider the use of' a 
`specialised internal audit provider'. The use of the same provider for both the internal and 
external audit services inevitably raises questions regarding the issue of independence and 
although the majority of organisations outsourcing the internal audit function use two separate 
providers, not all of them believe that independence is compromised when using one provider. 
- 
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Chapter I: 
Introduction 
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1.1 Introduction 
Outlining his vision of the future in an article published by the Wall Street Journal. Per F. 
Drucker (1995) stated that "In another 10 to 15 years, organ i: urtions mal be outsoýiurring, all 
work that is `support' rather than revenue producing, and all activities that do na! provide 
career opportunities into senior management. In many organizations a majority of the re /) ecohlt' 
who work for them might be employees of an outsourcing contractor". Today,, it appears that 
Drucker's vision of the future has 
- 
to an extent 
- 
materialised. Outsourcing. the practice 
whereby a firm is contracted to perform one or more business activities that traditionally have 
been performed inside the organisation, has become an established feature of the ývaý" business 
is conducted. 
For most of the 20t' century, businesses have flourished using strategies made up of dedicated 
staffs and clear hierarchies within their own organisations. However, this strategy is believed to 
be no longer valid. The business processes that used to underline traditional structures such as 
vertical integration have been greatly altered. Rather than trying to do everything, organisations 
are assessing their strengths and weaknesses and are concentrating on what they can do best. 
From top to bottom, organisations are putting whole departments out to tender. They are 
increasingly turning to outsourcing as a way of aggressively reshaping themselves and 
fundamentally changing the way they do business in order to ensure their long-term success. 
Most Directors would admit that their organisations are at present operating within a much 
more competitive environment, than was the case a few years ago. Organisations are currently 
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being forced to identify exactly where they have the greatest competitive advanta`_e. and to re- 
define their organisational structures so that they can sustain that advantage. According to 
Watkins (1994), nowadays organisations are compelled to define their 'core' activities or 
competencies and to establish flexible business structures which can most effecti% clv exploit 
those skills and advantages. 
It is true that the state of the economy in the late 1980s forced organisations to tighten their 
belts and downsize. In some cases, downsizing left work still to be done, and that is when the 
trend of outsourcing really picked up momentum. After all, an organisation might explain: 'We 
are not in the business of hiring people, making deliveries or maintaining cars. Why don't we 
hire an outside organisation which is an expert in providing the services that are, for us, 
essentially a distraction from our main business? ' Firms are increasingly rejecting the so-called 
`we can do it all' mentality and they are now concentrating on what they are good at and are 
outsourcing the rest. As organisations seek to enhance their competitive positions in an 
increasingly global marketplace, they are finding that they can cut costs and maintain quality 
by relying more and more on outside service providers for activities viewed as secondary to 
their core business. 
During the second half of the 1980s and particularly during the whole of the 1990s a succession 
of articles supporting outsourcing activities appeared in business and other professional 
periodicals, often with eye-catching titles and extravagant claims. 'Growing more by doing 
less', 
`Outsourcing gains speed in corporate world', `Outsourcing can be a productive solution 
for the 90s', `Outsourcing marches on'. 'Contracted out, but in control'. are some of the many 
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flashing titles used in support of the outsourcing trend. Even the words of the Carious 
economist Adam Smith were put to use in support of outsourcing: "The tailor does not atte, n pt 
to make his own shoes, but buys them at the shoemaker" (Davis, 1992. p. 58). 
Despite all of its recent publicity, outsourcing is not really a new phenomenon. In fact, 
organisations have been subcontracting functions such as building security and maintenance for 
decades. People have used the word `outsourcing', but what is being done today is not really 
anything new. What is new, however, is the fact that organisations are now outsourcing a 
whole range of functions which they would not have considered doing in the past. In today's 
highly competitive economic environment, if an organisation feels it can do without a person or 
persons, it simply does so. 
Few eyebrows would be raised if an organisation contracted out peripheral activities such as 
distribution and catering. People are used to businesses outsourcing such activities. However. 
recent outsourcing deals have included human resource functions, information technology and 
even internal auditing. Organisations are increasingly saying that there may be someone out 
there who can do things better than they can. It has to be accepted that no single organisation is 
a star-performer at everything. According to this view, organisations are embracing outsourcing 
because they understand their own limitations. 
Although the 1980s were characterised by an explosion of mergers and acquisitions. it is clear 
now that corporate forces during the 1990s moved in the opposite direction towards 
streamlining and a renewed focus on core business functions. In that particular era of 
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streamlining, re-engineering, and downsizing, outsourcing sounded like a panacea. Perlin 
(1993) has even gone as far as to argue that almost any function is potentially. 'outsourceable 
. 
Despite the high number of success stories, Brown (1992) warns against making outsourcing a 
panacea. It may not seem odd to some people but most of the times we get to hear only about 
the success stories of outsourcing contracts. On the other hand. we rarely hear about the failures 
of such contracts, but the truth is that there are many of them. The harsh reality is that a lot of 
people in organisations get charmed and mesmerised by buzzwords such as 'outsourcing' and 
are driven into making the wrong assumption that they can actually outsource any thing. As a 
result, they might engage into outsourcing something that is mission critical to their 
organisation, and eventually lose control over that area. 
Once an organisation outsources a function, it becomes very difficult and costly to bring that 
particular function back in-house. Outsourcing can be like a one-way road: once an 
organisation goes down that road it becomes almost impossible to come back. It is up to each 
organisation to make sure that they really want to go down that road. Similarly. Albert 
Marcella Jr. (1995) in his book `Outsourcing, downsizing and reengineering', argues that 
"... outsourcing is very much like a marriage. It takes a long leap of faith, and then you have lo 
live with the consequences, good or bad". 
At the end of the day, organisations should ask themselves Is outsourcing for us'? Just because 
an organisation can outsource does not mean it should do so. It could prove to be a mistake to 
jump onto the outsourcing bandwagon just because someone else can do the job or just because 
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it is in fashion. Although the old saying, `if it ain't broke, don 't fix its. is true in some ca,, c,. 
nothing should go without a periodic critical evaluation. 
As part of the ongoing trend towards corporate restructuring. a number of organisations have 
adopted or are exploring the idea of outsourcing their internal audit functions. There is no 
doubt that Chief Executive Officers are present under increased pressure to reduce costs in the 
short term, free capital resources, improve focus and shed non-core activities. But should 
organisations even contemplate the possibility of outsourcing their internal audit function'' 
Does everyone involved in internal auditing need to be a full-time employee of the 
organisation? And is this a function that can be safely, intelligently and successfully outsourced 
in order to generate cost savings? 
Naturally, there are arguments on both sides. On the one side, there are those suggesting that 
the decision to outsource the entire internal audit department is the most ill-advised move an 
organisation's Directors can make. They argue that, when an organisation outsources vital 
functions, such as internal auditing, it may be possible to save some money in the short-run, but 
the organisation runs the risk of losing touch with that function. Furthermore, critics of 
outsourcing are quick in pointing out their concerns regarding independence. conflicts of 
interest, and confidentiality that are raised when the same accounting firm provides both 
internal and external audit services. 
On the other side, some recent decisions by some Directors seem to indicate a perception that a 
better outcome is obtainable from outsourcing all or part of the internal audit function. 
-? 1 - 
Outsourcing selected services can be an innovative and, at the same time. a creative solution for 
internal auditors who have been asked to reduce the number of staff employed. while at the 
same time expand the scope of their audit programs. Perhaps the most significant claim that 
will be made by the major providers of contracted services is that they can provide a service to 
their clients at a lower cost and with improved quality. One further claim is flexibility. Auditors 
can often be hired at a moment's notice or for specified periods of time. Obviously, there are 
many conflicting arguments in terms of the decision to outsource the internal audit function 
which will be examined extensively in the forthcoming chapters. 
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), not surprisingly, continues to maintain a preference 
towards an 'internal' internal audit function. The IIA is in fact convinced that the internal audit 
function is best performed by a fully resourced and competent in-house internal audit 
department. The Institute, however, leaves the door open to the possibility of externally 
provided services by suggesting that some functions may require services obtained by contract. 
It acknowledges the fact that there are cases where parts of an in-house internal audit 
department can be contracted out in order to achieve organisational goals and objectives more 
economically. The Institute also maintains that outsourcing is preferable to having no internal 
audit function and it may even be appropriate in some cases in order to correct sub-standard 
internal audit activities. 
While the decision to outsource the entire internal audit function, or part of 
it, may be one of 
the easiest business decisions a Chief Executive Officer has to make, mainly 
due to the obvious 
costs and the predominantly intangible benefits associated with internal auditing, 
it does not 
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necessarily mean that it will be the most appropriate one. Outsourcing is a big step. with many 
advantages and possible pitfalls but as long as the pressure is on to reduce costs. organisations 
will continue to turn more of their activities like internal auditing over to outsiders. Therefore. 
the trend toward the outsourcing of internal auditing is significant and it will most likely to 
continue in the future. 
1.2 The Need for the Study 
In recent years we have all witnessed the dramatic changes that have taken place within the 
boundaries of organisations, and the impact they had, and are still having, on the concept of 
internal control. It is a well-known fact that the internal audit profession faces many challenges 
as we march in this new millennium. Motivated by the universal mandate to minimise expenses 
and boost or at least maintain profits at a reasonable level, internal audit departments are 
desperately seeking ways to add value and prove that they can still `do the business' for their 
employers. 
The internal audit function is in transition, evolving from its traditional role of assessing 
internal controls and safeguarding assets to a significantly broader role. Evidence suggest that 
the previous heavy dependence on a large number of auditors to verify compliance is gradually 
diminishing. Instead, today, the rapid advances in information technology and the ever- 
increasing tendency towards outsourcing the internal audit function have rendered previous 
`traditional' control concepts and procedures obsolete. The truth of the matter is that computer 
applications are widely used today and this is the main reason why internal auditors are almost 
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certain to become involved in the implementation and checking of procedures which are 
adopted to ensure that the use of such systems is properly controlled. As more organisations 
take advantage of improved networking technology, the paperless system is becoming 
increasingly common. No longer it is so necessary for an audit manager to visit auditors 'in the 
field' in order to review completed audit working files 
- 
these can be now transmitted via a 
modem to the audit manager for review. 
The pace of technological change has therefore made necessary the need for a new breed of 
internal auditor who often relies more on his/her IT skills and less on his/her traditional audit 
and accounting skills. If the organisation is not in a position to provide the best service itself'. 
then the logical alternative should be to find someone from the outside who is capable of' doing 
so. As a result, many organisations are turning to innovative outsourcing arrangements in order 
to obtain the services of such specialised internal auditors without themselves incurring any 
training or recruiting costs. 
Although a lot has been written on the subject of outsourcing in general, based on current 
publications, little research concerning the outsourcing of the internal audit function has been 
conducted to date thus many questions still remain unanswered. It will be the aim of this 
research to determine firstly how organisations perceive internal audit. In particular, there will 
be an attempt to establish whether internal audit is perceived to be a core activity, in which case 
according to the conventional wisdom should be kept in-house, or whether it is considered to 
be an essential but a non-core activity, and therefore the function constitutes a good candidate 
for outsourcing. The research will also examine the factors affecting the decision to outsource 
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the internal audit function and the impact such a decision will ha,, e on auditors' independence 
(internal and external) and on the quality of the internal audit service. 
1.3 Objectives 
The research has the following five objectives: 
9 Outsourcing, endorsed as a quick-fix cost-cutting measure by management experts like 
Peter F. Drucker, has emerged as the most dynamic trend to hit management in recent 
years. The first objective will therefore be to determine whether cost-savings are the main 
determinant in the decision to outsource the internal audit function or whether other factors 
are more important. 
" 
It is increasingly the case that many small or growing publicly-traded companies do not 
perceive the need for a full-time internal audit function. Outsourcing can be a cheaper 
alternative for those organisations when considering regular employees' salaries, benefits, 
and associated overhead (e. g. demand for office space, training, etc). The second objective 
is therefore to find out whether the size of the organisation can affect the decision to 
outsource the internal audit function. 
" Critics of outsourcing point out their concerns regarding independence that are raised when 
the same accounting firm provides both internal and external audit services. Inevitably, the 
third objective will be to ascertain whether independence is compromised xvhcii public 
accounting firms take on the dual role of internal and external auditor. 
- 
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" Naturally, for an organisation that has an internal audit department in-house for a ion_, time. 
it will be more difficult to outsource the whole or part of the internal audit function. On the 
other hand, for an organisation that never had an internal audit function. it will probably be 
easier to consider outsourcing. Whether the length of time the organisation had an internal 
audit department in-house will influence the decision to consider outsourcing or not. x\ ill be 
the fourth objective of this research. 
" 
Today, as corporate leaders understand the strategic value of outsourcing, the,, - are looking 
at every function to determine whether it is essential and core to their business. Functions 
such as internal audit, tax, finance, human resource management, and accounting, that wci-c 
traditionally considered to be `too close' to the core of the business to be performed by 
outsiders are now recognised as `essential but not core'. The fifth and final objective will be 
to examine if it is correct to argue that Internal Auditing while essential is not considered to 
be a core activity. 
1.4 Limitations of the Study 
An extensive literature review has revealed that outsourcing is an area with enormous research 
potential. Unfortunately, mainly due to time constraints this research cannot be stretched over 
an infinite period of time. For precisely the same reason this research will only concentrate on 
the domestic market although a global view of how outsourcing is perceived and the potential 
of the outsourcing markets around the world would have been quite beneficial. A farther 
limitation is that, accurate data regarding the size and the trend of the outsourcing market here 
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in the UK, as far as internal audit is concerned, is not readily available. Nobody has up-to-no« 
managed to come up with an exact figure that would have given us an accurate indication of the 
size and the trend of the domestic outsourcing market. The figures that have been lbund are in- 
fact estimates which are, more often than not, hugely inflated. 
1.5 The Structure of the Research 
The research is split into Eight Chapters. The First Chapter is mainly the introduction to the 
research. The introduction is then followed by the literature review which is divided into two 
chapters 
- 
the Second and the Third. Chapter Two, which has been given the title 'The 
Outsourcing Phenomenon 
- 
Conceptual Foundation', reviews what has been written on the 
subject of outsourcing in general, in particular the main reasons that drive organisations to 
consider outsourcing, and also the cultural and legal implications of outsourcing. It will also 
include an examination of how organisations have evolved over the years, the pursuit of core 
competencies, the consequent emergence of the virtual corporation as the future organisational 
structure, and finally it will make a reference to the work of Oliver Williamson on Transaction 
Costs Economics which is directly related to the whole issue of outsourcing. 
Chapter Three (Outsourcing and Internal Auditing), will concentrate mainly on the issues 
relating to the outsourcing of the internal audit function. It will include the alternative methods 
of outsourcing, all the conflicting arguments in terms of the decision to outsource the internal 
audit function along with the principal advantages and disadvantages involved in making such 
a decision. 
_: 7_ 
Chapter Four will be the research hypotheses. This chapter will demonstrate the main reasons 
behind the formulation of the ten research hypotheses which will be subsequently explored and 
tested. Chapter Five will contain the research methodology. This Chapter will provide the 
analysis of, and rationale for, the particular method(s) used by the researcher in the given study. 
Chapter Six will be the data collection phase through the use of a questionnaire and also the 
descriptive analysis of the data collected. Chapter Seven will focus primarily on testing the ten 
hypotheses and the conclusions reached regarding the acceptance or rejection of the 
hypotheses. The Eighth and final Chapter will consist of the summary. conclusions, and areas 
for further research. 
1.6 Final Thoughts for Chapter I 
Nobody can argue against the fact that there is a definite trend toward outsourcing of «Tat has 
traditionally been in-house processes and services. There is no doubt that as long as the 
pressure is on to reduce costs, organisations will continue to turn more and more of their 
activities over to outside service providers. The question that naturally arises is whether such 
action will always be beneficial for all the parties involved. Some critics are in fact suggesting 
that organisations do not always realise the benefits they originally anticipated from 
outsourcing. On the other hand, some advocates of outsourcing are claiming that entrusting the 
provision of traditional corporate tasks to specialised outside service providers can be cost- 
effective and advantageous provided that the right tasks are contracted out. Hopefully. in the 
forthcoming chapters the researcher will be able to examine both sides of the outsourcing 
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debate and accordingly provide the reader with additional information regarding the wholc 
issue of outsourcing. 
-? 9- 
Chapter II: 
The Outsourcing Phenomenon 
- 
Conceptual Foundation 
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"The benefits of contracting out are always immediate and 
visible. The costs or losses are invisible and inevitably 
appear sometime in the future " (Rock. 1995. p. 4-1). 
2.1 Introduction 
Outsourcing, also known as `contracting-out' or `subcontracting'. has been. without a 
doubt, one of the strongest and most sustained trends within businesses over the last ten 
years. According to Petrick (1996), `outsourcing', in our days, is nothing less than a frill 
fledged business megatrend. Media reports on the subject are frequently euphoric and the 
expected benefits are described in radiant terms. Survey after survey, both here in the t' K 
and abroad, suggests overwhelming support for outsourcing. Outsourcing has been hailed 
by many to be one of only a few cost-cutting measures that really work. Despite all of its 
recent fanfare, outsourcing is considered to be a complex procedure with many advantages 
and possible pitfalls. For the purpose of this thesis the following definition for outsourcing 
will be used: "Outsourcing is the practice whereby a firm is contracted to perform one or 
more business functions that traditionally have been performed inside the organisation " 
Although in the past, outsourcing was considered to be an immediate financial remedy and 
the last resort for big organisations in financial trouble, today it has become an 
indispensable part of the way organisations of all sizes conduct their business. The rapid 
growth in outsourcing owes more to the fact that organisations are increasingly getting rid 
of a whole new range of functions which they would not have considered in the past. 
- 
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Organisations are stripping down their operations to the bone 
- 
retaining control only over 
those core functions that give them their competitive edge 
- 
and letting outsiders handle 
everything else, whether it is manufacturing, accounting, cleaning and catering, niarketiný,. 
or even in some cases internal auditing. What is important, however, is that organisations 
are finding that this strategy usually yields two distinct advantages: Firstly, most of the 
times it saves money by keeping down costs, such as capital expenditure and full-time 
wages; and secondly, it enables them to react faster to any, sudden changes in market 
demand or to take advantage of new opportunities by adding or shedding expertise 
accordingly. 
Viewed strategically, outsourcing fundamentally challenges today's executive to rethink 
the traditional vertically integrated organisational structure in favour of a much more 
flexible one based on core competencies and mutually beneficial, long-term outside 
relationships. At its best, outsourcing allows organisations to concentrate on what they do 
best 
- 
their `core competencies'. It enables them to have all other functions performed 
more efficiently at a lower cost and higher level of competency by organisations that 
themselves are performing in their own key areas of expertise. In fact the decision to use 
outsourcing is usually based on the premise that the service provider has some inherent 
advantage over the client-organisation in delivering that particular service. This ability can 
be either the result of using superior technology or organisational and management skills 
that the provider has developed in that specific area. It could also be due to economics of 
scale the provider was able to successfully achieve over time. 
- 
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Outsourcing', like any other management tool and technique. can be used properly or it 
can be easily misused. Unfortunately, the penalties that misuse brings along can be severe 
and sometimes destructive. A large number of organisations understandably find the 
temptation to outsource irresistible. The prevailing thought of turning 'fixed costs into 
variable costs' is proving to be quite an attractive one. But let us be under no illusions. for 
organisations that outsource and get it right, the benefits look increasingly worthwhile. On 
the other hand, for organisations that outsource and get it wrong. the costs may be more 
than any amount saved. They could in fact end up paying more to the outsource provider 
than they would have spent if they were to carry out the function(s) in-house. 
2.2 Organisation of Chapter II 
This chapter will mainly focus on the theoretical aspects surrounding the whole issue of 
outsourcing. It will explain and document the pursuit of core competencies and the 
consequent emergence of the virtual corporation as the future alternative to the vertically 
integrated organisational structures. 
In a perfect world, the market is naturally the cheapest source for the provision of goods 
and services since intense competition, economies of scale. and other factors 
drive prices 
to a minimum. However, since the world we are living is anything but perfect, the market 
may not always be the lowest cost provider due to the high search, contracting, monitoring 
and enforcement costs, better known as `transaction costs'. 'When these costs are 
high. 
organisations will be better off if they are to produce most, if not all, of their goods and 
- 
JJ 
- 
services in-house because internal costs are lower than the market price. Oliver 
Williamson has successfully constructed a comprehensive theory- of the effects of these 
`transaction costs' known as the transaction cost economics approach which will be 
reviewed in great depth. In addition, Chapter II will examine the related subjects of 
Business Process Reengineering and Downsizing, along with the main reasons that drive 
organisations to consider outsourcing, how outsourcing affects the culture of the 
organisation and the employee morale, and finally the legal implications of outsourcing. 
2.3 How Organisations have Evolved Over the Years 
A proper understanding of outsourcing should start by examining how organisations have 
evolved over the years. The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century brought about 
the evolution of powerful companies. A `company' is generally thought of as a large, 
integrated organisation, that is, an organisation that directly owns and manages most, if 
not all, of its required resources. Success is seen as synonymous with acquiring all the 
factors of production. 
Diagram 2.1: The Evolution of Organisations Over the Years 
1800s 1850s 1920s 1950s 
Owner-Managed » Functional Divisional Matrix 
i 
-- 
-----------I 
Vertically Integrated 
1980s 
Network 
- 
34 
- 
2.3.1 Owner-Managed (1800s): It was in the beginning of the 19`h century when the first 
owner-managed corporations started to make their first appearance. These small 
companies, were generally concentrating on making a single product for a regional market. 
and were controlled by one person, usually the founder. «-ho performed many 
administrative tasks. Since then, four new broad forms of organisation have emerged. 
2.3.2 Functional (1850s): Firstly, the functional organisation, appeared in the mid- 
nineteenth century. This new organisational form allowed many firms to achieve the 
necessary size and efficiency to provide products and services to a growing domestic 
market. They took on more managers 
- 
each assigned to oversee a stage in the commercial 
chain from raw materials to finished products 
- 
and as a result, the vertically integrated 
company was born. According to Miles and Snow (1992), an early vertically integrated 
functional organisation was designed by Andrew Carnegie who applied ideas about 
functional specialisation from the railroads to steel production. By controlling both raw 
materials supplies and distribution, he was able to keep his mills running efficiently on a 
tightly planned schedule. Firms frequently integrated forward, creating new wholesaling 
and retailing channels to ensure that their output could be efficiently distributed and sold. 
Similarly, these firms often integrated backward to assure themselves the steady flow of 
materials and components essential for efficient operation. However, the further backward 
and forward a firm integrated, the greater the costs of co-ordination were. In addition. 
ultimately it became difficult to determine whether any particular asset along the value 
chain was making a positive contribution to the overall profitability. 
- 
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2.3.3 Divisional (1920s): The first important change came in the 1920s. The 
divisionalised organisation appeared shortly after the end of World War I and spread 
rapidly in the late 1940s. Hammer and Champy (1995) stated that among the earliest 
divisionalised structures was that designed by Alfred Sloan at General Motors. «-here 
vertical chains of command for each operating division existed in parallel. Sloan created 
smaller, decentralised divisions that managers could oversee from small corporate 
headquarters simply by monitoring production and financial numbers. He was applying 
Adam Smith's principle of the division of labour to management just as Ford had applied 
it in the production of cars. The divisional form achieved both flexibility and economies of 
scope through its ability to rapidly focus clusters of assets on new or expanding markets. 
Unfortunately, in a divisionalised firm, broad operating freedom created the opportunity 
for divisions to suboptimise, in other words, to take actions that improve only their own 
profitability at the expense of possible overall corporate gains. 
2.3.4 Matrix (1950s): After World War II, companies started the trend toward the matrix 
system. Designed for a period of growing demand and therefore accelerating growth, this 
form of corporate organisation suited the circumstances of the post-war times perfectly. 
Matrices, combined elements of both the functional and the divisional forms, with workers 
reporting to various supervisors depending on the task they performed. The strength of the 
matrix lied in its ability to facilitate co-ordination when the organisation had a multiplicity 
of complex and interdependent activities. Technical and professional personnel moved 
back and forth from functional departments to product or project teams. and from one 
team to another, as their skills were needed. When a project was completed. personnel 
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return to their home departments to work on standard product needs and perhaps await 
reassignment to another project team. The matrix form gave a firm the capacity to expand 
and contract and to constantly address new market opportunities while holding at the same 
time key human assets. The problem with the matrix form was that if managers of 
functional departments had full say over assignments to project teams, the needs of the 
stable portion of the organisation dominated those of the flexible side, making it difficult 
for project team managers to meet customer needs for both technical sophistication and 
timeliness. 
2.3.5 Network (1980s): Movement toward the network form became apparent in the late 
1980s. The network structure is spreading rapidly today, mainly because of the 
communication and technological breakthroughs that make it easier to co-ordinate 
suppliers and customers around the world. Network organisations are different from 
previous organisations in one important respect. Over the past several decades, firms using 
older structures preferred to hold under one roof (i. e. in-house) all the assets required to 
produce a given product or service (i. e. Vertical Integration). In contrast, many networks 
use the collective assets of several firms located at various points along the value chain. 
The network organisation has in fact sought to incorporate the specialised efficiency of the 
functional organisation, the autonomous operating effectiveness of the divisional form, 
and the asset-transferring capabilities of the matrix organisation - all with considerable 
success. However, the network form itself has inherent limitations and its vulnerable to 
misuse. If the several suppliers and distributors in the network focus their assets solely on 
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the needs of a single core firm, the benefits of broader participation in the marketplace are 
lost. 
2.4 Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration, as previously mentioned, has been the predominant approach to 
sourcing in the second half of the previous century and for most of this century. According 
to David Jennings (1996), vertical integration was a response to the lack of appropriate 
supply markets leading to reliance upon internal sources for a wide range of activities. The 
list of benefits from vertical integration includes possible cost reduction through 
economies of scale, reduced transaction costs, greater flexibility in changing product 
design and volume, protection of essential knowledge, market access and enhanced 
opportunities to differentiate the organisation's final product or service. Manv of' these 
factors can also be among the potential costs of vertical integration. The required volume 
for exploiting potential economies of scale may be difficult to achieve. In-house provision 
may reduce flexibility by displacing the opportunity to tap different supplies and 
distributors. Jennings also claims that the development of in-house knowledge may make 
too great a call on resources unless the organisation limits its own efforts to a few core 
technologies. 
The potential benefits of vertical integration may work well in stable or predictable 
industry environments, but in reality only few such industries can be found today. 
Technology and world-wide competition have destroyed the potential benefits of such 
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infrastructures for most organisations. In fact, vertical integration, today. exposes an 
organisation to all the risks at each activity level in which it participates. The reason 
behind this is mainly because vertical integration forces organisations to be experts in 
more areas than they can possibly sustain as `best in class'. James Brian Quinn (1992) 
argues that, unless transaction costs are very high, vertical integration is unlikely to offset 
the costs of having units with lesser expertise and a higher total investment base in a 
highly competitive marketplace. The use of outsourcing allows organisations to 
concentrate on what they do best, avoid the investments and risks in areas where they are 
less expert, and to acquire the expertise of best in the world suppliers. 
Given today's rapid technological advances, many organisations find they can lower their 
risks and leverage their assets substantially by avoiding investments in vertical integration. 
There are several reasons for this. First, well-managed outsourcing can put the world's 
very best talent at the disposal of the organisation. Second, it decreases the firm's risk 
since it is spread between the different service providers. Third, if new technology 
suddenly appears, it is easier to switch sources. Finally, the system enjoys all of the 
motivation, flexibility, and lowered bureaucracy and overhead costs of a much more 
decentralised activity. 
In short, the general value of vertical integration tends to be negative. It is associated with 
large 
- 
mostly fixed 
- 
costs and can tie up substantial resources. This can be particularly 
damaging when a business is going through tough times. Worse. at a strategic level. it can 
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greatly reduce manoeuvrability and responsiveness when fundamental changes are taking 
place in the corporate environment. 
2.5 What Lies Ahead 
- 
The Virtual Corporation 
During the 21St century, the corporation as we have known it for `ears will most likely 
disappear. Many observers believe that the organisational structure of the future will be 
what is termed the `virtual corporation'. According to Byrne et al (1993), the virtual 
corporation is a temporary network of companies that come together quickly to exploit 
fast-changing opportunities. In a virtual corporation, organisations can share costs, skills. 
and access to global markets, with each partner contributing what it is best at. Trust is the 
defining feature of this structure. In the concept's purest form, each organisation that links 
up with others to create a virtual corporation will contribute only what it regards as its 
`core competencies', the jargon phrase used for describing the key capabilities of an 
organisation. It will mix and match what it does best with the best of other organisations. 
It will have neither a central office nor an organisational chart. Instead, this new model 
will be fluid and flexible. Once the opportunity is met, the venture will, more often than 
not, dissolve or as Jack Patterson (1994) describes it, "here-today-gone-tomorrow " 
What gives the virtual corporation its advantage is its responsiveness and flexibility. 
Virtual corporations co-ordinate much of their business through the marketplace and 
consequently they can use the power of market forces to develop, manufacture, market. 
distribute, and support their offerings in ways that fully integrated organisations can not 
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replicate. Such `temporary' organisations could become world-class competitors. with the 
speed, the muscle, and up-to-date technology to seize a market before the window of 
opportunity closes. 
If it becomes widespread, the virtual corporation model could become the most important 
organisational innovation since the 1920s. That was when Alfred Sloan de,, -elopcd the 
principle of divisionalisation in order to organise giant, complex corporations. According 
to Byrne et al (1993), one big United States industry already operates in this way. Ever 
since the collapse of the old Hollywood studio system, movies have been made by virtual 
corporations. Full-blown movie studios that hold exclusive long-term contracts with actors 
and directors, have a staff of full-time music composers and scriptwriters, and own and 
operate fully equipped production lots are a thing of the past. Now the studios act like 
brokers who negotiate a set of contracts with independent talents (i. e. actors. directors, 
etc. ) that come together for a single film and then go their separate ways again. Perhaps it 
is no coincidence that the movie business is one of the biggest success stories of our times. 
Bottoms (1994) offers another example of a flourishing virtual corporation that of the 
aerospace giant Boeing Co. in the US. In building its new Boeing 777 aircraft. the 
company assembled successfully a virtual network of partners that may remain intact for 
many years to come. Customers, including airlines such as United from the US. were 
brought into the network to contribute to the design, helping to ensure that their 
requirements and innovative ideas were incorporated in the new aircraft. Furthermore, 
most of the pieces of the plane were manufactured by suppliers to Boeing who were also 
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brought onto the network. Boeing created an extended enterprise that ensured that designs 
met customer requirements and that the plane was assembled. largely by business partners. 
An example from the domestic market is that of British Airways (BA). Reed (1997) claims 
that few organisations in the UK have caught the outsourcing bug in a bigger way than has 
BA. Although those in high places in the airline are dismissing suggestions that British 
Airways is slowly turning into a `virtual airline', industry-watchers and particularly a 
number of employees that recently saw their jobs outsourced, are not so sure that this is 
not what is actually happening. When Robert Ayling took over from Sir Colin titarshall as 
the new Chief Executive Officer of British Airways in the beginning of 1996 (one of the 
two most profitable airlines in the world at the time), he was convinced that the key to 
continued success laid in drastic cost-cutting measures which involved the implementation 
of a productivity/outsourcing programme. 
Through this programme, BA estimated that it could save much of the £1 billion a year the 
carrier needed to retain its competitive edge in the highly competitive aviation market. 
Among other activities, the airline outsourced its ground transport service to a company 
called Ryder on a 5-year contract. Of the 456 employees involved. 415 moved to Ryder. 
and from the remaining 41 employees some took early retirement. and the rest took 
voluntary severance or they were redeployed within the airline (Reed, 1997). Eventhough 
Ayling's cost-reduction efforts where hailed as successful, BA's profits dropped steadily 
particularly during the second half of his tenure and the carrier only made a marginal profit 
: \y lin`e's for the just-ended fiscal year. Having held the helm for fifty turbulent months. 
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reign at British Airways came to an end in March 2000 when he announced his 
resignation. 
While there are many successful virtual organisations, there are even more failures that do 
not actually make the headlines. Failures always carry bad publicity and as a result they 
are quickly covered up. The benefits of the virtual corporation are obvious. but this 
structure has some real risks too. First of all, an organisation joining such a network runs 
the risk of losing control of the functions it transfers to its partners. Proprietary 
information or technology may escape and the structure will pose difficult new challenges 
for managers, who must now learn to trust their outside service providers and manage 
beyond their own walls. Still others are wary of the concept because it visualises the idea 
of the `hollow corporation', the term put forward to describe organisation that have 
increased profits by abandoning manufacturing and outsourcing production to factories in 
low-wage countries. 
While Buss (1995) claims that the ultimate manifestation of outsourcing is the virtual 
corporation, Chesbrough and Teece (1996), argue that in reality, only few of the virtual 
corporations that have survived and prospered have actually outsourced every-thing. 
Instead, the successful ones have carefully nurtured and guarded the internal capabilities 
that provide the essential underpinnings of competitive advantage, and the%- invest 
considerable capital resources in order to maintain and extend their core competencies 
internally. With the majority of organisations already striving to do things better. faster. 
and smarter, the virtual structure challenges today's managers to re-think the traditional 
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corporate hierarchy. The hierarchical structures of the past, which were so effective in the 
static environments of mass production, will turn out to be a disaster in the fast-moving 
world of the virtual corporation. Flexibility and radical responsiveness is what will be the 
4 norm' in the future. 
2.6 The Transaction Cost Economics Approach 
It would have been a great omission if we were to fail to make a reference to the work of 
Oliver Williamson on transaction cost economics. His work is very important for 
particularly in estimating the actual costs that are involved in any outsourcing decision. He 
introduced a number of variables, that although important, are frequently ignored by most 
decision makers when considering outsourcing a function. 
In the early decades of this century, John Commons pointed out the importance of 
transactions in the economy, and in the 1930s the economist Ronald Coase again asserted 
their importance. But the whole concept of transactions was not picked up and developed 
until Oliver Williamson made it into an important force in the 1970s. According to Perrow 
(1986), the transaction-cost economics approach claims to be a new paradigm that wi 11 
explain better than all other organisational theories the change in this century from many 
small organisations (a market) to a few giant ones (a hierarchy). 
Williamson (1981) asserts that, "... a transaction takes place when a good or service is 
transferred across a technologically separable interface ". The idea is that there are 
-44- 
transaction costs associated with market-type exchanges between contracting partners. 
There are search costs (the costs of gathering information to identify and evaluate 
potential trading partners), contracting costs (the costs associated with negotiatin`7 and 
writing an agreement), monitoring costs (the costs associated with monitoring the 
agreement in order to ensure that each party fulfils the predetermined set of obligations), 
and enforcement costs (the costs associated with ex post bargaining and sanctioning a 
trading partner that does not perform according to the agreement). These are 'externalities' 
to the firm in its dealings with other economic organisations. When firms find these 
transaction costs are high they will have an incentive to internalise' them \vithin the 
boundaries of their firm by performing the operation in-house which was othcrwise 
contracted with an outside supplier. 
In a perfect market, transactions are carried out without transaction costs. Information is 
available for free, decision-making is rational, there are always alternative suppliers and 
buyers, and there are no carry-over effects from one period to the other of a specific 
transaction between two parties in the market. When these conditions do not prevail, 
transactions costs emerge because there is a need to devote efforts to organising. carrying 
out and controlling transactions among interdependent actors. 
Coase's 1937 classic article (`The nature of the firm') about the origins of markets and 
hierarchies stands at the centre of a research tradition that continues to flourish. Coase 
posed his now famous question: "... if the price mechanism is the most efficient mcc hanism 
for allocating resources in a market economy. w'hy do firms exist"'' (Knoedler, 1995. 
-45- 
p. 386). The answer was that economic agents incurred transaction costs when using the 
price mechanism. The greater the number, and the complexity of transactions. the `greater 
the costs involved in transacting. So firms emerged. and merged, in order to reduce the 
costs associated with making transactions with other firms by bringing more activities 
within one governance structure ('governance structure' refers to the institutional 
framework within which the integrity of a transaction is decided). 
Coase's work has been extended and refined by many scholars. but the basic argument 
remains the same: transactions will be governed by the institutional arrangement that is 
most efficient. Williamson (1975) has led the development of this stream of thought and 
his work most fully elaborates on Coase's idea. Of special importance to Williamson's 
own purposes are Coase's work following attributes: 
1. Transactions, and the costs associated therewith, not technology, are the central object 
of the analysis; 
2. Uncertainty and, implicitly, bounded rationality are key features of the argument. 
Despite his considerable reliance on prior literature, Williamson's work differs from 
earlier treatments of markets and hierarchies in significant respects. According to 
Williamson, the principal differences between the earlier literature and the approach that 
he adopted are the following: 
1. He is much more concerned than are prior treatments with tracing out the ramifications 
of bounded rationality; 
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2. He introduces the notion of opportunism and he is interested in the ways that 
opportunistic behaviour is influenced by economic organisation: and 
3. He emphasises that is not uncertainty or small numbers, individually or together, that 
cause market failure but it is rather the joining of these factors with bounded rationality 
on the one hand and opportunism on the other that gives rise to exchange difficulties. 
According to Thompson et al (1991), the core of Williamson's argument is that 
transactions that involve uncertainty about their outcome, that recur frequently and require 
substantial transaction-specific investments are more likely to take place within 
hierarchically organised firms. Exchanges that are straightforward, non-repetitive and 
require no transaction-specific investments will take place across a market interface. 
Hence, transactions are moved out of markets into hierarchies as knowledge specific to the 
transaction builds up. When this occurs, the inefficiencies of bureaucratic organisation will 
be preferred to the relatively greater costs of market transactions. There are two reasons 
for this: bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Bounded rationality 
- 
the inability of economic actors to write contracts that cover all 
possible contingencies; when transactions are `internalised', however, there is little need to 
anticipate such contingencies since they can be handled within the firm's `governance 
structure'. Opportunism 
- 
the rational pursuit by economic actors of their own advantage. 
with every means at their disposal. More generally, Williamson (1985) claims that 
opportunism refers to "... the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially 
to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, or otherwise confuse ". He assumes that 
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at least some people might behave in strategic, guileful ways, if they can do so undetected 
and thereby promote their own interests. This might involve representing their position in 
a way that is less than completely honest, or even, perhaps. entirely dishonest. 
Opportunism is mitigated, however, by authority relations and by the stronger 
identification that parties presumably have when they are joined under a common roof. 
Employees within organisations have better opportunities to 'pay back' (and, as a result, 
discourage) opportunistic organisation members. 
According to Williamson (1986), the criterion for organising commercial transactions is 
assumed to be the strictly instrumental one of cost economising. Before proceeding any 
further, however, it is important to note that Williamson has been quite critical of the 
economists (Milton Friedman in particular) because over the years they have been 
preoccupied with production costs instead of appreciating the importance of transaction 
costs. He claims that "... the object is not just to economise on transaction costs but to 
economise in both transaction and neoclassical production cost respects " (Williamson. 
1985, p. 61). 
Economising on transaction costs essentially leads to economising on bounded rationality 
while simultaneously safeguarding the transactions in question against the hazards of 
opportunism. Holding the governance structure constant, bounded rationality and 
opportunism are in tension, since a reduction in one usually results in an increase in the 
other. Thus a reduction in monitoring commonly gives rise to an increase in opportunism. 
Monitoring the employment relation, however, needs to be done with special care. 
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Progressively increasing the intensity of surveillance can cause resentment and can ha,, e 
counterproductive results. Such problems are less likely for inter-firm trading. 
2.7 Nature of Transactions 
Williamson (1985) identifies three dimensions of transactions which he and other scholars 
claim that they dictate whether markets or hierarchies are most efficient: uncertainty. 
asset specificity, and frequency. These dimensions affect the costs associated with writing. 
executing and enforcing contracts; when such costs are high. markets fail and hierarchies 
emerge in their place. Under conditions of certainty, it is possible to gather information 
and to specify contracts between supplier and buyer, to take care of various future 
contingencies, and also, to control the fulfilment of the agreement between the parties. 
However, when uncertainty prevails, contracts will be very complex and costly both to 
construct and to enforce, especially in the case of small-numbers bargaining. 'Small 
numbers' means that there are few, if any, alternatives open for a buyer or for a seller to 
replace each other in a transaction. The major reason for this is that the asset specificity is 
high 
Asset specificity refers to the extent to which the resources used in a transaction have a 
value therein that is higher than in any other use or to any other user. The higher the asset 
specificity, the more dependent the parties will be on each other. and the higher the costs 
of switching to another party will become. Asset specificity has implications for 
organisations because of the reluctance of parties to terminate transactions to which they 
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have committed specific assets. Owners are aware of the capital losses they must incur if 
they redeploy their assets, and people with whom they are transacting know that nowhere 
else can they find assets as suitable to their needs as those already committed. In other 
words, both parties are to some extent `locked into' a transaction to which highly specific 
assets have been assigned. A physical example of a highly specific asset includes 
equipment designed to make components that will fit into the product of only one buyer 
(for example, wings for Boeing's 777 aircraft). Consider now the case of office-cleaning 
where asset specificity is low. The level of physical capital required in this activity, is 
negligible. The equipment necessary 
- 
the vacuum cleaners, brooms and brushes 
- 
are not 
specific to any particular contract, hence the physical assets are transferable across 
different contracts or activities. These two examples of high and low asset specificity do 
not imply that transaction specificity is confined only to physical assets. Human 
investment in individual or team knowledge that is not fully transferable is also transaction 
specific. If, by working for a firm at a specialised job, you develop certain skills that job 
seekers outside the organisation do not possess, you have specific assets, and this gives 
you, as a result, some bargaining power. Therefore, your employer has to think twice 
before he or she fires you or refuse your demand for a pay raise. 
Frequency of transactions also enters as a major concept in the analysis. Frequent 
transactions raise costs for the simple reason that haggling and negotiating occur more 
often and allow for frequent exploitation. When a buyer and a seller do not interact on a 
regular basis, vertical integration is usually not necessary, whether asset specificity is low 
or high. When asset specificity is low, markets can operate effectively using standard 
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contracts. Likewise, when asset specificity is high, the contracts may be quite complicated 
but integration is still not necessary. Even if the frequency of transactions is hi(-, h. low 
asset specificity will mitigate its effects. However. when assets are specific and 
transactions are frequent, vertical integration is likely to be warranted. Otherwise. 
transaction costs and risks will be too high. and complete contracts to eliminate these 
uncertainties will be difficult to draft. In summary, the transaction cost economics 
approach states that high levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, and/or frequency «-i 11 
lead to the internalising of functions otherwise available from the market. 
2.8 The Transaction Cost Economics Approach and Outsourcing 
When contemplating the possibility of outsourcing a function, `transaction costs' are 
bound to come into the frame. As the term suggests, this economic approach is concerned 
with the costs of making a transaction. This includes not only the cost of reaching an 
agreement which will satisfy the parties involved, but also that of adapting the outsourcing 
agreement to unanticipated contingencies and of enforcing its terms. Furthermore, the real 
cost of outsourcing a function rather than having it in-house must also include the costs of 
identifying suitable providers, communicating your requirements to them, monitoring their 
quality of service, avoiding opportunistic behaviour by them and so on. 
Walker and Weber (1984) share a similar view with Williamson. They claim that. 
although there are two kinds of costs (production costs and transaction costs) that should 
be taken into account in any outsourcing decision (the two authors refer to the outsourcing 
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decision as the make-or-buy decision), only one of them, production costs, is always given 
more consideration. Production costs are directly measured by calculating direct and 
indirect labour, materials, and allocatable utilities; transaction costs. on the other hand. 
are typically assessed indirectly by measuring the degree of asset specificity and 
uncertainty associated with the buyer-provider contract for the production of the product 
or the provision of the service. 
Because the evaluation of production costs is relatively clear and relates directly to the 
economic value of an outsourcing decision, it is likely that the they would consistently be 
part of the rules guiding the decision-making process. In contrast, because of the 
vagueness with which administrative costs associated with a transaction may be measured. 
transaction costs are not likely to be considered explicitly in every outsourcing decision, 
although in many cases decision-makers may take into account the implications that a 
relatively high level of uncertainty and asset specificity have for current and future 
contracting with providers. While production costs are always important in any business 
decision, managers should also consider transaction costs in conjunction with the decision. 
Organisations that continue to outsource functions based solely on production costs will 
eventually fail. 
The transaction cost economics approach introduces a number of variables that 
organisations, most of the times, tend to neglect when they consider outsourcing, like for 
example, the notion of small-numbers bargaining. Williamson claims that an outsourcing 
arrangement whose original terms were negotiated in an environment of large numbers 
_ýý_ 
competition is transformed during its implementation to one where small numbers 
bargaining is inevitable at the stage of contract renewal. Small numbers bargaining along 
with the related concept of asset specificity will provide the external provider with added 
bargaining power during contract renewal. Such a situation naturally offers great scope for 
opportunism when renegotiating a new contract. This would occur particularly if the 
winner of the initial contract benefited from learning-by-doing during its execution and 
was able to appropriate those benefits, enabling him to compete advantageously when 
terms for a new contract are negotiated. 
If this is the case, the outside provider is in a quite privileged position. Even if the buyer 
discovers that his provider's quality of service is worsening, he/she may be reluctant not to 
renew the contract because he/she is set up to deal with that particular service provider. 
After providing the service for a while, the provider should have gained considerable 
experience, knowledge of the organisational culture and other skills the buyer cannot 
simply hire from another provider. So, the buyer is more or less trapped into a situation 
where there is no easy way out. 
Williamson's model of transaction cost analysis is illustrated in a simplified form by 
Reilly and Tamkin (1996) in their book "Outsourcing: A Flexible Option For The Future". 
The two authors argue that, although this analysis is more appropriate to manufacturing 
choice, it is in fact equally applicable to the decision to acquire or provide all goods and 
services externally or internally. 
- 
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Diagram 2.2: Williamson's Model of Transaction Cost Analysis 
Asset Specificity 
v Occasional 
O 
r 
Frequent 
N 
Low Asset Specificity High Asset Specificity 
Outsource Outsource 
Outsource Insource 
Uncertainty 
Outsourcing would be favoured when: 
9 Asset specificity is low, irrespective of the degree of uncertainty and frequency of the 
transaction (This is shown in the diagram by the top-left-corner and the bottom-left- 
corner boxes). Under these circumstances buyers benefit from the inherently lower 
production costs of the supplier. Suppliers enjoy lower production costs due to 
smoother production schedules and greater economies of scale. If the provider fails to 
deliver the promised quality of service, the client can always switch to another service 
provider because the task is not that specific. As a result, the threat of using an 
alternative provider should keep opportunism under control. Whether the task is 
regular or not is irrelevant, because either way production costs are relatively low 
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compared to internal arrangements. Similarly uncertainty can be managed because 
adaptation is easily made for a specific product or service. 
" Asset specificity is high and the transaction takes place occasionally (Shown in the 
diagram by the right-top-corner box). Production costs will be high if done in-house 
because of the infrequency. For example adding an internal auditor with specialised 
skills to the permanent staff is not always a realistic option for an organisation. 
especially if they are to use this auditor only a couple of weeks each year. Outside 
suppliers, on the other hand, can afford to have a an expert because they can use him 
for other assignments throughout the year. 
Insourcing would be favoured when: 
" Asset specificity is high, the transaction is frequent and subject to high uncertainty 
(Shown in the diagram by the right-bottom-corner box). The production cost advantage 
of the external provider decreases as assets become progressively more specific. 
Therefore, as assets become more fully specialised to a single use or user. and 
consequently less transferable to other uses and users, economies of scale can be as 
fully realised when a firm operates the asset under its own roof as when its services are 
obtained externally by contract. Coming back to the example of the internal auditor 
with the specialised skills, if this auditor is needed on a more regular basis it might 
cost the company the same or even less to have him on its permanent staff rather than 
to obtain his services from outside, therefore in this case insourcing is preferred. 
Uncertainty is also important especially if future situations are complex or hard to 
anticipate, because of opportunism. 
- 
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Despite the fact that Williamson overall favours vertical integration (something that 
`Toc 
against the whole point of outsourcing), his work is relevant to outsourcing research. In 
particular, it is important to acknowledge and appreciate Williamson's introduction of 
useful concepts such as asset specificity, small-numbers bargaining and his overall 
contribution to the development of the transaction cost economics approach. 
2.9 The Criticism 
The transactions cost economic approach has been recently rather extensively debated and 
criticised by both economists and sociologists. According to Perrow (1986), not all 
transaction costs are counted in Williamson's argument. Williamson said that minimising 
transaction costs is the key to efficiency and this could only be achieved by buying out the 
person you sell to or by buying out your supplier, in other words you should vertically 
integrate. However, he has never mentioned that there are large costs in acquiring even 
small firms, and he also failed to recognise that internal co-ordinating costs rise when 
different operations must be combined and that flexibility in response to changes is greatly 
reduced. Furthermore, uncertainty affects internalised units as severely as it affects 
independent firms in the market; fluctuation in demand and supply, labour problems. 
problems with competitors, and so on do not disappear, and their resolution may be more 
difficult in a large hierarchical firm. Opportunism, to the extent that it is a problem. will 
also accompany the acquired firm. Costs that could be externalised and risks that could be 
borne by the independent firm must now be internalised by the acquiring firm, and the 
-56- 
'A 
acquiring firm may have less flexibility in dealing with these problems because of long- 
term commitments and the power of groups with specific assets within the firm. 
According to the transaction costs theory, an organisation that outsources specialised 
products/services which are considered to be strategically important to that firm's primary 
operations, and which might be subject to economies of scale, is surrendering power to the 
contractor, making itself vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour. The theory predicts that 
these are precisely the activities that are most likely to be vertically integrated 
- 
in other 
words, conducted in-house 
- 
rather than outsourced. However, Harrison and Kelley (1993) 
argue that in an era of intense global competition (and therefore of cost-consciousness). 
the organisation that contracts-out gains numerical flexibility by reducing fixed and quasi- 
fixed costs, a benefit which, from a strategic perspective, may outweigh the risks of 
opening itself to opportunistic behaviour by its specialised external provider. Harrison and 
Kelley (1993) criticise Williamson further for ignoring the learning effects thought to be 
associated with an establishment's tapping into a network of highly technically qualified 
suppliers. By vertically integrating to avoid potential opportunism, an establishment may 
inadvertently forego access to potentially important information embedded in the 
outsourcing network. 
Other critics, including Thompson et al (1991), also claim that, overall. the transactions 
cost approach is vague, even ill defined, and that there is little, if any. empirical evidence 
that economising on transaction costs is a good explanation of, or even, a dominating 
motive for, vertical integration. Finally, the assumption in the transactions cost model that 
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mankind is basically opportunistic, with guile and deceit, has been questioned. from both 
an empirical and a moral point of view. Sociologists, in particular, point out that economic 
relationships also contain elements of mutual trust and exchange of a social and cultural 
kind. 
It has to be said that although Williamson's work has contributed immensely towards a 
better understanding of the issues involving transactions across a market framework, he 
has nevertheless made a number of assumptions, particularly about how the various actors 
behave, which are questionable in some respects. Specifically. when talking about market 
arrangements and opportunism it is important to add that it is not just the outside service 
provider who might behave in an opportunistic way. A large client-organisation can 
equally act in a quite opportunistic manner which might suit their own purposes. This sort 
of exploitation can be found in cases where there is a small number of buyers of a product 
or a service. Furthermore, certain important decisions cannot be reduced to cost 
assumptions 
- 
transaction and production 
- 
alone. Factors like the prevailing culture of an 
organisation can influence judgements and eventually affect the way decisions are taken. 
Most importantly, however, is that Williamson's work ignores the knowledge to be gained 
that a client-organisation stands to benefit from if it was to entrust the provision of a 
specific service to the capable hands of a reputable provider. Having to vertically integrate 
in an effort to avoid the potential drawbacks associated with opportunism. can deny the 
organisation the chance to benefit from access to potentially important new industry 
knowledge and up-to-date techniques which can be usually found embedded in most of the 
specialised outside providers. 
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2.10 Core Activities and Core Competencies 
In their efforts to streamline operations, managers are dismantling bureaucracies and 
questioning the benefits of vertical integration. One alternative is a strategy that focuses 
internal operations on a small set of critical `core activities' 
- 
the functional areas of a 
business that make it stand out and give it an advantage over its competitors. According to 
Saunders et al (1997), "these activities evolve slowly through collective learning and 
information sharing, they cannot be quickly enhanced through additional large 
investments, and they cannot be easily imitated or transferred to other. s. A core activitvv is 
one of a limited number of functions that provides a strategic advantage to the company 
Alexander and Young (1996) suggest four different meanings for what actually constitutes 
a `core activity': 
1. An activity traditionally performed internally with long-standing precedent. 
2. An activity critical to business performance 
3. An activity creating current or potential competitive advantage. 
4. An activity that will drive the future growth, motivation or rejuvenation of the 
enterprise. 
One of the consequences of defining an organisation's core activities or competencies is 
the re-examination of the functioning of those activities outside that core. This has led to 
the concept of outsourcing. The main objective is to focus on the core activities and let 
other businesses provide the non-core activities. According to Hinton (1996) 'non-core' Is 
whatever does not contribute directly to creating a product or delivering a service; is 
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repetitive with low decision-making; and requires a level of constant. cost-efticicnt 
service. Any outsourcing decision if it is to be successful. should be treated strategicall`-. 
This basically implies an extensive understanding of the core activities and core 
competencies on which the organisation intends to build its future competitive advantage. 
The customary tactic is that organisations should never consider outsourcing their core 
activities. Outsourcing should in fact focus on areas far removed from those activities. 
Naturally, as outsourcing decisions come closer to the organisation's core activities, the 
strategic risk increases considerably. Placing critical core activities in the hands of an 
outside service provider can lead to an unhealthy balance of power and, worse still, it can 
leave an organisation vulnerable to market failure. On the contrary, Alexander and Young 
(1996) claim that while organisations may not wish to outsource all activities which are 
core to their primary business, they may decide that at least some of them would be better 
off this way. In reality, only a small number of organisations will simultaneously gain 
advantage in all, even most, core activities. By specialising in a few, they may increase 
their chances of building real advantage there. 
The basic ideas behind core competencies and outsourcing have been well supported by 
research extending over a number of years. Both theorists and analysts have defended the 
idea of more focused organisational concepts, also known as `sticking to your knitting'. 
Some of the most prevalent theories that are extensively used in order to illustrate the link 
between non-core activities and outsourcing are discussed in detail below. 
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2.10.1 The `Shamrock' Organisation: In his book The Age of Unreason'. Charles 
Handy considers outsourcing to be neither desirable nor necessary but simply a fact. The 
main causes that he advances are the increasingly rapid change, improved information 
technology, increased competition and above all the high recessionary pressures. The 
overall result is the shamrock organisation, named after the three-leafed clover. The 
shamrock is the Irish national emblem and it is used symbolically to make the point that 
the organisation of today is made up of three very different groups of people, groups with 
different expectations, that are managed differently, paid differently, and organised 
differently. The first leaf represents the professional core. These are the people -w ho are 
essential to the organisation. Between them they own the organisational knowledge which 
distinguishes that organisation from its counterparts. All non-essential work, work which 
could be performed by someone else, is therefore sensibly outsourced to people who make 
a speciality of it and who should, in theory, be able to do it better at a lower cost. This is 
the second leaf. In the third leaf of the shamrock are all the part-time and temporary 
workers who contribute to the production or sale of the good or service the shamrock 
creates. They handle the off-hours and seasonal surge leads no one can afford to 
accommodate through permanent staffing. In Handy's structure, this third leaf also 
includes the increasing number of professionals who work from their homes, connected to 
the main organisation by computer. 
2.10.2 The `Doughnut' Principle: The doughnut principle was once more developed by 
Charles Handy in his book The Empty Raincoat'. According to this principle, the heart of 
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the doughnut, the core (Shown in Diagram 2.3), contains all the things which have to be 
done in that job if the organisation is not to fail. 
Diagram 2.3: The `Doughnut' Principle 
Source: Harris, P. (1995) Outsourcing. Management Accounting, March, p. 30. 
Over the years, organisations as well as individuals have come to realise that they have 
their essential core, a core of necessary jobs and necessary people, a core which is 
surrounded by an open flexible space which they will fill with flexible outsourcing 
contracts (A-E represent pockets of non-core activity which are outsourced by the 
organisation). Work itself, is no longer organised as it used to be. The vertically integrated 
organisation, one which wanted to own and run the whole of its doughnut, is a thing of the 
past. Organisations are not now drawn as pyramids of boxes. Handy (1994) claims that 
British steel is said once to have had an organisational chart which, when unfolded. 
stretched across a room. The new shape of work will centre around small organisations 
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with a small core of key people and activities, and a collection of outsourcing contracts in 
the space around the core. 
2.10.3 The `Flexible Firm': Atkinson's model of the flexible firm, gained a prominent 
role in the 1980s as one of the most influential contributions to the deployment of 
`flexibility' as a new strategy for labour utilisation. Because during the 1980s firms found 
themselves under severe pressure to achieve greater control over labour costs, they took 
the decision to concentrate all their efforts in assembling a workforce which could react 
swiftly, easily and cheaply to unforeseen changes. In other words, a workforce that could 
contract as smoothly as it could expand, in which worked time matched precisely job 
requirements, and finally, in which unit labour costs could be held down. A key aspect or 
the desire for flexibility has been the development of a series of measures in order to offer 
employers flexibility over the number of staff which they employ, a particularly relevant 
concern in financial services where staff salaries are by far the biggest part of the 
industry's running costs. According to Clutterbuck (1985), the model of the flexible firm 
suggests that the firm is flexible in terms of its adaptability to expansion, contraction or 
change in the product market. According to Atkinson (1984), firms are really looking for 
three different kinds of 'flexibility': 
1. Functional flexibility: Under this form of flexibility employees can be redeployed 
quickly and smoothly between activities and tasks. As products and production 
methods alter, functional flexibility implies that the same labour force changes 
accordingly with them, in both the short- and medium-term. 
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2. Numerical flexibility: This form of flexibility allows the number of people employed at 
any given time to be quickly and easily increased or decreased in line with even 
temporary changes in the level of demand for labour. The end result would be that the 
number of people employed/working exactly matches the number needed. 
3. Financial flexibility (also known as wage flexibilitl): With this kind of flexibility- the 
organisation attempts to link wage payments to productivity and product demand. 
Benson and Ieronimo (1996) claim that outsourcing contributes to all three of the above 
kinds of flexibility. More precisely, tasks undertaken are contract- and not craft-related. 
worker numbers can be adjusted to the production requirements, and finally payment is 
made only to work completed. 
Diagram 2.4: The `Flexible Firm' 
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Source: Atkinson, J. (1984) Manpower Strategies for Flexible Organisations. Personnel 
Management, August, p. 28. 
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The model of the flexible firm above. involves the dismantling of the hierarchical structure 
of the firm in such a way that radically different employment policies can be pursued for 
different groups of workers. The new divisions are based on the separation of jobs which 
are specific to a particular firm from those involving only general skills. The new structure 
involves the division of the labour force into the following four groups: 
1. Core group: The workers belonging to this group are full-time permanent employees. 
Their employment security is gained at the expense of accepting functional flexibility 
both in the short-term (involving cross-trade working, reduced demarcation, and multi- 
discipline project teams) as well as in the long-term (changing career, retraining c. t. c. ). 
The terms and conditions of their employment are designed to promote functional 
flexibility. The most important characteristic of this group is that their skills cannot 
readily be obtained from outside the organisation. 
2. First peripheral group: As with workers belonging to the core group. workers 
belonging to this group are also full-time employees. However, they enjoy less job 
security and less access to career opportunities. In effect they are offered a job, not a 
career. The firm turns to the external labour market to fill these jobs. and seeks to 
achieve both numerical and financial flexibility through a more direct and immediate 
link to the external labour market than is sought for the core group. Functional 
flexibility is not desired and, because these jobs tend to be less skilled, little training or 
retraining is required. 
ý. Second peripheral group. If the firm needs to supplement the numerical flexibility of 
the first peripheral group with some functional flexibility. then a second peripheral 
group can be distinguished. They are on contracts of employment designed to combine 
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the two. Part-time working is the best example of this, the jobs having all the 
characteristics of those in the first peripheral group. with their deployment often 
structured to match changing business needs. Job sharing. short-term contracts, public 
subsidy trainees and recruitment through temporary contracts all perform a similar 
function 
- 
maximising flexibility while minimising commitment to the worker, job 
security and career development. 
4. External groups: Where jobs are not at all firm-specific because. for example. they are 
very specialised (e. g. systems analysis) or trivial (e. g. office cleaning and catering), 
firms are increasingly likely to resource them outside, through the use of 
subcontracting, outsourcing, temporary help agencies, and self-employed jobbers. I'his 
not only permits greater numerical flexibility (the firm deciding precisely ho« much of 
a particular service it may need at any time), but it also encourages greater functional 
flexibility than direct employment (as a result of the greater specialisation of the 
external service provider). 
So, under this organisational model, the labour force is split into peripheral, and therefore 
numerically flexible, groups of workers assembled around a numerically stable core group 
of skilled employees with access to a primary labour market. This privileged core group of 
employees will perform the organisations' key firm-specific activities. By contrast, the 
peripheral' workers are less central to the firm's primary activities, therefore they can be 
more easily recruited from the open labour market. At the core the emphasis is on 
functional flexibility whereas at the periphery numerical flexibility is far more important. 
As the market grows, the periphery expands to absorb the extra work and as the growth 
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slows down the periphery contracts. At the core the workers are isolated from possible 
medium-term fluctuations of the market, whereas those in the periphery are more exposed 
to them. 
Considerable debate has centred around the existence of the so-called 'flexible firm', and 
Atkinson's model has come under a considerable amount of criticism. Most commentators 
mention the lack of empirical evidence supporting the existence of the flexible firm. They 
claim that the studies undertaken by Atkinson did not use a statistically representative 
sample of firms. In fact the firms that made up the sample were chosen "because they 
were known to have introduced changes to work organisation specifically to promote 
flexibility, or because they represented clear examples of flexibility already, achieved " 
(Poliert, 1988, p. 285). 
Poliert (1988), in particular, criticises the model for being conceptually weak and 
unsupported by empirical evidence. She also points out that the model is rarely. if ever. 
encountered in the real world. John Maclnnes (1988) shares a similar view with Poliert. 
He argues that there are two main problems with the flexibility model. Firstly, the 
empirical evidence for the actual spread of the flexible firm is unconvincing and secondly. 
it is not clear why firms should develop in the way the model suggests. Despite the debates 
that centre around the model as a whole, it is apparent that particular features that it 
incorporates have become more prominent in recent years with most notable the trend 
towards outsourcing. 
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2.10.4 Value Chain: Every organisation is more or less a collection of activities that are 
performed to design, produce, market. deliver. and support its product or service. All these 
activities can be represented using a model that has been developed by Michael Porter 
(1985) known as the value chain. The value chain consists of value activities and margin. 
Value activities are the physically and technologically distinct activities a firm performs. 
These are the building blocks by which a firm creates a product valuable to its buyers. 
Margin is the difference between total value (total value = total revenue) and the collective 
cost of performing the value activities. 
Diagram 2.5: The Value Chain 
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Source: Johnson, G. & Scholes, K. (1993). Exploring Corporate Strategy. Hertfordshire, 
UK: Prentice Hall International, p. 121. 
Value activities can be divided into two broad types, primary activities and support 
activities. Primary activities are the activities involved in the physical creation of the 
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product (or service) and its sale and transfer to the buyer as well as after-sale assistance. In 
any firm, the primary activities can be divided into the five generic categories. On the 
other hand, support activities support the primary activities and each other. The dotted 
lines reflect the fact that procurement, technology development, and human resource 
management can be associated with specific primary activities as «-ell as support the entire 
chain. Firm infrastructure, unlike other support activities, is not associated with particular 
primary activities but supports the entire chain. Although firm infrastructure is sometimes 
considered to be an `overhead', it can be a powerful source of competitive advantage. 
Recognising one's core activities and focusing all the firm's resources on it is the first step 
on the road to success. A firm must carefully examine every activity to see whether it adds 
to the value chain. If it does not, it becomes a good candidate for outsourcing. 
Unfortunately, determining what are the company's core competencies and core activities 
can sometimes be quite a tricky process, and a wrong guess fatal for the organisation. As 
work becomes more complex, and the opportunities to excel in many detailed activities 
diminishes, managers find that they cannot be best at every activity in the value chain. 
Most organisations target two or three (not one and rarely four) activities in the value 
chain most critical to future success. As they go beyond three to four activities, they are 
unable to match the performance of their more focused direct competitors. 
Today, some outside suppliers, by specialising in the specific skills and technologies 
underlying a single element in the value chain, can become more proficient at the activity 
than virtually any organisation spreading its efforts over the whole value chain. In essence. 
-69- 
each organisation is in constant competition with all potential suppliers of each activity in 
its value chain. Hence, it must benchmark its selected core competencies against all other 
suppliers of that activity and continue to build these core capabilities until it is 
demonstrably best. 
According to James Quinn (1992), if one is not `best in the world' at a critical activity, the 
organisation is sacrificing competitive advantage by performing that activity internally. 
This dictates that managers should consider each activity in their value chain on a "make- 
or-buy" basis and seriously consider outsourcing the activity when the organisation itself 
cannot internally achieve `best in the world' status. 'Nike', for example, the world's 
largest athletic shoe firm does not make shoes! Nike's success is attributed to its superior 
product design and marketing. But Nike must also be credited with realising that its 
strength did not lie in manufacturing, which it has outsourced to other firms. Nike seeks to 
provide its greater value at the pre-production (research and development) and post- 
production (marketing, distribution, and sales) levels, outsourcing the whole of its 
footwear manufacturing to numerous companies abroad. 
2.11 Is Outsourcing Necessary ? 
Over the last few years, many articles have been written and published about outsourcing. 
an issue which, in many cases, has been fiercely debated. It is only natural for those in 
favour to be highly enthusiastic and want to implement it in a variety of management 
roles. Quinn and Hilmer (1995), for example, are among those who are broadly favouring 
-70- 
outsourcing as a strategic response to increased competition. They claim that most 
organisations can substantially leverage their resources through strategic outsourcing by: 
First, developing a set of carefully-selected core competencies of significance to customers 
and in which the organisation can be best-in-the-world; second. focusing investment and 
management attention on them; and finally, strategically outsourcing many other activities 
for which the firm has neither a critical strategic need nor special capabilities. 
A similar view is expressed by Jennings (1996) who declares that outsourcing is a strategic 
development which is made more urgent by increasing competitive pressures and 
uncertainty. According to the author, adopting outsourcing can lead to a number of 
benefits including reduced costs, economies of scale, access to complementary resources, 
and increased flexibility. Hinton (1996) claims that among the benefits attributed to 
outsourcing are improved cash flow through tighter control over expenditure; decreased 
costs; measurable high service quality; increased flexibility through access to more varied 
skills; faster development of new procedures and practices, and finally greater strategic 
focus. 
On the other hand, some sceptics warn that organisations relying heavily on outsourcing 
invite a disastrous loss of competitiveness. Among the increasing number of those who 
claim that outsourcing can seriously undermine competitiveness, are Prahalad and Hamel 
(1990), who point out that the skills that give rise to the next generation of core 
competencies cannot be `rented in' by outsourcing. Their argument is that core 
competencies must be nurtured and protected over time for competitive success. 
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Competencies are the glue that ties together existing businesses and the engine for new 
business development. The two authors firmly conclude that "too many companic. 5 hale' 
unwittingly surrendered core competencies when they cut internal investment in what they 
mistakenly thought were just `cost centers' in favor of outside suppliers " (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990. p. 84). 
Similarly, Bettis, Bradley, and Hamel (1992) concluded that the improper use of 
outsourcing is playing an important role in the continuing competitive decline of many 
Western firms. They further argue that outsourcing decisions, taken by Western managers, 
tend to be incremental. "A whole series of incremental outsourcing decisions, taken 
individually, may make eminent economic sense, but collectively may also rcprescnt, in 
effect, the surrender of the business capability to compete" (Bettis, Bradley. and Hamel, 
1992, p. 12). In effect creating the `hollow corporation', an organisation that no longer has 
the ability to sustain its own distinguishing core technological capabilities. 
Troubled firms with financial problems often consider outsourcing to be the most 
appropriate solution to their problems. Hoewing (1992), however, maintains that caution 
must be taken not to outsource tasks as a last resort. Outsourcing tasks in an effort to 
salvage a financially unstable corporation seldom works. In other words, if the case is 
more or less hopeless, even resorting to outside expertise is unlikely to yield positive 
results. In many cases, the decision to outsource a particular function is taken too hastily 
by the chief executive officer or by the chief financial officer and is speedily approved by 
an over-enthusiastic board of directors. Willis (1996), however, claims that the 
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implementation of an outsourcing decision should be an unhurried process and should 
more or less resemble the building of a house. The organisation can start right in. pouring 
concrete and framing the walls just to get a roof over their head. Alternatively, they can 
take the time to make a detailed plan that spells out exactly what is required and how to 
-o 
about creating it. Only by putting in the time up front can they truly get the result they 
want. 
In the long term, McCune (1993) argues that, although outsourcing may give organisations 
the flexibility to react quickly to changing market conditions or to take advantage of new 
opportunities, it may not necessarily be the best strategy for every function. Outsourcing 
allows organisations to grow without investing in fixed assets 
- 
whether equipment, plants 
or personnel 
- 
but the strategy needs to be constantly re-evaluated. As time goes by and as 
sales and cash flow increases, however, it may make more economic sense to bring certain 
functions back in-house. 
2.12 The Reasons for Outsourcing 
According to Michael Corbet (1996) of the Outsourcing Institute in New York, 
organisations outsource for basically two reasons. The first reason is tactical. They want to 
see immediate benefit and save money. The second reason is strategic. They are turning to 
outsourcing so that they can focus on what really differentiates them from their 
competitors, not just to save costs. The first five reasons discussed below are tactical. and 
the second five are strategic: 
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2.12.1 The Top Five Tactical Reasons for Outsourcing: 
Reason 1- Function Difficult to Manage or Out of Control: Outsourcing is certainly one 
way of offloading such function. Outsourcing does not. however. mean complete 
relinquishment of management responsibility by companies in trouble. If the organisation 
collapses the directors will still be held responsible. 
Reason 2- Resources Not Available Internally: Organisations outsource because they do 
not have access to the required resources in-house. Through outsourcing, a business owner 
can gain access to highly specialised, sophisticated services without having to add to the 
payroll or be obliged to use the specialist for a long time. Especially where the required 
resources would otherwise need to be built from scratch, outsourcing becomes a viable and 
attractive alternative. 
Reason 3- Reduce And Control Operating Costs: Outsourcing often reduces operating 
costs, mainly because outside providers of a single type of service have a lower cost 
structure gained from economies of scale. The practice also turns fixed costs into variable 
ones that can more easily be reduced when necessary, helping small organisations keep 
their cost structures in line with the ups and downs of their business. 
Reason 4- Cash Infusion: Outsourcing often involves the transfer of assets from the 
customer to the provider. Facilities, equipment, and licenses used in the current operations 
all have a value and are, in fact, sold to the vendor. The vendor then uses these assets to 
provide services back to the client and, frequently, to other clients. 
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Reason 5- Make Capital Funds Available: Outsourcing is a way to reduce the need to 
invest capital in non-core business functions. Because capital is not tied up in secondary 
functions, it is more readily available for investment in core areas of the business. 
2.12.2 The Top Five Strategic Reasons for Outsourcing: 
Reason 1- Free Resources For Other Purposes: Every organisation has limits on the 
resources available to it. The constant challenge is to ensure that its limited resources are 
expended in the most valuable areas. Outsourcing permits an organisation to redirect its 
resources from non-core activities toward more value-adding activities. 
Reason 2- Share Risks: Organisations are often keen to `lay off risk' to their suppliers. 
There are huge risks associated with the investments an organisation makes. When 
organisations outsource they become more flexible, more dynamic, and better able to 
change themselves to meet the changing opportunities. It is possibly not too far-fetched to 
suggest that after a significant amount of outsourcing, the manageability of an organisation 
would improve, in other words, it would be easier for an organisation to change direction 
or embark on a new initiative. 
Reason 3- Accelerate Reengineering Benefits: Outsourcing is often a by-product of 
another powerful management tool which will be discussed later on - business process 
reengineering. It allows an organisation to immediately realise the anticipated benefits of 
Teengineering by having an outside organisation 
- 
one that is already reengineered - take 
over the process. 
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Reason 4- Access to World Class Capabilities: Employing the sen-ices of a world-class 
provider can offer the following advantages: 
" Access to new techniques that the organisation may not currently possess. 
" Avoidance of the training costs associated with each new generation. 
" Better career opportunities for personnel who move to the outsourcing provider. 
Reason 5- Improve Company Focus: Outsourcing allows organisations to focus their 
resources and efforts on a set of core activities while having operational details assumed 
by an outside expert. By limiting or getting rid of those activities where it can develop no 
strategic advantage 
- 
and where it is generally much weaker than the best outside sources 
- 
an organisation can increase the value it delivers. 
While all of the above reasons might be seen as the main driving force behind the decision 
to outsource a function such as information technology, not all these reasons apply in the 
case of outsourcing the internal audit function. Of course an organisation could outsource 
the internal audit function either because the necessary `resources are not available 
internally' in order to cope, for example, with the volume of work to be done or even in 
some cases so that to `reduce and control operating costs'. However, one should not expect 
the management of any organisation to outsource the internal audit function in order to 
share risk' with a third party or even to `free resources for other purposes'. These reasons 
do not apply because for one neither the directors nor the management of an organisation 
can share the risk or outsource the duty of being fully informed about significant issues 
affecting the organisation. If the organisation collapses, management will still be held 
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responsible simply because the ultimate responsibility for corporate governance. which 
includes accounting controls and internal auditing, cannot be completely ceded. Nor will 
the outsourcing of the internal audit function bring along any substantial financial benefits 
such as capital investment funds and cash infusions. 
Harrison and Kelley (1993) made an attempt to examine the reasons why the management 
of an organisation with the actual or potential capacity to engage in a specific 
production/service activity within its own facilities, resort to outsourcing'? In order to give 
an answer to their question, they suggested three distinctly different management 
rationales for outsourcing: 
Reason 1- Capacity Outsourcing: It refers to the situation in which an organisation 
experiences periodic product (or service) demand that exceeds its current capacity to fulfil 
in a timely fashion. As a result, management turns to an outside source in order to 
temporarily supplement existing capacity. 
Reason 2- Specialisation Outsourcing: It refers to the situation in which a particular 
aspect of production (or service) may require the use of specialised equipment or skills 
that the specific department does not have in-house. The organisation may have the 
financial capacity to employ the necessary expertise on a permanent basis 
- 
which would 
not in any case be central to the main mission of this particular department 
- 
but this is not 
attempted for strategic reasons, for example because it might distract managers from 
focusing on more important problems. Instead, management decides to outsource this 
work. 
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Reason 3- Cost-Cutting Outsourcing: It refers to the situation in which the management 
of an organisation engages into outsourcing in order to reduce costs. Other firms can 
perform the same job more cheaply, either because they can employ workers at lower 
wages or because they have more efficient technology with which to do the work at lower 
COSt. 
Although nobody can dispute the fact that outsourcing can reduce production costs, 
organisations need to consider seriously Williamson's arguments about transaction costs. 
It might be the case that the transaction costs associated with finding a suitable provider, 
negotiating an agreement with him, and constantly monitoring his performance might be 
too high and consequently it might make more sense to keep the service in-house rather 
than to outsource it to a specialised provider. When considering outsourcing as an 
alternative option, it is important to have in mind that one size does not fit all. 
Management requirements are not the same in all organisations or even within an industry. 
Petrick (1996) claims that the amount of outsourcing appropriate for each organisation 
depends mainly on in-house capabilities, current capacity, future workload, the focus 
necessary, time lines, specific expertise needed to achieve the desired outcome, and of 
course, the budget. 
According to Raynor (1992), The most significant advantage of outsourcing may well rest 
with the fact that most organisations' support services are an overhead. Typically. 
organisations neither understand how support services work, not regard it highly enough to 
make the investment in time and money necessary to make it cost-effective and 
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productive. In contrast, for specialised providers, providing such services is their main 
focus of business. Consequently, there is an incentive for those providers to invest in 
people through training. The result is the development of a team of highly skilled. 
motivated individuals who have a stake in making services pay. 
Despite all the pluses, outsourcing can have a number of drawbacks. Loss of control has 
always been one of the main concerns. When an organisation relies on an outside vendor 
for a service or product, then it has much less control over how that particular service or 
product is delivered than if it was to perform the function for itself. Retaining direct 
control of the function in-house offers managers much needed psychological comfort. 
Another potential drawback is the damage incurred by a firm that becomes overly 
dependent on its outsourcing service provider. There can be worries that the outsourcing 
service provider may effectively become part of the core. The flexibility, which was the 
point of Handy's doughnut structure, disappears if the firm becomes dependent on a single 
provider. Furthermore, poor communication and inadequate cost reduction top the 
concerns. In general, handled improperly, outsourcing will more than likely waste a 
company's time, effort, and money. 
2.13 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) and Downsizing 
When an organisation embarks on outsourcing spree, it must do so in conjunction with re- 
engineering of its business processes, and not as a simple cost-cutting measure. In fact, 
managers who look to outsourcing for cost reduction alone are missing the point. 
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Introduced in the late 1980s, Business Process Reengineering has been gaining momentum 
ever since as organisations identify ways to provide quality products and services with 
fewer resources. As a result, organisations are aggressively eliminating activities perceived 
to add little or no value. BPR is defined as "the fundamental rethinking and radical 
redesign of * business process to achieve dramatic improvements in critical measures of 
performance such as cost, quality, service, or speed" (Hammer and Champy. 1995, p. 32). 
Practically every aspect of the organisation is transformed, often beyond recognition. 
Hence, BPR is about fundamental, not superficial change. 
Fundamental changes in business processes have implications for every part and aspect of 
an organisation. When a process is reengineered, jobs evolve from narrow and task- 
oriented to multi-dimensional. Empowerment is one of the unavoidable consequences of 
reengineering. People who once did as they were instructed they are now both permitted 
and required to think, interact, use judgement, and make decisions on their own. As a 
result, reengineering and its consequent empowerment have powerful implications for the 
kinds of people organisations will hire. It is no longer enough merely to look at 
prospective employees' education, training, and skills; their character becomes an issue as 
well. 
As work becomes more multi-dimensional with reengineering, it also becomes more 
substantive. Reengineering eliminates not just waste but non-value-adding work as well. 
Most of the checking, reconciling, monitoring, and tracking - the unproductive work that 
exists because of boundaries within organisations 
- 
is eliminated. which means that people 
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will spend more time doing real work. Moreover. with reengineering work becomes more 
satisfying since workers achieve a greater sense of completion and accomplishment from 
their jobs. There is, however, a challenging side to all this good news about work in a 
reengineered environment. If jobs are more satisfying they are also more challenging and 
difficult. Few simple, routine, unskilled jobs are to be found in a reengineered 
environment. 
Downsizing is at the heart of the reengineering commitment to do more with less. Whereas 
BPR attempts to change the nature of the work, downsizing often means the same work is 
performed but with fewer people. Nonetheless, the two concepts have become hopelessly 
inter-linked over the last few years. The term `downsizing' has its roots in the computer 
industry. Downsizing, according to James (1996), meant replacing the corporate 
mainframe with a network of much cheaper mid-range computers or personal computers. 
Having downsized the Information Technology department, it was then easier for firms to 
downsize everything else. 
The question being increasingly asked, however, is whether addiction to downsizing is 
healthy for companies. Downsizing, also known as the equivalent of corporate anorexia, 
can make a company thinner; it does not necessarily make it healthier. The company can 
end up with lower overheads but a less efficient business. In fact, drastically altering an 
organisation's work force, in terms of numbers or job functions, can cause havoc in the 
organisation. 
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It is unfortunate that the terms outsourcing and downsizing are frequently used as 
synonyms. This is incorrect to say the least. Whereas outsourcing encompasses a change 
from an internal to an external employer, with occasionally a small reduction in staffing. 
downsizing involves primarily a substantial reduction in the total number of employees 
directly employed by an organisation at any one time. The confusion between downsizing 
and outsourcing is disturbingly common. Claims that firms are shrinking in order to 
concentrate on their core business serves to worsen this confusion. It is difficult to 
comprehend why reducing the number of employees through downsizing helps the 
organisation concentrate on its core business. In fact the same number of activities is 
undertaken as before, only now there are actually fewer personnel to carry out those 
activities. On the other hand, outsourcing does reduce the number of activities undertaken 
by the organisation, activities which remain essential to the value chain, but which are 
performed more efficiently outside. 
Downsizing sometimes results in losing the wrong people, who may take their experience 
and knowledge to a competitor. Middle managers have been the principal victims of 
downsizing initiatives. While many organisations had let go thousands of managers over 
the last ten years, few had followed these difficult layoffs with significant reengineering of 
their organisations. They changed the number of managers on board without considering 
the corresponding changes that needed to be made in how management work was actually 
done. While an organisation may not have to downsize if they reengineer, if they downsize 
without reengineering, they are asking for trouble. 
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2.14 The Cultural Implications of Outsourcing and the Impact on 
Employee Morale 
The process of outsourcing inevitably imposes a question of a change in the corporate 
culture. According to Harris (1995), the cultural implications of outsourcing are of 
considerable, and possibly of primary, importance since the main objective of a significant 
amount of outsourcing is to make the organisation smaller in size, as it focuses on core 
activities and lets contracts of packages of work to replace its non-core activities. Unless, 
however, the outsourcing service provider is willing to dedicate all of its time and effort to 
the same organisation for a substantial period of time, it will not be able to familiarise 
itself and gain the appropriate inside into the organisation and its culture. Naturally. the 
more an organisation outsources, the more difficult it will be to establish and cultivate a 
strong corporate culture that can hold a work force together. 
Organisational culture is defined by Jay Lorsch (1986) as the "... shared beliefs top 
managers in a company have about how they should manage themselves and other 
employees, and how they should conduct their business(es). These beliefs are often 
invisible to the top managers but have a major impact on their thoughts and actions ". 
Through the corporate culture, experiences are shared across the organisational spectrum 
and are carried forward from one generation of managers to the next. Culture is also the 
medium through which values are communicated through symbols, stories, routines and 
rituals. 
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The core of an organisation's culture is encapsulated in the paradigm of the or<(anisation. 
According to Johnson and Scholes (1993), the paradigm consists three lavers: 
1. Values may be easy to identify in an organisation, and are often %t-ritten down as 
statements about the organisation's mission, objectives or strategies. 
2. Beliefs are more specific, but again they are issues which people in the organisation 
can talk about. 
3. Assumptions are the real core of an organisation's culture. They are the aspects of 
organisational life which are taken for granted and which people find difficult to 
identify and explain 
Within a well-run organisation employees learn a great deal from their «orking 
environment, but what they learn is not just what is available in reports, manuals, memos, 
and responses as they travel up and down the corporate communication ladder. They learn 
from informal conversation and from shared-past knowledge and experience. This tends to 
depart when their department is outsourced. The inevitable gradual growth of a cultural 
divide reduces informal communication to a minimum. The outsourcing service providers, 
as it might be expected, insist that this is not the case. They argue that because of the so- 
called TUPE legislation (which will be discussed next) the same people are doing the same 
job and most of the times in precisely the same location. 
Evidence suggest that dissatisfaction, anxiety, and uncertainty are often the results of an 
outsourcing decision. For the affected employees, the prospect of outsourcing implies that 
the activity with which they have been associated is about to fall into the hands of a 'new 
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management', and even their own jobs may be on the line. This naturally will most of the 
times generate a feeling of anxiety among the employees. With it can `grow feelings of 
resentment and anger at the anticipated `unfair* treatment of staff. Organisations tend to 
evolve into communities, with strong social interactions between members which foster 
fellowship and solidarity. When a member group from such a community is perceived to 
be threatened by potentially adverse changes, its fellow employees may rally to the cause. 
fostering their opposition to the proposed changes. This was what actually happened \vhen 
British Airways decided to outsource some of its activities. The airline encountered 
problems in their attempt to convince staff of the merits of their outsourcing plan and as a 
result a three-day strike was called on the 9"' of July 1997 
- 
the start of the peak summer 
travel season 
- 
which brought the airline, even one as powerful as BA, to its knees. 
When people change over a short period of time from being employees to being suppliers 
of a service their motivation and morale will inevitably suffer. undermining the overall 
success of the outsourcing relationship. They are no longer part of the corporate culture 
and as a result they might feel rejected and betrayed. John Hendry (1995) in fact argues 
that the moment an organisation changes its relationship with the providers of functional 
services from that of an employer to that of a contract customer, the moment the 
organisation even nominates some functions or activities as `non-core', it begins to isolate 
them from the culture. 
He claims that, "To be part of a tribal culture you have not only to live with the tribe and 
communicate regularly with its members, you also have to belong to it ". Even if they 
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continue to work, as the same people, on the same location, doing the same job. they are 
excluded from the core and they are no longer part of the tribe. Once they move off-site. 
and once the first generation of ex-employees are replaced by people who have never had 
any link with the organisation other than that of supplier and customer, they almost 
inevitably move out of the organisational culture. Of course. the new service suppliers will 
continue to have all the information they need to perform their job efficiently. What they 
will not have, however, is the more informal shared understanding and experience that 
goes with being an integral part of the organisation, and that is necessary to do a job 
effectively. 
Henderson (1997), maintains that not only the morale of those employees that are directly 
affected by an outsourcing initiative will suffer, but also the morale of those who are 
retained in the organisation. In fact, those employees that were not directly affected by the 
outsourcing decision might feel that their turn to be outsourced is not that far away and 
therefore they will start feeling uncertain and insecure about their own future. Insecurity 
and uncertainty, however, leads to distraction and errors. Henderson carries on by saying 
that apart from the need to treat outsourced staff in a fair, non-discriminatory way, it 
would be desirable to ensure that staff remaining within the organisation which has 
outsourced operation(s) are also treated in a way which recognises their moral rights. 
Unless clear and positive measures are taken in advance, remaining staff is likely to 
anticipate that further upheaval will occur and this will lead to the generation of feelings of 
distress and anxiety. 
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A strong corporate culture is critical for survival in today's complex, evolving. and highly 
unpredictable environment. It describes the essence of the organisation's character and 
therefore it cannot be ignored without a high cost. Naughton (1996). a critic of the trend, is 
worried that outsourcing could lead to increasingly fragmented work cultures in which 
lower-paid employees simply get the work done, with little initiative or enthusiasm. In fact 
he claims that: "A mercenary may shoot a gun the same as a soldier, but he it'll/ not create 
a revolution, build a new society, or die for the homeland" 
The arguments on whether outsourcing can actually have a negative cultural impact are at 
least open to challenge. On the one side there are those who believe that an outsourcing 
decision will make the development of a strong corporate culture almost impossible and 
will inevitably generate a feeling of anxiety and uncertainty among employees, and on the 
other side there are the service providers who claim that they always use specially- 
designed transition plans in order to minimise the impact on the culture and employees. 
The fact that outsourcing will have some impact on both the directly and indirectly 
affected employees should not be dismissed or underestimated. What must be carefully 
thought about, however, is how an outsourcing decision should be communicated to all the 
employees of the organisation in a way that addresses their concerns. Another factor to 
consider is how to develop a strong corporate culture while at the same time avoiding a 
cultural conflict since outsourcing implies that different people with different 
organisational backgrounds will be performing different activities in the same 
organisational environment. 
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2.15 The Legal Implications of Outsourcing 
The rights of employees in the vast majority of business transfers are protected by 
Regulations introduced as the result of EC legislation. By signing up to the 77/187/EEC 
Transfer of Undertakings (Acquired Rights) Directive in 1977. the British government, set 
in motion a series of events that could, more than twenty years later, cause a number of 
serious problems to both the private and the public sectors as far as outsourcing is 
concerned. The 1977 Directive introduced the principle that when a business is sold. 
employees should automatically transfer to the new owner along with the same basic 
rights and obligations (except for an equivalent pension entitlement), and may not be 
dismissed for reasons connected with the transfer (Shown in Diagram 2.6). If employees 
of the transferred business are dismissed the liability arising on their dismissal will fall on 
the new employer. It is also important to note that the Directive applies over more than 
one phase, so that the transfer of an activity from one contractor to another is covered. 
Similarly, insourcing arrangements are included, for example when an activity is brought 
back in-house from a contractor. 
Diagram 2.6: Consequences of a Transfer of an Undertaking 
Transfer of 
I Transferor (A) Undertakings 
Rights j Obligations 
Employees X+Y 
Transfer of Rights 
And Obligations 
Transferor (B) 
Same V1 Same 
Rights #4 Obligations 
Employees X+Y 
Source: Bernard, C. (1995) EC Employment Law. Colorado Springs. US: John Wile), & 
Sons, p. 336. 
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The importance of communication with employees regarding the implications arising from 
outsourcing initiatives cannot be overstated. In order both to warn the employees of what 
is to happen and to provide a degree of legitimation of managerial decision-making, 
Article 6 of the Directive requires information and consultation of workers' 
representatives. Article 6 provides that the transferor and the transferee must inform the 
representatives of their respective employees affected by a transfer of the following: 
9 the reasons for the transfer; 
9 the legal, economic, and social implications of the transfer for the employees: and 
" the measures envisaged in relation to the employees. 
Both the transferor and the transferee are obliged to give the information to the employees' 
representatives in `good time' but no specific time-limit is specified. Although the 
Directive does provide for an element of employee participation in commercial decisions, 
at least through their representatives, employees do not have the right to veto such 
decisions for fear that this would jeopardise any potential transfers. 
In the UK, the implementing law (the Transfer of Undertakings and Protection of 
Employment 
- 
TUPE) which was brought into force in 1981 to protect the rights of 
employees under transfers and business mergers, excluded the public sector. The European 
Commission, however, saw that as a failure to implement the Directive properly and 
consequently launched infraction proceedings against the UK government. After several 
legal dogfights and particularly the Dr Sophie Redmond v Bartol case of 1992 where it 
was recognised that the Directive can apply equally to transfers of parts of a business from 
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other non-commercial bodies such as local authorities, government departments. charities. 
and other non-profit making organisations, the European Court of Justice confirmed that 
the Directive applies in both the private and public sectors. UK law was as a result 
amended, via the 1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act (TURERA). to 
include public sector employees (Kobrin, 1993). Since the Redmond case. many UK 
public sector employees who have had their terms and conditions cut as a result of the 
contracting out of public services, are claiming retrospective damages. If any one lost 
his/her job in connection with the transfer, they can take the contractor to an industrial 
tribunal, where they can be awarded up to £ 16,000. 
According to Smith (1996), contractors can get rid of inefficient staff but only if they can 
prove that the redundancies have nothing to do with the outsourcing decision. All 
dismissals are automatically unfair if they are connected to the transfer, unless the 
employer can justify the decision on economic, technical or organisational grounds (the 
so-called ETO defence). The employer will probably have to show that the dismissals are 
necessary rather than merely desirable to ensure the well-being of the firm, and that they 
are designed to alter overall numbers and functions of employees not just be an incidental 
effect. The employer cannot justify redundancies on the basis that it improves the terms of 
the sale or transfer, but they may be able to prove that they are essential for the future 
success of the enterprise. 
If a transfer falls within the Directive's scope, the employees of the activity being 
transferred become employees of the new owners, bringing all their rights. porters. 
dutie. 
`. 
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and liabilities with them. This means that the contractor must honour all terms and 
conditions of employment, and deal with any outstanding claims. It is possible in theory 
that a new employer could inherit a claim for constructive dismissal or even a claim for 
sexual harassment. Furthermore, if TUPE applies, then there is limited choice as to who 
must transfer. Those staff who are working in the relevant section of the enterprise at the 
time of the transfer are required to change employer. Of course some employers might 
take into account, to some extent at least, of employee wishes for an alternative job 
(redeployment) or voluntary redundancy. If the employee is unhappy with this 
arrangement, the only alternative is to claim constructive dismissal by arguing that there is 
a substantive alteration to their working conditions which breaks the contract or 
alternatively that the change of employer is significant and to his/her detriment. If he, 'she 
cannot prove this detrimental impact, there is the opportunity introduced via II' IZERA to 
object and have his/her contract terminated by the transferee without any right to 
compensation. When, eventually, the initial outsourcing contract runs out, it is possible 
for another outside provider to take on the new contract. Under TUPE the people can 
transfer to the new provider if they wish to do so. Of course, there is every possibility that 
they may choose to stay on with the first provider. 
The fact that the contractor must take on all the employees of the firm that outsources the 
function has posed a number of problems because many contractors are in the business of 
finding work for their own employees without taking on more. Service providers that have 
considered taking on such outsourcing contracts now fear that they ýN-ill have no flexibility 
when it comes to staffing and inevitably they will have to absorb the costs of existing. 
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sometimes unwanted and inefficient, employees. Panic and terror has, as a result, ensued 
among potential outsourcing service providers. 
The debates on whether the original Directive could be applied more broadly than to 
purely commercial undertakings and what exactly constitutes a 'transfer'. forced the 
European Commission to propose a revised Directive. In January 1997, the Commission's 
proposal to revise the 1977 Directive by stating that transfer of undertakings legislation 
shall only apply when an `economic entity which retains its identity' is transferred, as 
opposed to an `activity', was rejected by the European Parliament. In February 1997, the 
Commission published a fresh proposal to amend the 1977 Directive which, however. 
preserves the original definition of a `transfer' 
Whether this judgement will deter contractors from bidding for both public- and private- 
sector work in the future remains to be seen. Moreover, how and in what extent did TU 11E 
affect any recent outsourcing decision is largely unknown. The fact that companies can 
now offload unproductive and unwanted employees through outsourcing and under the 
cover of TUPE without themselves suffering the painful and at times costly consequences 
(i. e. redundancies and litigation) might further influence their decision to consider 
outsourcing. If this is actually the case then the possibility of a sharp increase in the 
volume of outsourcing contracts in the very near future might be closer than it has been 
previously expected. The main question now, however, is for how long and ho«- many- 
outside service providers will be willing to take on-board such unproductive staff every 
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time they win an outsourcing contract. It is quite possible that in the future we will also 
witness a definite decrease in the number of specialised outsourcing service providers. 
2.16 Summary 
In times of rapidly growing markets, limited production capacity. and plenty of business 
for all new-comers, it made a lot of sense to put as many parts of the business as possible 
under one roof. This was the era of vertical integration. The key to economic success was 
owning as many of the resources and factors of production that went into the business as 
possible. Today, this era has ended for many industries. The reality that organisations have 
to confront nowadays is that the old ways of doing business simply do not work anymore. 
In today's environment, nothing is constant or predictable 
- 
not market growth. the rate of 
technological change, or the nature of competition. Suddenly. the world is a different 
place. Few corporate activities can expect to remain untouchable in this era of downsizing 
and business process reengineering. Organisations are outsourcing much more of what 
they used to consider either integral elements of their value chains or necessary staff 
activities. They are redefining the meaning of core and non-core functions and they are 
willing to experiment with outsourcing functions to specialised service providers that have 
made it their business to acquire expertise in a specific field. Without a doubt, focusing on 
core functions 
- 
and outsourcing the rest 
- 
is still a major trend. 
The literature reviewed provided mixed evidence on the benefits of outsourcing. Some 
researchers believe that outsourcing will come to characterise the post-industrial age. 
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Organisations will have a small core of committed people and will also draw on a large 
number of part-time or contract workers who provide their services to many employers. 
But others warn that businesses relying too heavily on outsourcing invite a disastrous loss 
of competitiveness. At the end of the day. when top executives encourage their 
organisations to seriously consider the possibility of outsourcing, are they really helping to 
stimulate real improvements or are they themselves like many others falling victims to 
fashion? Just because outsourcing has worked miracles for some organisations does not 
necessarily mean it will do the same for everybody else. A number of organisations, have 
in fact stood and watched their outsourcing efforts and substantial investments go down 
the drain due to lack of long-range planning and total commitment from top management. 
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Chapter III: 
Outsourcing and Internal Auditing 
-95- 
3.1 Introduction 
Outsourcing may be a relatively new term, but it is hardly a new concept. In the 1970s and 
1980s, organisations had already begun to contract out certain functions. Functions such as 
building security and maintenance, catering, and cleaning, were graduall`- outsourced to 
specialist outside providers during the 1970s. By the 1980s, even essential functions, such as 
information systems and manufacturing, were increasingly considered to be non-core". and 
were as a result outsourced. What is relatively new, however, is the outsourcing of the internal 
audit function. 
One thing that needs to be made clear from the outset is that the practice of outsourcing the 
internal audit function is not the same as outsourcing any other function. While poor service 
in office cleaning or catering, might be unpleasant and sometimes disturbing, it does not have 
the potential to be damaging. On the other hand, placing critical activities. such as internal 
auditing, in the hands of an outside provider can prove to be a serious mistake and will 
probably cause a significant number of problems to the organisation in the long-run. Internal 
auditors are in many respects the guardian angels of corporate standards. They are specialists 
in assessing internal controls and act as the first line of defence against fraud. safeguarding 
assets, and evaluating compliance. Verschoor and Farell (1996), in particular, claim that 
internal audit is one of the board's principal sources of information needed to fulfil its 
oversight responsibilities. Outsourcing the function could decrease both the breadth and 
quantity of information the audit provides to the board. The overall result will be an increase 
of directors' risk. 
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Although many organisations are currently using outsourcing as a 'best practice' for accessing 
expertise and gaining flexibility, internal auditors view this trend as a threat. In-house internal 
audit teams are increasingly seeing their jobs coming under threat from outsourcing. which is. 
of course, not completely illogical. However, it has to be questioned whether such fear is 
entirely justified. While it is true that outsourcing is gathering pace, whether it is in the public 
or in the private sector, a large, well-established internal audit department should not be easily 
displaced by an outside provider. This, of course, is not to infer that this could or should not 
happen. There may often be good reasons why organisations choose to outsource their internal 
audit functions, like for example, the need for an internal audit department has only been 
recently established, or due to a shortage of skilled staff and resources inside the organisation. 
or because outsourcing is a cheaper and a more convenient alternative. 
3.2 Organisation of Chapter III 
This chapter will concentrate primarily on the issues surrounding the outsourcing of the 
internal audit function. An examination of the potential benefits and costs associated with 
outsourcing, as well as the potential advantages from retaining an in-house internal audit 
department, will be undertaken. The issue of independence in relation to outsourcing and the 
complications arising when public accounting firms assume the dual role of the internal and 
the external auditor will also be considered. Finally, the three outsourcing options (i. e. full- 
outsourcing, partial-outsourcing, and partnering/cosourcing) will be examined along with a 
comparison between outsourcing and insourcing and a discussion about the size of the 
outsourcing market. 
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3.3 Establishing an Internal Audit Department 
According to Anderson (1996), traditionally when an organisation was considering the 
establishment of an internal audit department, it had only a single option; it hired in-house 
staff. However, things have changed a lot over the last few years and some organisations are 
now using a non-traditional approach (i. e. outsourcing) as a fast, and efficient way to establish 
internal audit coverage. 
3.3.1 The Traditional Approach: In the past, an organisation establishing an internal audit 
function started from scratch and built the department entirely in-house. While this approach 
worked well for some organisations, there were certain drawbacks. For example. there were 
significant start-up time and costs to recruit the necessary staff as well as to develop an entire 
internal audit methodology and related processes. 
3.3.2 The Non-Traditional Approach: To alleviate the problems associated with the 
traditional approach, some organisations today make use of outside providers as a fast and 
efficient way to provide internal audit coverage. It seems that many directors find the 
avoidance of the, sometimes lengthy, time lag necessary for setting up an in-house internal 
audit department, beneficial and they tend to favour outsourcing instead. When starting from 
scratch, the non-traditional approach is attractive to a smaller, cost-conscious organisation, 
because it can avoid adding expensive full-time employees and the associated costs which 
follow that decision. The non-traditional approach also gives organisations access to 
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specialised audit personnel, which they might not have been able to afford to employ on a 
permanent basis. 
Unfortunately, going outside for help is not a decision that can be taken with great ease by 
many internal auditors. Internal auditors, and people in general. have traditionally perceived 
the need for further assistance as a sign of weakness and consequently they, do not want to 
give the impression to their superiors or fellow-employees that they are not familiar with or 
capable of performing a certain activity. Nevertheless, any department will have certain 
strengths and weaknesses. In areas where an internal audit department is particularly strong, 
those strengths should be emphasised. When a weakness is discovered, however, internal 
auditors should not be afraid to seek assistance from outside. It might easily be the case that 
there is someone out there that has as his/her strength the organisation's weakness. Ignoring 
one's weaknesses and leaping ahead into unknown territory may jeopardise the professional 
integrity of the internal audit function. The old `head-in-the-sand ' syndrome should, 
therefore, be avoided at all costs. 
3.4 The Challenges Facing Internal Audit Today 
It is difficult to pinpoint any time in the last twenty years when the threat to internal audit was 
as great as it is now. The internal audit function is in fact facing many challenges during the 
21 " century. The cost constraints facing organisations nowadays are compelling. In virtually 
every organisation, internal auditors are being asked to do more with fewer resources at their 
disposal. Organisations are outsourcing, downsizing, reengineering, and employing a series of 
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other strategies in order to help them gain a competitive advantage over their competitors. 
These strategies are bound to have an impact on the profession sooner or later. 
Diagram 3.1: The Challenges Facing Internal Audit Today 
Business Process 
Re-engineering 
INTERNAL 
AUDITING N 
Ü 
cr4 
Outsourcing 
Diagram 3.1 exhibits some of the main forces advancing towards in-house internal audit 
departments. In particular: 
" Business Process Re-engineering (BPR): BPR can affect internal audit in two ways. 
Firstly, the internal audit function can be the primary target of reengineering, in other 
words, the internal auditing process itself may be reengineered. And secondly. 
reengineering can radically change the processes and internal controls in those areas 
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audited by internal auditors. The threat is that reengineering may in fact weaken the actual 
internal controls. In an effort to radically redesign business processes, so that to achieve a 
dramatic improvement in the overall performance of the organisation, a number of 
traditional control virtues, such as the segregation of duties, verification and authorisation, 
may be falsely eliminated. 
" 
Control Self Assessment (CSA): CSA is another recent development in the internal audit 
profession that represents a significant change in the traditional way internal audit services 
are being delivered. The development of this concept has provided fresh challenges for the 
audit profession, in terms of their potential role of assisting management in setting up and 
running a self assessment programme, and more importantly, in appraising its 
effectiveness. In a CSA environment, the internal auditor is expected to become more 
consultive and supportive of the management process. However, several concerns have 
been expressed regarding the ability and the appropriateness of internal auditors to wear 
two hats, the `audit' hat worn in conducting conventional audits versus the `management 
consultant' hat worn as a CSA facilitator. The general belief among those with opposing 
views in terms of the involvement of internal auditors in CSA processes, which is also 
shared by the IIA, is that if internal auditors are operationally involved with the CSA 
process, their independence and objectivity would be compromised when reviewing the 
effectiveness of the CSA program and its results. 
" Downsizing: Control environments have been shaken and shifted as a result of 
downsizing. As in the case of reengineering, internal auditors can actually find themselves 
the main target of downsizing initiatives. It is probably no wonder that internal auditors 
today are more fearful for their future than ever before. 
- 
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" 
Outsourcing: The cost constraints facing organisations today are compelling to say the 
least. Having downsized and reengineered, many organisations have now adopted or are 
exploring the idea of outsourcing their internal audit functions. It seems that day after day 
the outsourcing bandwagon is gathering more and more pace, whether it is in the public or 
in the private sector. 
Should, however, organisations outsource their internal audit functions? This has recently 
been a contentious question within the auditing profession and the general business 
community. On the one hand, there is a perception that a better outcome can be actually 
obtained from outsourcing all or part of the internal audit function. Pelfrey and Peacock 
(1995), for example, claim that a base staff of internal auditors can handle certain functions, 
allowing special projects or assignments to be outsourced to specialised internal audit 
providers. Outsourcing can, in fact, eliminate the need for hiring permanent staff when the in- 
house internal audit function cannot cope with the extra amount of work to be done. Audit 
directors rarely maximise efficiency by relying solely on internal talent. Trying to build a staff 
large enough to meet every need is impractical, and the overall result is that talented people 
are sometimes deployed on the wrong projects. Outsourcing enables audit directors to 
alleviate some of the problem. 
On the other hand, many internal audit professionals, supported by recent pronouncements 
issued by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), argue that a properly organised internal audit 
unit can perform more efficiently and effectively than an outside service provider. The 
Institute, despite the huge trend towards outsourcing, still believes that the internal audit 
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function is best performed by a fully resourced and professionally competent staff that is 
integral to the management of the organisation. The IIA, however. also suggests that some 
functions may require services obtained by contract, thereby opening the door to the 
possibility of externally provided services. It recognises that there are cases where parts of an 
in-house internal auditing function can be outsourced to achieve organisational goals and 
objectives more economically. Outsourcing may be also appropriate in some situations in 
order to remedy substandard internal auditing activities, and finally, outsourcing is preferable 
to having no internal audit function. 
The Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing suggest that internal 
auditing staff should collectively possess the knowledge, skills, and disciplines necessary for 
the practice of the profession within the organisation. If the internal audit department does not 
possess the necessary knowledge, skills, and disciplines in order to carry out its audit 
responsibilities, then the Standards advise to obtain these from an outside service provider. 
The Standards define an outside service provider as "... a person or firm, independent of' the 
organisation, who has special knowledge, skill, and experience in a particular discipline " 
(Standard 220.02.1). Outside service providers must be educated and trained in disciplines 
that relate to the particular assignment, they must hold professional qualifications, licenses or 
other recognition of their competency in their particular discipline, they must have experience 
in the type of work they are asked to perform, and finally they must have a satisfactory 
knowledge and experience in the industry in which the organisation requiring their services is 
operating in. Outside service providers include among others, accountants, fraud investigators, 
information technology specialists, and even the organisation's external auditors. 
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3.5 Potential Benefits From Outsourcing Internal Auditing 
Various conditions and concerns may lead to the decision to outsource the internal audit 
function. This decision, it is claimed by many, particularly the service providers. to have a 
number of potential benefits for the organisation: 
3.5.1 Cost-Effective: There is considerable controversy about whether outsourcing is 
actually cost effective. Gil Courtemanche (1991) asserts that external audit firms can never 
hope to compete with internal auditors on the basis of cost per hour. Their only alternative 
will be to compete on the basis of overall cost. Their promise is to lower the overall cost 
through better trained personnel, less non-productive time for staff, improved audit 
techniques, utilisation of the latest technology, elimination of unnecessary audit services, and 
better audit planning. External audit firms may find it feasible to charge a lower rate for their 
extended audit services because they can make better use of their excess capacity during their 
slow season. It is a well-known fact that external audit is a seasonal business. with its slow 
period occurring during the months May to September. Any firm securing work for its idle 
staff during this five-months period could offer highly-discounted rates while still achieving 
some profit. However, in-house internal auditors insist that external auditors are lowballing 
their proposals in order to secure contracts and that they will begin to escalate their fees soon 
after they set their foot in the company. 
3.5.2 Specialised Expertise: In today's age of increasing technicality, internal audit staffs 
frequently encounter unfamiliar territory 
- 
territory that requires specialised knowledge if it is 
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to be audited effectively and efficiently. While specialised knowledge is required in many 
situations, internal audit directors admit that maintaining such an expert on staff is not al«-a) s 
a realistic option. Adding an auditor with specialised knowledge to the permanent staff is 
often not worth the cost, especially in light of the number of different areas where the internal 
audit department might require specialised knowledge at one time or another. Calling in an 
outside specialist provides a cost-effective solution to the sporadic demand for specialised 
knowledge. 
3.5.3 Supplementing Resources: Supplementing the department's resources is another 
reason for outsourcing. Internal audit (I. A. ) departments may hit peak periods where their lean 
and mean staffing level cannot cover the amount of work to be done. At that point, I.: \. 
departments need to bring in additional resources to take care of the unexpected peak load. 
Budgetary constraints may also create inadequate staffing levels that necessitate supplemental 
help. The I. A. department knows that due to budgetary constraints they cannot acquire 
additional staff, but they still have to meet the department's audit responsibilities. So the 
short-term solution is to outsource some of that work. Even time resources become an issue 
that involves outside service providers. Often a project request comes in with such a deadline 
that is practically impossible to meet. For whatever reason, the project must be pursued in a 
hurry, but there is not enough staff available in-house. As a result, extra help is called in for 
assistance. 
3.5.4 Transferring the Risk: Organisations are often keen to lay off risk to their provider. 
Through outsourcing, there is the potential for transferring some of the risks of business 
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failure due to poor control systems to an external party. Outsourcing, however, does not mean 
abdicating total responsibility. If the organisation collapses the directors are still the ones who 
will be held responsible. Corporate Governance responsibilities cannot be shifted completely 
when engaging into outsourcing. An organisation can outsource, but it cannot just walk away. 
The day-to-day worry may be taken off their hands, but the ultimate responsibility still rests 
with the organisation and not the outside provider. 
3.5.5 Management Pluses: Business owners who perform a lot of outsourcing insist that it 
helps them avoid the cycle of hiring people for every function when business is good, having 
to shed them when times are bad, and then trying to rebuild the organisation's human capital 
when business picks up again. 
3.5.6 Cost Conversion: The outsourcing decision would lead to the elimination of the fixed 
cost commitment to the internal audit department. Thus, internal audit expenses become a 
variable component of the cost structure which is controllable by management. Also, 
outsourcing removes the otherwise huge impact on capital budget due to periodic technology 
upgrade, as audit facilities often need to be modernised and personnel always need to be 
trained in order to keep up-to-date with a constantly changing environment. 
3.5.7 Better International and Cultural Coverage: Large international internal audit service 
providers have locations around the world staffed with local individuals with knowledge of 
the domestic market. The use of these firms to provide internal audit coverage should lead to 
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efficiencies resulting from savings in expensive travelling and time. improved lam-ua`Te skills. 
and better understanding of the existing culture. 
3.5.8 Improved Quality: Outside service providers often claim that their staffs are more 
capable of providing an effective internal audit service than the existing in-house personnel. 
This argument must be considered on a case-by-case basis as it essentially depends on the 
individuals employed within each organisation. One must be wary. ho« ever, of the practice of 
using external audit staff during their `down time' to perform internal audit reviews. As Gibbs 
and Courtemanche (1994) discuss in their article `Inside Outsourcing 
- 
Can external auditors 
provide quality internal auditing services? ', "It is one thing, for internal auditors to provide an 
opinion on internal controls and quite another for public accountants to do so ". They carry 
on to say that "... the methodology used by public accounting firms tends to focus largccliv on 
financial reporting control objectives, however, internal auditing increasingly invol vc'. ti 
activities aimed at verifying the adequacy of* controls for achieving,, c'//'ctiivcnc's. ti and 
efficiency of operations as well as compliance with applicable policies, la't. ti, and 
regulations ". 
3.6 Potential Costs From Outsourcing Internal Auditing 
While an outside internal audit service provider can be of tremendous benefit to the company. 
some problems may arise. Company directors should consider the following points v dien they 
are dealing with outsourcing: 
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3.6.1 The Risk of Quality: Unless there is prior knowled`(e of and experience of a 
provider's work, the internal audit director runs the risk of reducing the quality of his ýcr-v ice 
every time an outsider is brought in to perform internal audit work. The majority of public 
accounting firms' employees who would most likely be given the internal auditing %ti cork only 
have experience in external auditing, and as a result, the standards and quality of internal audit 
work will inevitably fall substantially. External and internal auditors have different goals and 
many different areas of expertise. Internal audit is a specialism on its own and. therefore. it 
should be treated as such. Modern internal auditing requires a dedicated group of 
professionals who possess broad perspective and in-depth expertise. 
3.6.2 The Issue of Confidentiality: There may be times when a situation is too sensitive to 
co-operate with someone from the outside, or proprietary information that the organisation 
prefers to keep private may be an issue. Most importantly, the outside internal audit provider 
might learn about issues that come out during the audit, before management had a chance to 
fully investigate and take the appropriate action. 
3.6.3 The Specialist's Unfamiliarity With the Organisation and its Culture: Most internal 
auditors claim that they have a unique perspective of the organisation that cannot be 
duplicated by an outside service provider. They argue that the outside service provider may 
only know the organisation in generic terms and may not be able to learn its inside workings 
as fast as needed. The danger is that the provider. unacquainted with the business or the 
politics involved inside the organisation, may not know the best way to make 
recommendations. Unless the contract internal auditors dedicated all of their time to the same 
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organisation for a period of three to four years they would not be able to familiarise 
themselves with the organisation and its culture. Knowledge of this culture can provide a 
valuable source of audit information. 
3.6.4 Loss of Loyalty: Many of the critics of internal audit outsourcing point out that an 
internal auditor's first loyalty must rest with the organisation. The outsourcer's first lo`valtv 
will presumably be to their own organisation, not to their clients. The in-hou,, e internal 
auditor, however, has no such dilemma. Having personnel whose future is connected with the 
organisation is a definite benefit. When possible, in-house personnel. will be more inclined to 
go the `extra mile' to improve further the efficiency of their organisation's operations, which 
eventually will affect their own wellbeing. It is claimed that this intangible asset is lost for the 
organisation using outsourcing because the employee may not give that `extra effort' fier the 
client, or will be forced to balance the demands of multiple clients. 
3.6.5 Loss of Training Ground: For some time, progressive organisations have been using 
their internal audit departments as training grounds for people with management potential. 
Because internal audits usually cover all aspects of operations. a suitable (often 2-3 years) 
assignment in the internal audit department will provide those high-potential employees with 
a `birds eye view' of all the activities of the organisation, as well as a knowledge of major 
players in various departments. When individuals are later moved to other areas. such 
experience could be of great value in assuring goal congruence and improving 
interdepartmental relationships. A full outsourcing decision would take a« aay this valuable 
training ground from the organisation. 
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3.6.6 Loss of the Continuous Presence: This means that internal auditors «will not he 
present in the organisation at all times if the function is outsourced. This naturally reduces the 
readiness of internal audit to meet the urgent needs of management as they arise. It also 
prevents the ongoing monitoring of activities and ensuring that transactions are properly 
executed and accounted for. 
3.6.7 Loss of Control: Loss of control has always been a worry for organisations 
considering outsourcing. It has been said that once an organisation outsources vital functions, 
it runs the risk of losing touch with them. Inexperienced service providers can assume too 
much control and responsibility while having too little daily interaction with internal 
organisation contacts. 
3.6.8 The Organisation Becomes Too Dependent on the Service Provider: One of the 
greatest potential costs is the damage incurred by an organisation that becomes overly 
dependent on its outsourcing provider. As the dependency increases, the organisation becomes 
vulnerable to pricing increases as the service provider takes more of a monopoly position with 
respect to the organisation. 
3.6.9 Loss of Management Tool: After the decision is taken and eventually the internal 
audit department is outsourced, if management is not entirely satisfied with the performance 
or the service of the outside provider, it is unlikely that they will reverse their decision and 
[)ring back in-house the department in the medium term. The problems associated with this 
option N ill, therefore, remain for some time. Once an organisation outsources. not dust 
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internal auditing but any other function, it will be very difficult and costly to bring that 
function(s) back in-house. As previously mentioned. outsourcing can prove to be a one-way 
road: once you went down is almost impossible to come back. 
Naturally, calling in an outside internal audit service provider may not always be the easiest 
decision to make. No cut and dried formula exists to tell organisations when to outsource and 
when not to outsource. Organisations have to balance all the variables, such as the time frame 
and the training costs of trying to get their employees up to speed in an area and then 
maintaining their expertise. They have to consider whether they need to maintain a specialist 
in an area over the long-run, or whether this is just a one-off situation, and they will not he 
auditing this area again in the future. A balanced solution may be partial outsourcing, in other 
words, an in-house manager with a small number of internal auditors, supplemented by other 
resources from outside providers. According to Crawford and others (1996), this solution 
would allow: 
" The continuous presence of a corporate-loyal internal auditor 
" Better control of specialist consultants and other external resources 
" Retention of internal audit as a management training ground 
" Greater options for management in the longer term over the direction and focus of the 
internal audit function. 
At Ernst & Young they have devised what they consider to be the optimum solution to the 
outsourcing debate. They named it "Strategic Partnering" (Martin, 1996). Strategic Partnering 
means that an internal audit function selects an outside supplier to become part of their team. 
working together to deliver the most effective service by providing access to a range of skills. 
resources, processes and methods. 
Both parties are required to invest time and effort in the partnership. and to really work as a 
team. It is believed that both parties involved, profit from each other's areas of expertise 
- 
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house knowledge of the organisation coupled with knowledge of the industry and best 
practice. On the other hand some critics of strategic partnering, like Saunders et al (1997). 
claim that outsourcing providers cannot be strategic partners because they do not share the 
same profit motive. They suggest that the outsourcing vendor's profits are inevitably 
maximised at the customer's expense. It is therefore virtually impossible for a provider to be a 
strategic partner. 
Similarly, `cosourcing' is the term introduced by Deloitte & Touche in marketing their 
internal audit services. According Aldihizer III and Cashell (1997), this new concept involves, 
among other things, an organisation's internal audit department forming an alliance with the 
external accounting firm in order to fulfil the organisation's internal audit service needs. With 
cosourcing, the accounting firm's primary role is to provide audit services that are typically 
non-routine or require special expertise that would be too costly for the organisation to 
maintain internally. Cosourcing, however, heavily relies on a strong in-house internal audit 
function. The in-house internal auditors are typically asked to perform services that require 
constant attention. 
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3.7 Potential Advantages From Retaining an In-House Internal Audit 
Function 
Outsourcing the services of internal audit departments that are very good at what they do 
might prove to be a serious mistake in the long-term. The major advantage of retaining an in- 
house internal audit function is the ability to continuously monitor controls and to prevent and 
detect fraud. It is often more desirable to have continuous, rather than periodic, availability for 
certain services. For example, internal control monitoring is usually more effective if carried 
out continuously rather than at one or two points during the year. Furthermore, retaining a 
strong in-house function also ensures the availability of personnel that understand the internal 
audit function and the organisation. 
Despite all the positive publicity that outsourcing has received over the last few years. it does 
not necessarily lead always to `win-win' situations. At times, it might be wise for the 
organisation to consider the potential advantages from retaining a competent internal audit 
department in-house. Some of the possible advantages are: 
" All of the in-house internal auditors are available for assignment during the year. 
" An in-house internal audit department can serve as a training ground for future managers. 
" The in-house internal audit department possesses an in-depth knowledge of the 
organisation. The need to familiarise with the organisation's policies, practices. business 
methods, and cultural environment is therefore eliminated. 
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9 All the risks and other traditional costs inherent in any major organisational change are 
avoided. 
9 Audit findings remain confidential, and the risk that successful business practices. 
competitive strategies, or other trade secrets could reach outsiders diminishes. Senior 
management has time to make a considerable assessment of significant adverse findings. 
" 
It is easier for employees than for contract auditors to share the congruent goals of the 
organisation, motivating superior performance. 
Within a well-run organisation employees learn from a good in-house internal audit 
department. A competent internal audit department provides the major supporting assurance 
that allows management to make an assertion as to the adequacy and effectiveness of its 
organisation's internal control structure. The internal audit department gains an unparalleled 
insight into the most detailed functions of the organisation and, most importantly, the culture 
of the organisation. This invaluable source of knowledge will be available to the organisation 
at all times if there is an in-house internal audit department and can also be called upon at a 
moment's notice to carry out work ranging from fraud investigation to computer audit. By 
outsourcing it, the organisation is possibly placing its future at risk. 
3.8 Outsourcing Options to Consider 
Although the word outsourcing is often portrayed as an all or nothing approach. in reality 
there is a variety of outsourcing options. In fact, three general outsourcing options are more or 
less available to organisations to choose the one that suits their particular situation: 
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Diagram 3.2: Sourcing Options for the Internal Audit Function' 
Internal Audit Kept In-House 
A. 
Partnering/Cosourcing 
\O 
-- -' 
Full-Outsourcing 
Partial-Outsourcing 
------- ----- ---------4 
3.8.1 Full-Outsourcing: In a full outsourcing arrangement, the outside service provider is 
expected to bring its full range of expertise, knowledge and support to the organisation. In this 
case, the organisation outsources the whole of its internal audit function. It may retain only an 
internal audit director in order to oversee the relationship, serve as a liaison with management, 
and conduct special projects. It is likely that an organisation that relinquishes complete control 
to an outsider, without very real oversight, to expose itself to considerable financial and 
operational risks. However, by retaining oversight of the internal auditing function. 
' 
: 
\r (2 Based on the model of Jennings, D. (1996) Outsourcing Opportunities for Financial 
Services. Long Range Planning. 29(3), p. 394 
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management can help to ensure the independence of the outside service provider while also 
alleviating any potential regulatory concerns. 
3.8.2 Partial-Outsourcing: With this approach, a specific portion of the internal audit 
function, such as the auditing of information systems, is contracted out to a qualified service 
provider. Essentially an organisation acquires expertise from the outsourcer and it also realises 
cost savings over the expense of acquiring permanent staff. It is possible that an organisation 
cannot afford to keep specialists on staff who may, for example. be needed for a couple of 
days and then not again for many months. Outsourcing selective services can prove to be an 
innovative and creative solution for internal auditors who have been told to cut staff. while at 
the same time expand the scope of their audit programs. 
3.8.3 Partnering/Cosourcing: Implementation of this option usually involves moving some 
in-house audit staff to the vendor, with other key audit personnel remaining in-house. Success 
is based on co-operation, therefore, both parties are required to invest time and effort in the 
partnership, and to really work as a team always sharing goals, knowledge, and objectives. 
Through partnering, an organisation can keep in-house knowledge and control while at the 
same time gaining from outside expertise and resources. At the end of the day. this approach 
results, according to Anderson (1996), in an extremely powerful and flexible audit structure 
that maintains continuity for the organisation. Likewise, cosourcing is also a team approach 
involving the service provider and the existing in-house internal audit department working 
hand-in-hand to provide expertise in areas that internal audits have difficulties in building for 
themselves either due to lack of time or capabilities. 
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3.9 Independence 
A major issue when considering outsourcing internal auditing is whether to build on a 
relationship with the same public accounting firm that is already providing external audit 
services. The public accounting profession has long been troubled by the seasonal nature of 
the profession. It has been common practice for public accounting firms to accept contracts at 
a very low profit margin (and at times below their costs) in order to keep their audit staff 
engaged throughout the year. 
Outsourced internal audit services, a practice that has come to be known as cxtc'nd¬'J audit 
services, can be provided during their non-peak seasons. allowing firms to provide an 
alternative and profitable activity to engage their staffs. Public accounting firms market these 
extended audit services to their audit clients by virtue of the fact that they are already familiar 
with their client's operations since having performed the annual audit, they already possess 
the information about the client that they will need to perform outsourced internal audit 
services. Concerns, however, have been raised regarding the potential harm of obtaining 
internal and external audit services from the same source. Having the same public accounting 
firm provide both internal and external audit services to the same client, the issue of 
independence is likely to be of paramount importance. 
It may be a natural route to follow in looking to the organisation's external auditors to 
perform the internal audit function, but there are two sides to the question. On the one hand. 
the organisation is familiar with and comfortable with the external auditors. On the other 
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hand, two different service suppliers keeps everybody honest and on their toes. Initially, one 
might think that the issue of independence could present an argument in favour of 
outsourcing. Since the outsourced auditors would not be employees of the organisation. the 
thought could follow that they would probably have less incentive to ignore improprieties 
made by other employees, play down unfavourable findings, or participate in collusion. 
HQwever, a survey of 72 Big 6 audit partners which was conducted by Accianni (1995) points 
up the real threat to independence: the partners who have been involved in outsourcing 
reported that 86% of their engagements were with current clients. In such situations the 
common checks and balances that exist between internal and external auditors would he 
eliminated, and the Big 5 firm will have a monopoly on an organisation's financial and 
operational audit processes. Consequently, such `double-role' will have serious implications 
for audit independence. 
Concern over auditor independence is nothing new. In fact, a significant number of people do 
indeed consider impaired independence an inherent problem for the activity. Chambers (1992) 
argues that, "No auditor, whether internal or external, can be completely independent. While 
the exiernal auditor draws his fee from the client, the internal auditor receives perhaps his or 
her total remuneration from the business whose affairs are being audited" 
It is widely claimed that, although independence is a difficult balancing act for any auditor, 
the external provider has less reason for allowing personal relationships or previous 
experiences with auditees to affect his judgement. Clearly, there is a danger that the service 
provider may say only what they think the client wants to hear but this is not usually the case. 
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According to Marshall (1994), not only does the provider has a reputation to consider, but 
also such dubious practice would become obvious over a period, and any client would soon 
recognise that they are paying for unsound advice. 
An additional independence issue is the magnitude of internal audit service fees. Public 
accounting firms view outsourcing contracts as opportunities with enormous new revenue 
potential. According to Aldihizer III and Cashell (1996), the IIA has in-fact estimated that an 
accounting firm's revenues from providing internal audit services could be up to 10 times 
higher than their accounting and auditing services. It is possible, therefore, that extremely 
lucrative outsourcing fees could affect the auditor's state of mind to such an extent that 
objectivity is impaired. Because of the magnitude of these revenues and the ongoing 
relationship, the external auditors may unconsciously become biased in the client's favour. 
The size of the public accounting firm will also play a major part in preserving independence. 
Engle (1996) points out that the larger public accountancy firms, as compared to smaller 
firms, are better able to maintain their independence while providing internal audit services. 
He argues that larger firms are more likely to have internal audit service departments that are 
separated from their audit departments and furthermore, with larger firms it is less likely that 
the fees from a single client will comprise a significant portion of the total revenues of the 
firm 
If an organisation intends to rely on the work of an outside provider, then the relationship of 
the provider to the organisation and to the internal audit department (if there is one in-house) 
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should be assessed in order to ensure that independence is maintained throughout the 
assignment. According to the Standards and Guidelines for the Professional Practice of 
Internal Auditing it is important to determine that there are no financial. organisational, or 
personal relationships that will prevent the provider from rendering impartial and unbiased 
judgements and opinions when performing or reporting on the assignment. When assessing 
the independence of a particular provider, the issues that need to be considered include: 
9 The financial interest the provider may have in the organisation. 
" The personal or professional affiliation the provider may have to the board, management, 
or others within the organisation. 
" The relationship the provider may have had with the organisation or the activities being 
reviewed. 
" The extent of other ongoing services the provider may be performing for the organisation. 
" Compensation or other incentives that the provider may have. 
One may question whether an in-house internal auditor can still be `independent' given 
today's tendency towards outsourcing and having in mind that the internal audit department 
heavily depends on the resources provided by the organisation for its survival. Can in-house 
internal auditors, realistically, perform objective audits of the overall internal control system 
when they constitute an integral part of it? 
The arguments examined above regarding the `independence' issue are certainly conflicting. 
Whether in-house internal auditors can maintain their independence while their jobs are under 
constant scrutiny from top management and whether public accounting firms can themselves 
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retain their independence when they take on the 'dual role' of internal and external auditor is 
an issue that requires further investigation. 
3.10 Size of the Market 
Up-to-now research has been unable to quantify the exact size of the outsourcing market in 
the U. K. However, what research has managed to reveal is that the practice is increasingly 
spreading within organisations of all sizes and in all the sectors of the economy. Reilly and 
Tamkin (1996) rightly claim that it is very difficult to indicate the current extent of 
outsourcing and how it has grown over recent years. The main obstacle is that there are very 
few studies that can be relied upon, and most importantly, there are many problems with 
definitions. 
There is no doubt that the main problem springs from the fact that there is no universally 
agreed upon definition for outsourcing. Since outsourcing means different things to different 
people it is therefore quite difficult to chart the occurrence of outsourcing and even more 
difficult to attempt to make a reliable forecast for the future. It seems that a significant number 
of researchers favour the use of terms such as `contracting-out' and `subcontracting' in place 
of `outsourcing'. Of course this can be largely attributed to the fact that until very recently the 
term `outsourcing' was virtually non-existent. This is particularly evident in the majority of 
surveys that were carried out in the U. K. in the second part of the 1980s and the beginning of 
the 1990s, where the term `subcontracting' was largely preferred. 
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The earliest information we have regarding some degree of outsourcing in the U. K. can be 
found in the 1987 ACAS Survey which shows that 77% of the 584 respondents used outside 
contractors. The figure 3.1 below exhibits the functional areas in which outside contractors 
were employed. Unfortunately, the 1987 survey was the last one on this subject to be 
published by the Advisory, Conciliation & Arbitration Service to this date. 
Figure 3.1: Areas in which Outside Contractors were Used 
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Consistent with a number of other surveys that were performed during the same period, the 
1987 ACAS Survey found that outsourcing was mostly used for what were traditionally 
considered to be peripheral activities. The 1987 national survey of Employer Labour [-'se 
Strategies (ELUS) also found that cleaning (42.1%), maintenance (52.20'0). and transportation 
()3.9%) were the three most popular types of work outsourced by the 658 out of 877 tirnýý 
that indicated the use of outsourcing. Both surveys came to broadly the same conclusions. also 
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indicating an increase in the number of firms that will be outsourcing some work over the late 
1980s. 
According to Brown (1997), a more recent report was published by, the PA Consulting Group 
in 1996, which clearly states that the average number of functions outsourced by organisations 
in the U. K. has risen by a staggering 225% (from 1.2 to 3.9) over the past five years and it has 
been predicted that it will continue to grow even more in the future. The report also discloses 
that at present, the most frequently outsourced activities are catering and information 
technology, but there is now clear evidence that outsourcing is moving from peripheral 
activities towards more central ones. As far as the European scene is concerned, a survey of 
350 large European companies which was carried out by Andersen Consulting has shown that 
52% will be undertaking a significant amount of outsourcing by the year 2010 compared with 
just 18% at present. In addition, the same report estimated that the global market for 
outsourced services is set to grow from £25.6bn to £66.9bn by the year 2001 (Bartram, 1997). 
Turning now to internal audit outsourcing, the one point that has to be raised is that there is no 
sufficient information to help us establish a definite trend as to the extent of outsourcing of the 
internal audit function in the U. K. Although, in recent years, many have speculated about the 
size of the outsourcing market in general, no one has been able to quantify the extent to which 
the internal audit function is being contracted-out to specialised providers. The fact that a 
large number of companies have had no experience with an internal audit function. let alone 
with outsourcing the function, makes an accurate estimation of the size and the potential of 
the market almost impossible. On the other side of the Atlantic, however, a number of 
- 
123 
- 
considerable attempts have been made and the results from these attempts have helped 
researchers over the last few years to make some useful observations and forecasts about the 
extent of outsourcing of the internal audit function. 
The results of a survey that was carried out by Kusel, Schull, and Oxner in the United States 
and Canada in 1996, were used to determine the extent to which portions of existing internal 
audit functions are currently contracted to outside providers. The survey responses of more 
than 1,300 internal audit directors showed that more than half of them, 53% (21.5°ßo in the US 
and 31.5% in Canada) to be exact, had contracted out some of their internal audit work. The 
survey findings are exhibited below. 
Figure 3.2: Percentage of Organisations Outsourcing Some Internal Audit 
Work in the US and Canada 
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Source: "Wh at Audit Directors Disclose About Outsourcing" by Kusel. &h ull. And Oxner 
In order to establish an idea of the future outlook of internal audit outsourcing, the researchers 
asked those internal audit directors who did not contracted-out some of their internal audit 
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United States Canada 
work, if they were thinking of doing so in the future. The findings show that within both 
countries about 68% of internal audit directors not now working with specialist outsourcers 
are expected to do so sometime in the future. Responses are detailed in the figure below. 
Figure 3.3: Percentage of Internal Audit Directors not Currently t1sing 
Outsourcing but Expecting to do so Sometime in the Future 
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Source: "What Audit Directors Disclose About Outcourcing" 1w Kucel. &*ull. And Oxner 
I 1995, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EU) and Arthur Andersen carried out a survey of 
03 senior executives from global businesses operating throughout North America and 
Europe. The survey responses show a more favourable attitude towards outsourcing of 
financial functions such as pension management (North America 64 o, Europe 16° o), Tax 1 
(North America 371ö, Europe 43"o), and a less favourable attitude towards internal audit 
outsourcing (North America 12q o, Europe 90 o). However. the survey shoe s that in the 3-% car 
period from 1990-1998 the number of companies that are likely to consider outsourcing their 
internal audit function rises dramatically. This is particularly evident in Europe 
- 
I2'ß 
- 
United States 
Figure 3.4: Internal Audit Outsourcing 
(1995 
- 
1998) 
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Source: "New Directions in Finance" byEJU. 1nd: lrthurind rscn, p. ýiý' 
However, Rittenberg and Covaleski (1997) claim that we have to treat the EIU and Arthur 
Andersen results with some caution because their survey, first of all, emphasised organisations 
that were favourably disposed toward the outsourcing concept in general, and secondly, their 
reported outsourcing includes only full outsourcing for the particular function noted, e. g. 
internal audit outsourcing, ignoring the possibility of other outsourcing alternatives such as 
partial-outsourcing and partnering. A survey that was undertaken in the United States in 1996 
by the two previously mentioned authors shows that approximately 39% of the internal 
auditing departments that took part had some experience with outsourcing. 
The most up-to-date data available in terms of the trend of the contracted-out internal audit 
services, is a survey that was undertaken in the United States in 1997 by Simon Petravick. 
Senior executives from 232 financial institutions (banks, thrifts and credit unions) indicated 
-126- 
the widespread use of outsourcing. Approximately 34% (79 out of 232) have outsourced their 
internal audit function while 35% (81 out of 232) use in-house internal auditors. Note that 
these results show that the number of financial institutions that use in-sourcing (81) nearly 
equals that of institutions using outsourcing (79). However, these institutions differ 
considerably in size. The table below shows that the median size of financial institutions that 
use an in-house internal audit function is nearly four times larger than those that use 
outsourcing. 
Table 3.1: Organisation of Internal Audit Departments 
Type of Internal Audit 
Department (n=232) Number Total Assets of Respondents (5000,000) 
Median Smallest Largest 
Outsourced 79 $44 $4 $1,000 
In-sourced 81 $170 $7 $16,400 
Supplied by an affiliate 27 $99 $19 $715 
None at this time 45 $45 $5 $394 
The findings of the above survey indicate that the use of outsourcing is inversely related to the 
size of the financial institution. They show that the small institutions are the most frequent 
users of outsourcing. According to the researcher, over 91% of the smallest institutions have 
otltsourced and only 9% have in-sourced. Within the largest institutions, on the other hand. 
there is a complete reversal: 92% have in-sourced compared to 8% that have outsourced. The 
survey also showed that in 65% of the cases, management formed its internal audit function 
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directly through outsourcing. Only 35% of the cases involved outsourcing an existing internal 
audit department. Therefore. most outsourcing is done to establish the initial into n, 11 audit 
Function. 
Table 3.2: Organisation of Respondents' Internal Audit Functions 
Organisation of Internal Auditing Number % 
Uses in-sourcing. Never considered outsourcing. 53 22.84 
Uses in-sourcing. Considered outsourcing. 
Decided to remain with in-sourcing. 28 12.07 
Total In-Sourcing 81 34.91 
Uses outsourcing. Did not have any internal audit 
function prior to outsourcing. 51 21.98 
Uses outsourcing. Had previously used in-sourcing. 28 12.07 
Total Outsourcing 79 34.05 
No Internal Audit Function at This Time 45 19.40 
Internal Audit Function is Supplied by an Affiliate 27 11.64 
Grand Total 232 100.00 
The table above shows that 28 out of the 81 in-sourcers have considered outsourcing but 
decided to stick with in-sourcing. When these are combined with the 28 outsourcers that 
previously used in-sourcing at one time or another, a total of 51 % of in-sourcers (56 out of 
109) had considered outsourcing. Half of them (28 out of 56) decided to switch from in- 
sourcing to outsourcing. 
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Unfortunately, the literature reviewed has produced no accurate estimates of the size of the 
outsourcing market for internal audit services in the U. K., but if the American experience is 
anything to go by, we are then talking about a very big market with an enormous revenue 
potential. Not coincidentally, the majority of the public accounting firms were quick in 
spotting this potential market and over the last few years have stepped-up their efforts in order 
to establish specialised practices designed to take over an organisation's existing internal audit 
function. Virtually all of the `big five' public accounting firms. as well as some regional 
firms, offer some level of extended audit services, and many have added internal audit 
professionals to their staff to enhance these capabilities. The fact that public accounting firms 
view internal auditing as an attractive new area for growth confirms the importance of internal 
auditing to organisations as an essential activity. 
3.11 Outsourcing Vs Insourcing 
The term outsourcing, as previously stated, refers to those organisations that made the 
decision that the whole or a part of a particular function will be supplied by an outside service 
provider. Insourcing, on the other hand, refers to organisations that formally evaluated 
outsourcing but selected their internal department's bid over the bids that were made by the 
external service providers. According to James Quinn (1992), the key strategic issue in 
insourcing versus outsourcing is whether an organisation can achieve a maintainable 
competitive advantage by performing an activity such as internal auditing internally - usually 
cheaper, better, in a more timely fashion, or with some unique capability - on a continuing 
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basis. If the organisation can perform that function uniquely well. then the activity should be 
kept in-house. 
Many organisations assume that because they have always performed an activity such as 
internal auditing internally, or because it seems integral to their business. the activity should 
always be kept in-house. However, on closer investigation and with careful benchmarking 
(i. e. the process of comparing and measuring an organisation's business processes against 
those of business leaders anywhere in the world), an organisation's internal capabilities may 
turn out to be significantly below those of the best outside providers. If it is not possible for 
the in-house internal audit function to accomplish benchmarked standards of performance, it 
might be better in this case for the function to be outsourced. 
Barr (1995) claims that despite the fact that in recent years many organisations have 
outsourced their internal audit function, on numerous occasions organisations have opted to 
set-up an in-house department again because two important aspects of their outsourcing 
experience dismayed them. Their first concern was seepage. The outside internal audit 
provider prematurely learned about issues that surfaced in the internal audit, before 
management had a chance to fully investigate them and take the appropriate corrective action. 
More worrying was the fact that each year of the outsourcing contract, the provider sent 
different auditors for most of the internal audit assignments. In other words. there was no 
effort to develop the necessary continuity and any attempt to build relationships from audit to 
audit. 
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Eventually, if the decision is made to outsource the internal audit function, then it is crucial to 
introduce the outsourcing process in phases so that there is time to test each phase properly 
before moving on to the next one. Most organisations will benefit by extending outsourcing 
first in less critical areas or in parts of activities. like quality assurance audit or computer 
audit, rather than the whole of the internal audit function. Quinn and Hilmer (1995) argue that 
as organisations gain experience, they may increase profit opportunities greatly by 
outsourcing more critical activities to non-competing firms that can perform them more 
effectively. 
3.12 Summary 
The idea of outsourcing internal auditing is not always received positively. The problem for 
employees is that even mentioning the word `outsourcing' can set off a chain of events which 
can prove very hard to control. Understandably, people may feel threatened by it, fearing they 
will lose their influence within the business, or even their jobs. Potential cost savings can be 
offset by the loss to the business of in-house knowledge and expertise, and the risk of 
management losing control of the internal audit function. The appointment of an outside 
service provider can destroy the careful relationship of trust and understanding which has 
been built up between the in-house function and the organisation's management over the 
years. It is therefore very important to ensure that the quality of service is not sacrificed in 
order to achieve short-term cost savings. However, on the plus side, outsourcing can offer 
access to a range of expertise that would be uneconomic to hold in-house on a permanent 
basis. 
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It is true that auditors working for external providers often have a broad range of experience. 
which can be invaluable in a newly created organisation or one whose management has little 
knowledge of internal control. The counter argument to this is that the outsourced internal 
auditor has no feeling for the culture of the organisation. Sometimes, however, it is the case 
that the culture includes a history of tolerance of poor internal control and therefore it has to 
change. In addition, it is also claimed that an outsider's judgement is more likely to be 
impartial. 
At the end of the day, should organisations outsource internal audit and can it be outsourced 
successfully? Is it better for an organisation to have its internal controls checked by an outside 
firm having only limited knowledge of the organisation and its controls, or by an in-house 
internal audit department familiar with the organisation's policies, procedures, and operating 
practices? Is independence compromised when public accounting firms assume the 'dual-role' 
of internal and external auditor? Is outsourcing a threat to the profession or a best practice? 
Could the decision to outsource internal audit come back to haunt some organisations? One 
thing is certain, future decisions for those in charge are going to be very difficult indeed and 
therefore they should be taken with great care. 
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Chapter IV: 
Research Hypotheses 
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4.1 Introduction 
In-house or outsourcing? This is one of the question that has been repeatedly asked by 
many Directors in recent years. In their frenzied efforts to downsize and reengineer so that 
to get lean and mean and to enhance next year's profits, organisations are increasingly 
using outsourcing as the basis of their strategies. `Do what you are good at; don't In ' to do 
everything' is their new motto. The truth of the matter is that, as the pace of change fast 
accelerates, few organisations can afford to be good at everything they do. Doing things 
for yourself might make sense around one's home, but it is rapidly making less and less 
sense for employers and their organisations. Why? Because most employers today are 
trying to accomplish more with fewer employees and they are trying to save money in the 
process. 
Until recently, organisations were quite happy to outsource non-critical activities, such as 
cleaning and catering, to outside service providers, but as years went by, they have turned 
to outsourcing as a way of reducing their overheads. Although cost-reduction is one of the 
main reasons that forces organisations to embark on an outsourcing spree, many other 
factors can be put forward as an explanation as to what fuels the decision to outsource the 
internal audit function. These factors without a doubt need to be further researched in 
order to come to an acceptable conclusion as to the principal motive(s) behind this rising 
trend in the market for outsourced internal audit services. The literature reviewed revealed 
a number of factors that can influence such a decision, but further research will most 
probably reveal many more. 
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Conflicting arguments as to whether internal audit is perceived to be a core or a non-core 
activity were identified in the literature review. It appears that, up-to-now, nobody has had 
much success in placing the function in either category. Questions. therefore. remain 
unanswered as to whether internal audit is actually a core activity 
- 
and according to the 
conventional wisdom it should be kept within the boundaries of the organisation 
- 
or 
whether it is a non-core activity 
- 
and hence should probably be considered for 
outsourcing. Consequently, it is important that further research into the subject should take 
place in order for suitable answers to be provided. 
Finally, a gap was identified in the existing knowledge concerning the impact of the 
decision to outsource the internal audit function. Having in mind that the outsourcing of 
the internal audit function is a relatively new concept and the fact that the contracts that 
were signed a few years back have not yet expired, does not facilitate the formulation of an 
accurate understanding of the impact of such a decision. Although the concern 
surrounding auditors' independence is nothing new 
- 
actually it is one of the issues that 
has been well-documented over the years 
- 
the advent of outsourcing has once again led to 
an upsurge in its popularity. The big number of public accounting firms that have been 
actively engaged in marketing their internal audit services, have raised questions regarding 
the appropriateness and potential harm of obtaining both services from the same source 
(Acciani, 1995; Aldhizer III and Cashell, 1996). 
Likewise, the quality of the internal audit service furnished by the outside providers, 
particularly the public accounting firms, has also been a major concern (Courtemanche, 
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1991). Despite the on-going concern, the major providers of outsourced internal audit 
services maintain that they are in a position to provide an externally-sourced service to 
their clients at lower cost and with improved quality of output (Crawford et al, 1996) As 
one can easily detect, there are arguments on both sides. The bottom-line is that 
outsourcing will most certainly affect, the long-term future of the adopting organisation. 
therefore, it is very important that the implications from embracing such a strategy should 
be further researched. 
Although a lot of research has already been carried out in the area of outsourcing in 
general, the subject of outsourcing of the internal audit function remains, more or less, an 
undiscovered territory particularly in the UK. Clearly, a number of intriguing issues need 
to be further investigated and clarified. In order to facilitate this research, three groups of 
hypotheses have been developed and are presented in the figure below. All the information 
needed in order to enable the testing of these hypotheses will be collected through the use 
of a postal-questionnaire. 
Diagram 4.1: Research Hypotheses 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Core Vs Non-Core 
Group (A) 
Factors Influencing The Decision 
Group (B) 
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4.2 Group A: Core Vs Non-Core 
Hi: `Core' activities should always kept in-house and all 'non-core activities should be 
outsourced. 
The trend towards outsourcing everything but one's core activities is increasingly 
becoming the normal way of business life. According to Cant and Jevnes (1998), a key 
concept in modern business philosophy and practice is the belief that organisations should 
concentrate resources on their core business activities. All non-core activities would 
therefore be satisfied externally (outsourced). In general nowadays. Directors are reluctant 
to outsource core activities, as they feel these should have a permanent place inside the 
organisation. 
Hodgson and Puschaver (1995) state that organisations are redefining the meaning of core 
and non-core functions and they are willing to experiment with outsourcing functions such 
as internal auditing to specialised service providers. But defining what is a core and what 
is a non-core activity is proving to be a less straightforward process. If most Directors 
were asked today what activities they believe are most suitable for outsourcing, the 
inevitable answer will be those that are non-core. If then they were asked to elaborate on 
the exact differences between core and non-core, the chances are that they «will struggle to 
differentiate between the two. So, one might rightly ask, ",, N-hat exactly constitutes a 'core' 
activity and what is its difference from a 'non-core actin its'ýý. 
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It seems that there has been little consistency in the literature about what 'core' really 
means. Some of the meanings that are put forward to explain the term -core' include 'key'. 
'-critical', or `fundamental'. The concept requires that organisations think much more 
carefully about which activities actually do create unique value and which activities could 
be outsourced. Some people regard core activities those that the organisation is 
continuously engaged in and therefore must be rigidly controlled and protected. On the 
other hand, non-core activities are those that are not critical to an organisation's 
competitive edge and are, therefore, considered to be the best candidates for outsourcing. 
For the purpose of this survey, however, a `core activity' has been defined as "One of a 
limited number of functions that provides its owner with a strategic advantage over its 
competitors. It evolves slowly through collective learning and information sharing, and it 
cannot be easily imitated or transferred to others ". On the other hand, a 'non-core 
activity' has been defined as "An activity which does not contribute directly to creating a 
product or delivering a service ". 
Testing Hi: Over the years, a number of writers have suggested that organisations should 
concentrate on their core activities and outsource all their non-core activities (Cannon, 
1989; James, 1992; Tully, 1993). Whether today this is common practice is an issue that 
requires further investigation. It is very likely that every organisation will have its own 
corporate philosophy as to which activities should be considered for outsourcing and 
which should remain in-house. In order to test this hypothesis. the participants will be 
asked to state whether they agree or not with the practice of keeping `core' activities in- 
house and outsourcing the remaining `non-core' activities. 
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H2: Internal auditing while `essential' is not considered to be a `core activity. 
Today, as corporate leaders are beginning to comprehend more and more the strategic 
value of outsourcing, they are becoming more selective about how they implement it and 
they are increasingly looking at every function to determine whether it is 'essential' and at 
the same time `core' to their primary business. Functions such as internal audit, tax, 
finance, marketing, information technology, human resource management, and 
accounting, that were traditionally considered to be too close to the core of the business to 
be performed by an outside service provider are now recognised as `essential but not core'. 
Clearly a difference can be found between what is regarded as `core' and what is deemed 
to be 'essential'. While an activity can be `essential', it is possible that it may not to be the 
essence of the organisation's competitive advantage, in other words, it is more or less 
considered to be a `non-core' or peripheral activity. While on numerous occasions it has 
been claimed that it is vital that core activities should be kept in-house, it is increasingly 
the case that activities which are identified as `essential' are deemed to be of low strategic 
importance and as a result they constitute good candidates for outsourcing. However. not 
all `essential' activities are prime candidates for outsourcing and should not be treated as 
such. It might be the case that the outsourcing of an `essential' activity, such as internal 
auditing, would leave an organisation potentially vulnerable to market failure sometime in 
the near future. 
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Not many people can dispute the fact that while internal audit is an `essential' function it 
may not be in the centre of a given organisation's competitive advantage. In fact, it is 
claimed that besides specialised outside internal audit providers, few organisations would 
consider themselves to be in the business of internal auditing. The reality is that internal 
audit, while it is perceived be many to be essential, it represents an activity that is not a 
core competency within most organisations, and inevitably it becomes a candidate for 
outsourcing. 
Testing H2: Whether internal audit is essential but not a core activity, is clearly a matter of 
opinion. For some Directors and their organisations, internal audit is not only perceived to 
be essential but also a core activity. Likewise, other organisations may view internal audit 
as a support activity which can be easily performed at a lower cost by one of the public 
accounting firms or an outside provider who specialises in the provision of this service. In 
order to test this hypothesis the participants will be asked to state how they perceive the 
internal audit function. 
4.3 Group B: Factors Influencing the Decision 
H3: Cost savings are the most important consideration in the decision to outsource internal 
auditing. 
The literature reviewed overwhelmingly supported that cost is really the primary 
consideration on which most organisations base their decision to employ the use of 
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outsourcing. At a time when employers demand higher and higher levels of performance 
and employees are facing cutbacks and diminishing resources. outsourcing is emerging as 
an attractive solution. According to Hendry (1995), the rationale behind this movement is 
quite simple. He explains that, "... if' contracting out is cheaper than doing it your, VL'l f, 
\ 
outsource ". Whether, however, internal auditing is a function that is outsourced mainly to 
generate cost-savings, is an issue that definitely requires further investigation. 
From what has been written in the literature, it seems that outside providers of internal 
audit services are winning outsourcing contracts, on the basis that their proposed fee is less 
than the cost of the current in-house internal audit function. If the external service 
providers perceive that internal audit work involves `low level' tasks which can be 
handled by trainee accountants from their external audit departments with only limited 
experience or in some cases by qualified external auditors during their spare time, then this 
must naturally influence their costing and pricing decisions. This strategy, without a doubt, 
allows outside service providers to offer heavily discounted rates while at the same time 
achieving a decent profit. Furthermore, the outsourcer may, in some cases, initially accept 
a low rate of return in order to build up its reputation with a longer term goal of increasing 
relative power and market share. Eventually, if the organisation decides to outsource its 
internal audit function what will probably gain is simply an immediate cost reduction 
coupled with an unpredictable long-term future. It is extremely important, however. to 
ensure that the quality of service is not sacrificed at the sacrificial stone of short-term cost- 
savings. 
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Furthermore, unless there is a fixed fee agreement in advance covering the whole duration 
of the outsourcing contract, there is always the danger of a possible fee explosion with the 
external service providers seeking to re-negotiate fees upwards once they have securely 
establish links with the organisation. Perhaps at the end of the day there will be nothing to 
gain and probably much more to lose from outsourcing the internal audit function. 
An evaluation of today's cost structure may not be representative of future costs, therefore, 
when the cost of outsourcing a specific function is calculated. it is always important to 
look into the future. It is not good enough just to use data unadjusted from the past. Future 
costs and not historic costs must be estimated in order to come to a conclusion as to 
whether an outsourcing decision will be cost-effective. Furthermore, Peter Chalos (1995) 
claims that "Empirical evidence suggest that companies do not always realise the benefits 
they expected from outsourcing. Too often, companies underestimate transaction (e. g. 
search costs to find a reliable supplier and costs of entering and enforcing contracts) and 
co-ordination costs (e. g. co-ordination costs of all exchanges over the life of the 
contract) ". Since such costs are very difficult to calculate, most of the times cost 
justifications for outsourcing decisions are inaccurate. Consequently, what initially may 
appear to be an appealing outsourcing arrangement may, on closer investigation, prove to 
be quite unattractive. 
It will also be necessary for an organisation contemplating the outsourcing of its internal 
audit function, to estimate how much it costs to maintain such a function in-house.: full 
and accurate identification of in-house costs will provide a more accurate picture as to 
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whether there will be any significant cost-savings to be made from outsourcing. In the case 
of an in-house internal audit function, some services such as office space. the use of 
organisational facilities (i. e. cars, computers, etc). secretarial help. assistance provided by 
other departments in the organisation, etc, should be included in the overall cost of 
maintaining an in-house department. 
Testing H3: In order to test this hypothesis it is important to find out whether 
organisations actually perceive potential cost-savings to be a significant factor in their 
decision to outsource the internal audit function or whether other factors are playing a far 
more prominent role. 
H4: There is a relationship between the size of an organisation and its decision to 
outsource internal auditing. 
It is widely believed that no firm is too large or too small to consider outsourcing. 
However, it has to be said that organisations outsource for different reasons according to 
their respective sizes. Small, rapidly expanding organisations, see the use of outsourcing 
as a way of reducing risk and delivering all the capabilities of a large firm without taking 
on extra fixed costs. McCune (1993), argues that "instead of adding employees and 
divisions as they grow, small companies are staying competitive by nurturing a few core 
products or services and hiring outside vendors to handle the details ". Even mid-sized 
and larger organisations that can afford to be self-sufficient are finding outsourcing to be 
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an attractive alternative. Having downsized and reengineered themselves to focus on their 
`core competencies', large organisations turn to outsourcing service providers to supply 
them with everything else. 
Since there are still no compulsory rules and regulations, at least in the private sector. 
forcing organisations to perform internal audit or maintain an internal audit department in- 
house, it is increasingly the case that many small or growing publicly-traded organisations 
do not perceive the need for a full-time internal audit function. Outsourcing will possibly 
enable the expansion of internal audit services into organisations where such a function 
was not feasible in the past. Chapman (1995) maintains that, "... adding internal auditors 
to the permanent staff is often not worth it, especially in light of the number of different 
areas where the internal audit department might require specialised knowledge at one 
time or another ". It seems that smaller organisations that could not previously afford to 
maintain a fully resourced internal audit department can now use outsourcing as a cheaper 
alternative. Outsourcing can prove to be a cheaper course of action for those organisations 
considering regular employees' salaries, benefits, and associated overhead (e. g. demand 
for office space, equipment, stationary, and training). 
Testing H4: The two variables of interest in the above hypothesis are the size and 
outsourcing. The main objective is to find out whether a relationship exists between these 
two variables. In other words, whether `the smaller the organisation the higher the chance 
to outsource' (size (-) then outsource (+)) OR whether `the bigger the organisation the 
lower the chance to outsource'(size (+) then outsource (-)) OR whether size has nothing to 
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do with the decision to outsource. Size will be measured using only the number of people 
employed by each organisation. The `number of people employed' was the only uniform 
metric that could be used in order to have an accurate indication of the size, given the large 
diversity of operations and the different industries the organisations that made up the 
sample are currently engaged in. 
H5: There is a relationship between the diversity of operations of an organisation and its 
decision to outsource internal auditing. 
A change in the business environment (i. e. an organisation going globally) can lead to the 
decision to outsource the internal audit function. For example, a construction company can 
get a contract to built a project in a distant foreign country and the provision of internal 
audit maybe necessary. In such case, the delivery of internal audit can be quite a complex 
procedure, especially when it involves compliance issues for government work. or when 
the paper trail the auditors must follow is written in a foreign language. covers foreign 
currencies, or subject to foreign laws, reporting, and tax regulations. 
Hodgson and Puschaver (1995) claim that outsourcing can help multinational companies 
achieve cost-effective internal audit coverage at multiple overseas locations. Sending an 
internal audit team to distant countries can be a logistical nightmare. The authors argue 
that, for years, multinationals have struggled with the task of providing internal audit 
services to international locations. The use of outsourcing can help management solve this 
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problem without inflating the travel budget. keeping away their staff from exhaustive and 
expensive trips, and also avoiding the language and cultural barriers that will most 
probably inhibit a visiting internal audit team. Even if the visiting internal auditors are 
fluent in the local language, they still require an adjustment period in order to become 
fully effective in their new setting. Local internal auditors, however. can step right in and 
get to work immediately. 
Testing Hs: The two variables of interest in the above hypothesis are the diversitl, of 
operations and outsourcing. The primary goal is to establish whether the diversity of 
operations can affect the decision to outsource the internal audit function. The diversity of 
operations will be measured: For the Private Sector in terms of the geographical domain 
where the organisations are currently operating in (National/International/Multinational), 
and for the Public Sector the type of organisation (Government 
Department/Agency/Housing Association) will be used. 
H6: Legal rulings can affect the decision to outsource internal auditing. 
It has been claimed that the TUPE legislation can have a direct impact on the decision to 
outsource not just the internal audit function but also any other function. For example, 
organisations that have tried to concentrate on their core activities and outsource the rest, 
have been held up by TUPE. Continuity of employment usually dominates employee 
concerns over whether terms and conditions will be the same after outsourcing. The 
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purpose of the legislation is to safeguard employees' jobs by preventing dismissal. If any 
of the employees that are involved in the transfer is dismissed the liability arising from 
his/her dismissal will fall on the new employer. New employers must bear in mind that 
they may have to pay a considerable amount of money in damages where employees have 
put in long periods of continuous service. 
The application of TUPE has left organisations with less room for manoeuvre. 
Organisations that were previously considering outsourcing certain functions will most 
certainly, at present, have less choice of quality outside service providers. The reason for 
this is that service providers that have, in the past, considered bidding for such outsourcing 
contracts fear that they will now have no flexibility when it comes to staffing and will 
have to take on board the costs of existing, sometimes unwanted and unproductive 
employees. Inevitably, TUPE will probably make outsourcing a totally unattractive option 
to consider. 
Although what has been just mentioned above might be true in some cases, the truth of the 
matter is that there is currently a large number of service providers in the market for 
outsource services. For the outside service providers, the fact that they have to take on a 
large proportion, if not the entire workforce of the client as a result of TUPE. inevitably 
entails a short-term constraint on efficiency gains, implying a higher contract price 
because of the costs of carrying surplus labour. In the long-run, however, Domberger 
(1998) argues that service providers can rely on natural attrition and redeployment to other 
activities as a means of aligning manpower requirements with the demands of the contract. 
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This can provide a sufficient explanation as to why service providers are so keen to take 
on more and more outsourcing contracts and it also demonstrates that TUPE might not he 
a serious obstacle after all. 
In addition, although many outside service providers might not see the retention of the 
client's entire workforce favourably, at the end of the day it might make good sense to do 
so. The reason for this is that most of the employees involved, for example with the 
internal audit function, already have relevant skills for the activity concerned (they might 
even be professionally qualified), they possess an in-depth knowledge of the organisation 
and therefore there is no need to familiarise themselves with the organisation's structure, 
policies, practices, business methods, and culture. They are also inclined to respond 
constructively to new management initiatives to improve working practices and increase 
productivity. 
Testing H6: In order to test this hypothesis, it is important to get the personal perspective 
of those Directors whose organisations have outsourced the internal audit function. It will 
also be beneficial to establish whether any future decision to outsource the internal audit 
function by those who have not done so up to now, will be influenced in any way by the 
advent of this legislation. It might be even the case that TUPE has actually made easier the 
decision to outsource because organisations will now have the chance to offload 
unproductive or unwanted employees without suffering the painful consequences such as 
litigation, redundancy payments, etc. 
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H7: There is a relationship between the length of time an organisation had an in-house 
internal audit function and its decision to outsource the function. 
The whole `history' of the organisation is bound to have an impact on the decision to 
outsource the internal audit function. For an organisation that has always favoured a 
vertically integrated organisational structure and has always maintained an internal audit 
department in-house, naturally it will be more difficult for them to consider any form of 
outsourcing. On the other hand, it is quite possible that organisations without a pre- 
existing internal audit department but requiring a swift internal audit coverage, might be 
tempted to consider outsourcing firstly. The engagement of an outside internal audit 
service provider, instead of starting an in-house internal audit function completely from 
scratch, will enable instant service provision limiting, at the same time, hiring headaches 
to a minimum. Furthermore, top management may not have the time, skills or background 
necessary for the establishment of a competent internal audit function in-house. 
Organisations that have always seen the necessity of having an internal audit function in- 
house, might not be willing to jump onto the outsourcing bandwagon just because 
someone else from the outside can provide the service. They will naturally resist the 
temptation. However, outsourcing will and should receive serious consideration when 
there is considerable dissatisfaction with the existing internal audit coverage. 
Organisations that tolerate a sub-standard internal audit coverage are contemplating their 
future establishment. 
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Testing H7: The main objective of this hypothesis is to establish whether the lenah of 
time an organisation had an internal audit function in-house will influence in any way the 
decision to outsource the function. In other words, whether an organisation that had an 
internal audit function in-house for a substantial period of time will be more inclined to 
avoid the use of outsourcing. 
Hs: The many alternative sources of supply in the market can influence the decision to 
outsource internal auditing. 
Internal audit service providers, and particularly public accounting firms, view internal 
auditing as an attractive market for revenue growth and for this reason, they have recently 
engaged into a marketing war in order to promote their extended audit services to existing 
clients as well as to new ones. It has always been the case that the benefits of competition 
tend to be greatest where the supply side of the market is well developed 
- 
that is where 
there is a reasonably large pool of potential service providers. Consequently, the high 
competition in the market for outsourced internal audit services, will provide potential 
buyers with a bigger pool of providers from which they can choose the one that will satisfy 
better their needs. It is not a secret that providers will do everything and anything in their 
power to capture a bigger share of the market. Low prices, improved quality of service. 
specialised internal audit personnel are only some of the main areas that providers are 
expected to compete among themselves in order to win over more clients. At the end of 
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the day, it is more likely that the buyer of the service is the one that stands to benefit most 
from this intense competition. 
However, Williamson has demonstrated that what may have been (and usually is) an 
effective large numbers bidding situation at the outset is sometimes transformed into a 
bilateral trading relation thereafter. This occurs if, despite the fact that large numbers of 
qualified bidders were prepared to enter competitive bids for the initial outsourcing 
contract, the winning bidder realises advantages over non-winners at the contract renewal 
stage because non-trivial investments in durable specific assets are put in place (or 
otherwise accrue, in a learning-by-doing way) during contract execution. As a result, the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour from the provider's part is quite possible, especially 
if we take into account the fact that it will be extremely difficult and very costly to switch 
to another internal audit provider or even to bring the internal audit function back in- 
house. Williamson concludes that the suffering of potential provider opportunism and 
small numbers bargaining can only be reduced if the buyer can obtain unilateral control of 
the function by producing it in-house. 
Testing H8: No one can argue against the fact that when there is competition in the supply 
market, the consumer of a particular service or of a product will be the overall winner. It is 
therefore quite possible that an organisation not only might be tempted to consider the 
possibility of outsourcing its internal audit function due to the benefits the different 
providers claim they can offer in order to win over more customers, but also. more 
importantly, by the significant choice of potential providers that they will have. 
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4.4 Group C: Impact 
H9: The quality of the internal audit service will be adversely affected if the internal audit 
function is outsourced. 
Since every providers' primary motive is and will always be to make more profit, and 
while significant opportunities exist to reduce their costs in a manner which has a negative 
effect on quality, the issue of `quality of service' will always remain in the forefront of any 
outsourcing debate. It appears that there is a tendency among organisations that have 
adopted outsourcing to focus primarily on the more tangible aspects of the bid, such as the 
financial cost of outsourcing, and to give to the more intangible aspects of the bid such as 
the provider's reputation for quality, less attention. This can have disastrous implications. 
It could bias the selection process in favour of the service provider who tenders an 
unrealistically low bid which, in turn, have other undesirable effects. The successful 
provider may subsequently seek to renegotiate prices upward, after the contract has been 
won. Alternatively, he may try to reduce the quality in an effort to reduce the gap between 
revenues and costs. Therefore it is very important before jumping onto the outsourcing 
bandwagon, like many organisations have done up-to-now, to ensure that the quality of 
service is not sacrificed at any moment in time. 
The main factor affecting the quality of the internal audit service is the experience level of 
the auditing staff. Unless prior knowledge of and experience of an outsourcing service 
provider exists, the organisation is running the risk of reducing the quality of internal audit 
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every time an outside provider is contracted to perform internal audit work. Poor quality of 
internal audit work will eventually cost the organisation more to rectify. Large firms when 
promoting what they consider to be their `extended audit services*. claim to have the edge 
in quality and training of personnel. Nobody can dispute the fact that traditionally external 
audit firms are renowned for their customary tactic to hire very bright individuals and to 
provide them with extensive training in the practice of financial auditing. Likewise, we 
can expect them to make every effort to employ experienced internal auditors to lead these 
new engagements. In addition, the broad range of experience the provider might have 
gained through the provision of internal audit services to other organisations in the 
industry, will enable them to identify problem areas and opportunities that have not been 
previously visible to the in-house internal auditors who might be long accustomed to wti ell- 
established routines. 
It is true that in-house internal audit staff are focused primarily on one organisation in one 
industry and may not have the time to keep up with what is going on outside their 
industry. Part of the service provider's role is to keep up with the latest developments and 
pass them on to their clients. On the other hand, in-house internal auditors will be more 
familiar with their organisation's operating policies and procedures, production processes, 
and the personnel in each department, as well as with the general culture of the 
organisation. Loyalty to the organisation may even lead an in-house internal auditor to 
greater dedication, while outsourcing could seriously undermine morale through fear of 
transfer or job loss. 
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In order to determine how satisfied the organisations, which have already outsourced their 
internal audit functions, are with the quality of service supplied by their respective service 
providers, a number of quality metrics have been developed. These quality- metrics are 
divided into three groups: 
Group I 
-Audit Performance: 
1. Adherence to the audit plan: An audit plan provides a framework for the performance 
of a successful audit. A detailed audit plan should be developed in advance so that to 
ensure the success of the audit. This specific quality metric aims to establish ho« 
satisfied is the client organisation that the audit work undertaken by the service 
provider always proceeds without any deviation from the original audit plan and in the 
event where some deviations are introduced those that are directly affected are 
informed beforehand. 
2. Provider's level of understanding of the operation(s) being audited: One of the many 
criticisms that frequently steams out of the outsourcing of the internal audit function is 
that service providers do not always bring relevant industry knowledge to the client 
organisation. In other words, there are cases where the provider is not familiar with the 
industry in which the client organisation is operating in, therefore he/she will be 
unable to audit certain operations effectively since it will be a completely new territory 
for him/her. Hence, this metric requires the respondent to indicate how satisfied his/her 
organisation is with the level of understanding, demonstrated by the service provider, 
of the workings of the operations(s) being audited. 
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3. Audits are conducted with minimum disruption to normal activities and with few 
demands on operating personnel: This quality metric wishes to determine whether the 
client organisation is satisfied or not that the way the outside service provider is 
performing the audit does not severely disrupt the auditees from their day-to-day 
activities. 
4. Professionalism of the service provider: Internal auditors should know how to deal 
with situations encountered based on the knowledge and skills they possess of how to 
perform internal audits. They should be proficient in applying internal auditing 
standards, procedures and techniques. In other words. does the service provider's audit 
personnel appear to be well trained and professional in their work? And how well do 
they exhibit a professional knowledge of the principles and techniques of internal 
auditing? 
5. Internal audit meets professional standards: Internal auditors should adhere to the 
Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing and the Code of Ethics. 
This quality metric wishes to find out how satisfied the organisations are that the 
service providers make use of the Standards for direction and guidance when carrying 
out an audit. 
6. Response to the organisation's needs within the pre-arranged time limit: It might be 
the case that the availability of audit staff may not coincide with the timing needed by 
the client organisation. Accordingly, this measure attempts to establish how satisfied 
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the client organisations are with the responsiveness of the service providers to their 
client's needs and whether they respond adequately and within the pre-arranged time 
limit as defined in the outsourcing contract. 
Group II 
- 
Internal Audit Provider/Auditees Relations: 
1. The scope and objectives of each audit are clearly communicated to our managers: 
The aim of this metric is to determine how satisfied the client organisations are with 
the fact that the scope and objectives of each audit are clearly communicated to the 
managers so that they are made aware of what to expect. 
2. Good inter personal skills on the part of the service provider: What this specific 
metric attempts to determine is how pleased the organisations are with the attitude of 
the outside service providers towards the auditees. Without a positive attitude the 
auditor will be unable to secure complete co-operation from the auditees undermining. 
as a result, the overall success of the audit. It is a well-known fact that the relation 
between auditor and auditee is inherently prone to conflict. Lawrence Sawyer (1996), 
for example, said that `for many years, auditors have known in a general way that 
their advent brings no joy and their leaving brings no tears ". Accordingly. its is 
necessary for the service provider to adopt a co-operative stance or what is sometimes 
known as the participative approach. What this means is that auditors should develop 
a teamwork relationship with the auditees. both parties striving towards the 
achievement of the same goals, eliminating at the same time any fear or animosity that 
may exist. 
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3. Appropriate personnel are alerted to the fact that an audit is to be carried out: The 
anticipation of the audit and the mystery that usually follows it can be defused by 
keeping surprise audits to a minimum, restricting them to such activities where fraud is 
suspected. Auditors can provide information in advance to auditees. explaining the 
audit process and how to best prepare for it. They can also explain the positive results 
of the audit and the benefits they can expect. This quality measure hopes to determine 
the extend of satisfaction of the client organisations with the advance warning given 
out by the providers prior to the audit. 
4. Findings are discussed with those directly concerned and their help is utilised in 
developing proposed solutions: Audit findings are conditions identified by internal 
auditors that require corrective action. It is important that no deficiency findings 
should be formally reported that has not been thoroughly discussed with operating 
management. More importantly, the auditees are more likely to accept a proposed 
solution if they have been directly involved in the decision making process. This 
quality metric attempts to determine how pleased the organisations were with their 
involvement in the joint development of proposed solutions with the outside service 
providers. 
5. Errors disclosed by audit are treated factually and fairly: Agreement with 
management should be reached on the facts and on some reasonable course of action in 
order to correct the disclosed errors. Errors should also be treated fairly. There are 
cases when internal auditors may not have interpreted conditions correctly or they may 
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not have read procedures as intended. In order to save themselves from a possible 
future embarrassment, they should be checking their understanding of «-hat they found 
by talking with those most likely to know the facts. The opinions of managers and 
experienced employees should always be welcomed. This quality measure endeavours 
to discover how satisfied the client organisations are with the way the providers treat 
identified errors. 
Group III 
-Audit Reports: 
1. Audit scope and objectives: The scope statement identifies the breadth or the 
limitations of the examination. It specifically points to areas that were not covered. 
Audit objectives, on the other hand, define intended audit accomplishments. It is 
critical that both the audit scope and objectives are clearly set in the beginning of the 
audit report so that to help the reader understand what to expect from the rest of the 
report. This metric tries to determine the extent of satisfaction of the organisation with 
the audit scope and objectives set out in every audit report. 
?. Accuracy of information: The report must be factual. The statements, figures. and 
references incorporated in the audit report must be based on facts. This metric tries to 
establish whether the client organisations were satisfied with the correctness and 
validity of all the information included by the service providers in each audit report. 
Consistency in the way audit reports are presented: It is important that the audit 
report is well-presented. Most organisations follow a fairly consistent format in their 
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report presentation. For example, longer reports generally have tables of contents in 
order to make their content more accessible. The titles used are sufficiently descriptive 
to clearly convey the subject matter of the report. Paragraphs are generally- short and 
there is an abundant use of headings to indicate what follows and to break up the 
crowded lines. Consistency is also desirable so that regular readers know where to look 
for matters which are likely to affect them. This particular metric should give an 
answer to the question: Are the organisations pleased with the way audit reports are 
presented to them by the service providers? 
4. Clarity and conciseness: Poorly structured reports are impediments to clarity. An 
orderly processing of ideas and a skilful translation of technical and jargonish terms 
enhances clarity. Conciseness, on the other hand, means eliminating what is irrelevant 
and immaterial. In other words, excluding from the audit report those ideas, findings, 
words, and sentences that do not help to get across the central theme of the report. This 
quality measure should indicate how satisfied the organisations are with the clarity and 
conciseness of the audit reports. 
5. Time taken to issue the audit report: It has to be bear in mind that the audit report is 
not designed to be a historical document. On the contrary, it should serve as signal to 
initiate the necessary corrective action. As a result, its effect is lost if it is not timely. 
Since audit reports are time-critical action documents whose impact and effectiveness 
is very much related to the lapse time between the end of the audit and their issuance. 
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this metric should show how satisfied the client organisations are with the time taken 
by the service provider to produce the final audit report. 
6. Proper treatment of findings according to relative significance: No audit finding 
should be given any more weight or stress than it deserves. Insignificant findings 
should not be formally reported at all, as long as they are properly corrected. On the 
other hand, major findings that require immediate corrective action should be given 
priority. This quality measure should point out how satisfied are the organisations with 
the significance of the reported findings? 
7. Absence of surprises when the final audit report is released: It is important to 
establish whether the provider reviewed all the adverse findings, if there were any, 
with the auditees and with management during the course of the audit to make sure 
that there was no disagreement on the facts. No findings should be incorporated in an 
audit report that were not previously discussed with the auditees. Furthermore, it is 
useful to discuss not only the impact of the findings but also the auditor's 
recommendations for corrective action. Mutual agreement between the auditor and the 
auditee on the course of corrective action is crucial. If the auditor has done his job 
effectively the audit report should give the auditees no real surprises. 
8. The number of audit recommendations: Service providers should make a sufficient 
number of practical and relevant recommendations in the final audit report which are 
likely to be implemented successfully by the client organisations. This quality metric 
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should indicate how pleased the organisations are with the number of viable 
recommendations made by their service providers. 
9. The quality of audit recommendations: Auditors should not tell operating managers 
how they must correct unsatisfactory conditions. The most they can do is recommend. 
This quality measure attempts to find out how satisfied the organisations are with the 
quality of audit recommendations made by their respective service providers. 
Although outsourced internal audit services offered by reputable professionals come with 
a reasonable assurance of quality, management should ensure that the service they are 
receiving is in accordance to the quality standards pre-agreed in the contract. Ultimately, 
the organisation using an outside service provider has to determine whether there are 
sufficient countervailing forces to mitigate the providers' tendency to reduce the quality of 
their service after a while in order to have a higher financial return. Such forces might 
include the organisation's ability to switch service providers at a relatively low cost, the 
ability to effectively monitor the provider's performance, and finally relying on the 
contractor's desire to safeguard an expensively acquired reputation and to secure future 
business by meeting the client organisation's expectations. 
Testing H9: Few would dispute the power of competition to drive prices down. One need 
only to observe what competition has done for mobile phone prices in recent years to 
acknowledge its force. But the influence of competition on quality is less clear-cut, if only 
because quality is typically much harder to quantify. Indeed. sceptics would argue that 
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competition often reduces prices at the expense of quality. However. one must note that 
what represents a good level of service to one person may be barely adequate for another. 
Such differences arise because expectations of what constitute good and bad vary 
significantly between service recipients. In order to test this hypothesis, a table will be 
constructed which will incorporate all the above mentioned quality metrics. Those taking 
part in the survey will be asked to indicate using a 5-point scale how satisfied is their 
organisation with the quality of service it currently receives. 
11 Hio: Independence is compromised when public accounting firms take on the dual role of 11 
the internal and external auditor. 
Critics of outsourcing point out their concerns regarding independence that are raised 
when the same accounting firm provides both internal and external audit services. 
Contrary to this view, advocates of outsourcing, particularly the public accounting firms 
that have been in recent years aggressively engaged in marketing their new internal audit 
services, would naturally insist that independence is not compromised by their initiatives. 
External auditors, maintain that they can perform many of the tasks traditionally assigned 
to internal auditors and furthermore, their independence, due to the absence of an 
employer-employee relationship, can also alleviate any potential regulatory concerns. 
\ldhizer III and Cashell (1996) claim that in-house internal audit staff cannot be 
independent because "... any party who is responsible for activcll, monitoring a company's 
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internal controls is an integral part of the internal controls and, therefor', i. S not 
independent with respect to that company ". On the other hand they maintain that "... an 
accounting firm's independence would be impaired if it provides all of the audit services 
(both external and internal) for a client". Based on the literature reviewed, it has been 
found that in more than half of the current cases in which internal auditing is outsourced, 
the outside service provider is also the external auditor. Naturally, the conflict potential is 
too great, despite the outsourcing providers' claims that nothing improper will occur 
simply because staff performing the internal and the external audits do not intermix. The 
size of the outside service provider will also have an important role to play in preserving 
independence. Large firms, as compared to small firms, are better able to maintain their 
independence while performing both activities. Advocates of this presumption point out 
that larger firms are more likely to have two different departments for providing internal 
and external audit services. Furthermore, it is less likely that the fees from a single client 
will make-up a considerable segment of the total revenues of the firm. Nevertheless, the 
general feeling both here in the U. K. and abroad is that if an organisation decides to 
outsource, it might be a good idea not to have the same firm performing both audits. 
Testing Hio: The issue of independence is quite a subjective topic and naturally each 
person will have his or her opinion on the subject. At times it has been even said that the 
potential compromise of independence associated with the outsourcing of the internal 
audit function is one of the problems that do not arise when outsourcing any other activity. 
It is therefore important to investigate whether independence is actually impaired or not 
every time a public accounting firm takes on this dual role. 
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4.5 Summary 
Table 4.1: Summary Table of Research Hypotheses 
Research Hypotheses 
Hi: `Core' activities should always kept in-house and all `non-core' activities should 
be outsourced. 
H2: Internal auditing while `essential' is not considered to be a 'core' activity. 
H3: Cost savings are the most important consideration in the decision to outsource 
internal auditing. 
H4: There is a relationship between the size of an organisation and its decision to 
outsource internal auditing. 
Hs: There is a relationship between the diversity of operations of an organisation and 
its decision to outsource internal auditing. 
H6: Legal rulings can affect the decision to outsource internal auditing. 
H7: There is a relationship between the length of time an organisation had an in- 
house internal audit function and its decision to outsource the function. 
H8: The many alternative sources of supply in the market can influence the decision 
to outsource internal auditing. 
H9: The quality of the internal audit service will be adversely affected if the internal 
audit function is outsourced. 
Hio: Independence is compromised when public accounting firms take on the dual 
role of the internal and external auditor. 
Based on the main points identified in the literature review, the above ten hypotheses have 
been formulated. By testing these hypotheses in the forthcoming chapters, the researcher 
hopes that he will unravel some useful findings which will make a significant contribution 
towards the on-going debate surrounding the issue of outsourcing of the internal audit 
function. The testing of the hypotheses will hopefully assist in establishing how the 
internal audit function is perceived, the identification of the main motivating factors 
behind the decision to outsource the internal audit function, and also the impact of the 
outsourcing decision on independence and the quality of service. 
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Chapter V: 
Research Methodology 
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5.1 Introduction 
There is no doubt that surveys have become a very common method of research in our time 
and probably most, if not all of us, have had some experience with them either by playing 
the part of the researcher performing the actual survey or as part of a sample requested to 
participate in a survey. According to Singleton et al (1993). among all the different 
approaches to social research, surveys offer the most effective means of social description. 
They can provide the researcher with detailed and precise information about large 
heterogeneous populations. Although they are quite flexible with respect to the topics and 
purposes of research, they also tend to be highly standardised. This makes them less 
adaptable in the sense that it is difficult, and at times even impossible, to change the course 
of research after the study has begun. That is, once the survey instrument is in the field, it is 
too late to make any changes. 
Basically, survey research may be conducted in two ways. The first way is through the use 
of personal face-to-face/telephone interviews and the second way is through the use of self- 
administered questionnaires (usually delivered and returned by post). These two methods 
tend to be standardised for all the respondents in order to enhance the reliability of the 
collected data. For the purpose of this particular thesis, it was decided that the use of a self- 
administered postal questionnaire would have been the most appropriate way to collect 
data, mainly because it would have been easier to reach a significant number of respondents 
across the whole of the United Kingdom. Two further important considerations were the 
time constraints and the limited budget the researcher had at his disposal. 
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5.2 Deciding on the Sample 
When a researcher embarks on his or her mission to cam' out a survey. what he or she 
would like to accomplish most of the times is to establish the broadest possible 
generalisation, applicable to infinitely large classes of events, vet for obvious reasons it is 
virtually impossible to observe all relevant events. Time. cost. or inaccessibility. are some 
of the main reasons which can restrict the researchers' ability to study the , thole population 
in its entirety. Unless the researcher is willing to restrict his or her inferences to a small set 
of narrowly defined cases or unless one has an abundance of time and money, there is no 
other way round sampling. A carefully selected sample is in fact a v-er,, - efficient Nvaý- of 
producing accurate information. 
Jankowicz (1991) defines sampling as the deliberate choice of a number of people, known 
as the sample. The main task in sampling is to select a representative sample of the 
population of interest, also known as the target population, that is, the population to %ý hich 
the researcher wishes to generalise his or her results. Ideally in sampling the researcher 
would like to obtain a sample that will be representative of the target population. However. 
it is extremely unlikely that one will be able to draw a perfectly representative sample. 
Because the populations studied are not known in all respects. there is no way of knowing 
just how representative a given sample is. 
For the purpose of this research, a sample comprised of ? 5C) organisations from both the 
public and the private sectors was drawn primarily for three reasons: ý 1) to have a better 
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indication as to the extent the internal audit function is outsourced in the L'K: (2) to provide 
the means for an accurate comparison; and finally (3) to generate feedback from a cross 
section of various-sized organisations. Over the years it has been frequently claimed in the 
literature that the outsourcing trend, in the private sector in particular. has been constantly 
on the rise. The aim behind the inclusion of the public sector in this research was to confirm 
whether this rising trend in the private sector has been also mirrored in the public sector. 
particularly under the market testing programme. 
Since the mid-1980s, government policy has focused on market testing and Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering (CCT) in the belief that this approach will contribute towards 
improving efficiency and better value for money. The internal audit function, as was the 
case with many other functions previously insulated from competitive market pressures, 
found itself under the microscope. Brennan (1995) claims that for years people have been 
saying that in-house internal audit departments in the public sector are on their way out. 
From the late 1980s up to very recently, internal audit was considered to be a good 
candidate for market testing and for eventual outsourcing. Today, however, things appear to 
be somewhat different from how they used to be. According to Marshall (1994), when the 
internal audit function is market tested, the in-house team usually prevails against the 
opposition. In other words, what is implied here is that the outsourcing of the internal audit 
function might not be as prevalent in the public sector as one might expect. By including 
the public sector in this research, the true extent of outsourcing of the internal audit function 
in this particular sector will be revealed in due time. 
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Since it was important to examine how the internal audit function is perceived, the primary 
motive(s) behind the decision to outsource the internal audit function and the impact such a 
decision will have, it was deemed necessary to obtain the views of those respondents whose 
organisations are currently outsourcing the internal audit function. The views of people in 
organisations that currently have an in-house internal audit function and those who do not 
have such a function were equally important in order to obtain a better overall picture of the 
extent of outsourcing of this particular function. Consequently, it was decided that the 
sample will be made up with internal audit directors and in the absence of such a director 
or of an internal audit function then the organisation's finance director was to be contacted. 
Their positions meant that they would have been familiar with the policy of their respective 
organisations in regard to the outsourcing of the internal audit function. 
Diagram 5.1: Sample Selection 
SCENARIOS 
1 2 3 4 5 
Internal Audit Internal Audit Internal Audit Partnering/ No Internal 
Function Function Function Co-Sourcing Audit 
Maintained Partially Fully Function 
In-House Outsourced Outsourced At Present 
INTERNAL A UDIT DIRECTORS 
IRECTORS 
The survey instrument chosen to collect primary data was divided into five different 
scenarios/questionnaires and each participant was requested to complete only the one which 
best described the current provision of internal audit within his or her respective 
organisation. From the private sector. 125 companies out of the top 150 listed in the 
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London Stock Exchange were selected while from the public sector a mixture of 125 
Government Departments, Agencies. Non-Departmental Public Bodies. Northern Ireland 
Departments, and Housing Federation Members was chosen. 
5.3 Questionnaire Design 
Jankowicz (1991) maintains that a questionnaire is an important instrument of research, a 
tool for data collection. The use of a questionnaire is a fully-structured technique. This 
means that the content and the sequence of the questions have been determined well in 
advance and likewise, the form of answers which the respondents will provide is also 
determined in advance. However, this technique is not as inflexible as one might expect. 
There is always scope for the inclusion of some open-ended questions. along with the 
closed-ended ones, within a fully structured questionnaire. 
The main advantages of postal questionnaires are: 
1. Low cost of data collection; 
2. Low cost of processing; 
3. Ability to reach respondents who live at widely dispersed addresses; 
4. Allows respondents more time to think about their responses 
The main disadvantages of postal questionnaire are: 
1. Generally low response rate; 
2. No control over the order in which the questions are answered, no check on incomplete 
responses, incomplete questionnaires or the passing on of questionnaires to others. 
3. No opportunity to correct misunderstandings, or to offer explanations or help; 
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The set of questionnaires was designed with primarily two things in mind: 'appearance 
and `easiness to complete'. It is true that no matter how good the covering letter is or ho«- 
attractive the promised incentives are, the first impression the prospective respondent will 
get from the appearance of the questionnaire will determine to a large extend whether he or 
she will pick up a pen and start completing it. 
Of course this goal can only be achieved if the questionnaire has a professional appearance 
and if the questions included are easy to read, answer, and they are, most Importantly. of 
considerable interest to the respondent. Therefore, every effort was made so that to improve 
the appearance, format, content, and layout of the questionnaires. Five different colours cat 
paper were used in order to differentiate between the five scenarios. Furthermore, the five 
questionnaires/scenarios were inserted into a professionally printed coloured file along with 
a glossary of terms, a covering letter and a reply envelope. All five questionnaires along 
with the covering letter can be found in Appendix I. 
It is generally believed that it is easier to get answers to closed-ended questions than it is to 
get answers from open-ended questions. Most of the times, open-ended questions require 
respondents to answer the questions in their own words while, on the other hand, closed- 
ended questions require respondents to choose one or, in some cases. more responses from 
a provided list. According to Jankowicz (1991) a variety of response formats for clo,, cd- 
ended questions is available to a researcher, with the most common being the fixed- 
alternative forms: 
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1. Multiple-choice is the most commonly used format and it involves asking respondents 
to choose only one from a provided list of alternative answers. An 'Other, plcac 
specify' alternative is always included in this format; 
2. Free-choice allows respondents to choose one or more answers from the listed 
alternatives. An `Other, please specify' alternative is once again included. and. 
3. Rating format requires from the respondents to assign a number to each of the 
alternatives. A Likert scale (attitude measurement scale) by which the respondents can 
do so, is usually provided. 
There is no doubt that one of the greatest advantages of an open-ended question is the 
freedom the respondent has when answering the question. The resulting information can be 
quite revealing at times, and even the researcher's whole understanding of the issue under 
investigation may completely alter by the unexpected responses to this kind of questions. 
One major drawback, however, is that open-ended questions usually entail more work, not 
only for the respondent but also for the researcher. A respondent may. and usually does find 
a questionnaire made up of open-ended questions to be time-consuming to complete or even 
in some cases he/she may be reluctant to reveal detailed information leaving, as a result. 
unanswered questions, which increase in turn the number of unusable questionnaires. For 
the researcher, the main problems arise from the fact that he or she has to code, summarise. 
and analyse varied (and at times vague) responses. 
Closed-ended questions, on the other hand. are easier on the respondent because they 
require less effort on his or her part. The presence of alternative responses also enhance 
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standardisation by creating the same frame of reference for all respondents making the 
analysis of the responses by the researcher so much easier. Ho«ever, the main problem with 
this type of questions arises from the fact that it is very easy to omit important responses. 
thereby forcing the respondents to choose among alternatives that do not correspond to their 
true feelings, ideas, or attitudes. An additional concern is the bias which a questionnaire 
made up of closed-ended questions can introduce. A respondent who is either lazy or short 
of time my be prompted to choose for each question one of the listed answers quickly and at 
random without thinking through a more correct answer. 
Obviously, both types of questions have their own advantages and disadvantages. At the 
end of the day, it might be a good idea to consider using a combination of the two types of 
questions so that to provide some needed variety. Although the majority of the questions 
incorporated into the five questionnaires were closed-ended, a provision was also made to 
include a small number of open-ended questions, particularly in areas where the 
respondents were asked to reveal their organisations' policy concerning certain issues. 
5.4 Pilot Testing 
Naturally, questionnaires do not emerge fully structured from one day to another; they have 
to be created or adapted, fashioned and developed to maturity after many tests. Usually they 
are the result of a long and painstaking work. Once the questionnaire is distributed, it is out 
of the researcher's control, and he or she has no means of helping the respondents to give 
him or her clear and accurate answers, resolve any ambiguities, or clear up any confusion as 
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to the meaning of questions. So, it is very important to pilot test the questionnaire on a 
small group of respondents having characteristics similar to those of the target group of 
respondents. In fact, every aspect of a questionnaire has to be tried out beforehand in order 
to ensure that it works as intended. When the set of questionnaires and the covering letter 
were pilot tested in November 1998, a number of useful suggestions and recommendations 
were made by the ten participants. All the suggestions and recommendations can be found 
in Appendix II. 
Pilot testing the survey instrument provided the researcher with useful answers to questions 
such as the following: 
1. Whether the language used in the questionnaire matches the sophistication of the 
respondents; 
2. Whether the instructions for completing the questionnaire are clear; 
3. Whether the questions and questions' format are varied enough to retain the 
respondents' interest and attention; 
4. Whether the choice options to closed-ended questions is clear and exhaustive: 
5. That the questionnaires do not include questions which respondents might resist 
answering; 
6. And finally, how long it took them to complete the questionnaire. 
It is also equally important to pilot test the covering letter which will be accompanying the 
questionnaire. At the very least, this should contain: 
1. A statement of who the person contacting the survey is; 
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2. A statement of the purpose of the questionnaire and the need for the study: 
3. A request for help; 
4. A statement that the respondents material will be treated responsibly and 
confidentially; and 
5. Finally, an expression of thanks in anticipation. 
Pilot tests are sometimes omitted because of time and cost constraints but this omission can 
seriously undermine the overall success of the questionnaire. The information gained by 
pilot testing the questionnaire will provide the researcher with direction as to and, necessary 
revision efforts and can considerably improve the end-product and the quality of the 
research as a whole. 
5.5 Advance Notice of the Questionnaire 
Many tests have shown that the percentage of returns can be increased significantly through 
the use of an advance notice. Therefore a decision was taken to introduce the questionnaire 
by telephoning all the people who comprised the sample. Although telephone introduction 
of a postal questionnaire is a lengthy process. nevertheless it has been found to be an 
effective way of giving advance notice. Paul Erdos (1970) in his book "Professional Mail 
Surveys" claims that in one case the preliminary telephone call resulted in 47.8 percent 
replies within ten days as against 28 percent without phone calls. He goes on to say, that 
another published test showed that the percentage of replies increased from 20.5 to 68.2 
percent with the help of a prior phone call. 
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Table 5.1: Estimates of Times for Contacting, Sending, Completion, 
and the Return of the Questionnaire 
Advance Notice of Days Number 
Telephone introduction of the postal questionnaire 88 
Initial Mailing 
Send the questionnaire to the sample by second-class mail 2 
Time for respondent completion 18 
Time for postal return 2 22 
Follow-up Mailing 
Send the questionnaire to the sample by second-class mail 2 
Time for respondent completion 10 
Time for postal return 2 14 
Total estimated time 44 days 
During a period of eight days (from the 20"' of May until the 28`h of May 1999) the 
telephone introduction of the questionnaire took place. Participants from 250 organisations 
from both the public and private sector were initially contacted and informed about the 
purpose of the survey and they were also invited to participate in the research by 
completing one of the set of five questionnaires they were about to receive through their 
mail. In some cases where direct contact with certain Directors could not be established, a 
message was left with either their secretaries or other colleagues. A set of questionnaires 
along with a covering letter was mailed on the 28t'' of May 1999. Table 5.2 shows the 
estimated times from the initial contact with the prospective respondents until the return of 
the completed questionnaires. 
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The main rule for achieving a higher return rate when using a postal questionnaire is: --you 
obtain co-operation by adopting a co-operative stance". The two most important factors in 
generating high return rates are: (1) increasing the perceived importance of the survey: and 
(2) reducing the costs for the respondent. The importance of the survey is impressed on 
respondents by making special appeals within the cover letter, and by making repeat 
contacts in the form of a follow-up mailing. Costs are reduced by including with the actual 
questionnaire a pre-paid self-addressed envelope or by offering monetary incentives. Apart 
from a summary of the results which was mailed to all those who participated in this 
research, no monetary incentives were offered and no postage was supplied with the self- 
addressed envelope due to the limited budget. 
5.6 Follow-Up Mailing 
Since it is practically impossible to achieve a 100% response, and this is true no matter 
what data-gathering technique is employed, a follow-up mailing was used on the 21 S' of 
June 1999. The main purpose of follow-up mailing was to reduce the percentage of non- 
respondents and thereby make the survey more representative. When the response rate is 
low, the adequacy of the sample will be in question because non-respondents' views may 
differ in important ways from the respondents' views. Follow-up efforts therefore are an 
important component of all kinds of surveys. 
Irrespective of how high a percentage of response is achieved by the initial mailing, a 
follow-up mailing will more often than not produce some more return. It has to be born in 
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mind, however, that eventhough such method can at times reduce the percentage of non- 
response, it cannot eliminate it altogether. Despite the efforts of the researcher. he or she 
will always get a number of people who, according to Paul Erdos (1970). are 'born non- 
respondents', simply refusing to participate in any kind of survey. He claims that every 
sample consists of three groups of individuals: 
1. Those who love to answer practically anything; 
2. Those who are more or less uninterested in completing questionnaires, but who can be 
induced to do so by an interesting subject, a well-constructed questionnaire, the 
importance of the sender or his/her survey, an attractive incentive, and/or persuasion; 
3. Finally, we have those who are `born non-respondents'. These people hate to be 
bothered by mail surveys and who seldom if ever answer anything. 
Follow-up mailing is aimed primarily at the 2nd group. The researcher's aim should be to try 
to persuade the members of this (largest) group of the sample and to get as many of them as 
possible to complete and return the questionnaire. In addition, follow-up mailing can help 
the researcher to reach some people who happened to be out of their offices or who for 
some other reason did not have the chance to answer the questionnaire the first time round. 
It is also possible to even find a few people from the 3 `d group in a rare responsive mood' 
The main objective of the follow-up mailing is to get the highest possible number of returns 
from non-respondents to the first mailing. Usually, the follow-up mailing contains another 
copy of the questionnaire and a reply envelope identical with those used in the first mailing. 
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The only thing that will be different this time around is the accompanying letter (See 
Appendix III). 
The accompanying letter for the follow-up mailing will include in a shortened version most 
of the elements of the first letter. Most importantly, it will express the researcher's 
appreciation to the addressee in case he/she has completed and returned the first 
questionnaire. There is a very good reason for mentioning this subject in the letter. It is 
unavoidable that a few people will receive a second questionnaire, even though they have 
answered the first one, because their reply may arrive during the short interval between the 
closing of the first mailing and the delivery of the second. It is therefore necessary to inform 
these respondents that they do not have to answer again and that the researcher is thankful 
for their help. For this reason, it is always desirable to send a follow-up mailing only to the 
non-respondents. Whenever there is a reasonably high return to the first wave, this 
procedure is also more economical. 
Out of the total of 250 questionnaires that were mailed, 165 (66%) were eventually 
completed and returned by the 5t` of July 1999. The response rate of the initial mailing was 
53.2% while the second mailing produced a further 12.8%. From those responded. 89 
(53.9%) were from the Public sector (67 were Government Departments, Agencies, Non- 
Departmental Public Bodies, and Northern Ireland Departments and 22 were Housing 
Federation Members) and 76 (46.1 %) from the Private sector. 
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5.7 Data-Description Phase and Hypotheses Testing 
The data description phase, which is a typical procedure in any data analysis project, 
provides the researcher with the necessary means in order to present the collected data in a 
comprehensible manner, through the use of tables and graphs. Apart from being an 
important activity, the descriptive analysis provides a very useful initial insight as to the 
nature of the responses obtained. According to Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (1997), 
the starting point in a descriptive analysis is the construction of a frequency distribution for 
each variable of interest. This shows in absolute (i. e. simple counts) or relative (i. e. 
percentages) terms how often the different values of the variable are among the units of 
analysis. 
Before the researcher proceeds with the construction of the necessary frequency 
distributions or perform any statistical tests, coding schemes must be developed for every 
variable or question. It is common practise to assign different numerical codes (i. e. I for 
YES and 2 for NO) for all the answers provided for each of the closed-ended questions. 
This simplifies the data entry and analysis particularly when using a computer package. In 
this study, the statistical package SPSS 9.0 for Windows was used in order to facilitate the 
actual statistical analysis. 
It is often said that a `picture speaks a thousand words. Rather than relying solely on 
frequency tables to describe the data collected, the researcher may choose to use bar charts. 
pie charts, or other forms of graphical representation. The average reader is more likely to 
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give more attention to a colourful chart rather than the ordinary black and white printed 
matter. For the graphical representation of the collected data. the computer package 
Microsoft Excel was employed. 
According to what the researcher wants to know. the next step would be to decide on the 
appropriate statistical analysis. The primary objective has been from the beginning to 
ultimately test a number of hypotheses which were formulated during the initial stage of the 
study. In order to achieve this, a combination of parametric and non-parametric tests was 
performed. The questions needed to either accept or reject each of the ten hypotheses was 
analysed using either the one/or two-sample chi-square test, the Mann-Whitney U test, and 
the two sample t-test. The statistical tests undoubtedly facilitated the acceptance/or 
rejection of the formulated hypotheses and the subsequent extraction of the overall 
conclusions. 
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Chapter VI. ' 
Descriptive Data Analysis 
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6.1 Sample Size and Scenario Frequency 
In total, 250 Internal Audit and/or Finance Directors took part in this survey (125 from the 
public sector and 125 from the private sector). Each one of these Directors received a set of 
five questionnaires during the last week of May1999. By the 5"' of July, which was the 
deadline for all the questionnaires to be returned, 165 questionnaires were received which 
represents the 66% of the total number of questionnaires that were initially mailed. Out of the 
165 questionnaires that were received, 89 (53.9%) were from the public sector (67 were 
Government Departments & Agencies and 22 were Housing Federation Members) and 76 
(46.1 %) were from the private sector. 
Table 6.1: Sample Distribution 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Public 89 53.9 53.9 53.9 
Private 76 46.1 46.1 100.0 
Total 165 100.0 100.0 
Figure 6.1: Sample Distribution 
46.1% 
53.9% 
OP riv ate M Public L 
As previously mentioned, five different scenarios were developed for this survey and for each 
of these scenarios a separate questionnaire was produced. All the participants received a set of 
all five questionnaires but were requested to complete only the one which best described the 
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current provision of internal audit within their respective organisations. The five scenarios 
were 
  
Internal audit function maintained in-house (Scenario 1) 
  
Internal audit function partially outsourced (Scenario II) 
  
Internal audit function fully outsourced (Scenario III) 
  
Partnering/Co-sourcing (Scenario IT) 
  
No internal audit function at present (Scenario l) 
Table 6.2: Scenario Frequency 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Scenario I 120 72.7 72.7 72.7 
Scenario II 18 10.9 10.9 83.6 
Scenario III 12 7.3 7.3 90.9 
Scenario IV 10 6.1 6.1 97.0 
Scenario V 5 3.0 3.0 100.0 
Total 165 100.0 100.0 
Figure 6.2: Scenario Frequency 
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 above indicate that the majority of organisations (120 out of 165) 
currently have an internal audit function in-house. A further important observation is that a 
total of 160 (97%) respondents stated that their organisations have either an internal audit 
function in-house or they employ the services of an outside service provider. Only 5 (3°"o) 
organisations have at present no internal audit function. 
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Table 6.3: Scenarios/Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Scenarios Scenario I 61 59 120 
Scenario II 14 4 18 
Scenario III 9 3 12 
Scenario IV 5 5 10 
Scenario V 5 5 
Total 89 76 165 
Table 6.3 above further analyses how the different scenarios were distributed among, the 
public and the private sectors. It is evident that all 89 organisations from the public sector 
responded to the first four scenarios which indicates that they either have an internal audit 
function in-house (61 out of a total of 89 actually do have an in-house internal audit function) 
or they make use of the services of an outside service provider. The five organisations that 
indicated that they do not have an internal audit function were from the private sector. 
6.2 When was Each Internal Audit Function Established and what are 
their Respective Sizes? 
Those Directors who stated that they have either an internal audit function in-house or they 
are partially outsourcing a segment(s) of their internal audit function (i. e. 138 organisations in 
total), were asked to state how long they had an internal audit function in their organisations 
and what is the size of each of their internal audit departments. The results are exhibited in 
detail in Tables 6.4,6.5, and 6.6. It is clear from the responses that were given that the 
majority of organisations have an internal audit function for more than 20 years (44.2%). Also 
a significant percentage of respondents (20.3%) started having an internal audit function six to 
ten years ago. 
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Table 6.4: The Length of Time there has been an 
Internal Audit Function In-House 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1-5 years 23 16.7 16.7 16.7 
6- 10 years 28 20.3 20.3 37.0 
11 
- 
15 years 15 10.9 10.9 47.8 
16 
- 
20 years 11 8.0 8.0 55.8 
More than 20 years 61 44.2 44.2 100.0 
Total 138 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.5: The Length of Time there has been an 
Internal Audit Function In-House/Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
1 
-5years 11 12 23 
6- 10 years 18 10 28 
11 
- 
15 years 13 2 15 
16 
- 
20 years 7 4 11 
More than 20 years 26 35 61 
Total 75 63 138 
Table 6.6: The Length of Time there has been an 
Internal Audit Function In-House/Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario I Scenario II Total 
1-5 years 21 2 23 
6- 10 years 22 6 28 
11 
- 
15 years 14 1 15 
16 
- 
20 years 10 1 11 
More than 20 years 53 8 61 
Total 120 18 138 
The same respondents were also required to indicate how many full-time internal auditors 
they employ at present. From Tables 6.7 and 6.8 it is evident that 40 out of a total of 1 '18 
(29%) organisations employ more than twenty auditors while 35 indicated that the,, - emploN 
between two and five auditors. Only 8 organisations currently employ between sixteen and 
twenty auditors. 
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Table 6.7: The Number of Auditors Employed by the Organisations with 
In-House Internal Audit Functions 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 auditor 14 10.1 10.1 10.1 
2-5 auditors 35 25.4 25.4 35.5 
6- 10 auditors 31 22.5 22.5 58.0 
11 
- 
15 auditors 10 7.2 7.2 65.2 
16 
- 
20 auditors 8 5.8 5.8 71.0 
More than 20 auditors 40 29.0 29.0 100.0 
Total 138 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.8: The Number of Auditors Employed by the Organisations with 
In-House Internal Audit Functions/Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
1 auditor 11 3 14 
2-5 auditors 25 10 35 
6- 10 auditors 20 11 31 
11 
- 
15 auditors 1 9 10 
16 
- 
20 auditors 4 4 8 
More than 20 auditors 14 26 40 
Total 75 63 138 
Table 6.9 makes an important revelation. The majority of organisations (i. e. 38 out of 120 
organisations) that have an in-house internal audit function employ more than twenty auditors 
while the majority of organisations that are partially outsourcing a segment(s) of their internal 
audit function (i. e. 8 out of 18 organisations) only employ between two and five full-time 
internal auditors. 
Table 6.9: The Number of Auditors Employed by the Organisations with 
In-House Internal Audit Functions/Scenarios Crosstabulation 
C'ni int 
Scenarios 
Scenario I Scenario II Total 
1 auditor 11 3 14 
2-5 auditors 27 8 35 
6- 10 auditors 30 1 31 
11 
- 
15 auditors 8 2 10 
16 
- 
20 auditors 6 2 8 
More than 20 auditors 38 2 40 
Total 120 18 138 
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6.3 The Outsourcing Experience 
All the survey participants were asked to declare whether their organisations have outsourced 
any other function(s) apart from internal audit. 152 of them, which represents 9 2.1 °ö of the 
total number of respondents, said that they have used some form of outsourcing and only- 1 
(7.9%) said that they have not used outsourcing. These results clearly demonstrate the 
widespread use of outsourcing across the whole of the U. K. in both the public and the private 
sectors. 
Table 6.10: Any Other Functions Outsourced? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Yes 152 92.1 92.1 92.1 
No 13 7.9 7.9 100.0 
Total 165 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.11: Any Other Functions Outsourced? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 80 72 152 
No 9 4 13 
Total 89 76 165 
Table 6.12: Any Other Functions Outsourced? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V Total 
Yes 110 17 11 10 4 152 
No 10 1 1 1 13 
Total 120 18 12 10 5 165 
It is also worth mentioning that 110 out of a total of 120 organisations that have not 
outsourced their internal audit function, have in-fact used outsourcing for other function(s). 
This suggests, at least to some extent, that the reason for not outsourcing the internal audit 
function is not because organisations have no experience with the use of outsourcing or they 
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are against the use of outsourcing altogether. On the contrary, it is evident from the responses 
that were given that organisations make extensive use of outsourcing. When those 152 
respondents who previously stated that they have used outsourcing, were asked to say which 
functions, apart from internal audit, they have outsourced, the majority indicated that they 
usually outsource, to a bigger extent, functions such as catering/cleaning, security, information 
technology, payroll, and vehicle fleet management, and to a lesser extent functions such as 
finance, human resource management, and accounting. 
Figure 6.3: Functions Other than Internal Auditing that are Currently 
being Outsourced 
Other 
Finance 
Vehicle Fleet Management 
Warehousing 
IR M 
Payroll 
Product Development/Design 
[T 
Marketing / Advertising 
Tax 
Accounting 
Legal 
Dis trtbut io n/ Tl ansp o rt at io n 
Security 
Catering /Cleaning 
Q Public Q Private 
Other functions which some organisations are currently outsourcing include property 
management, telecommunications management, pension awarding & payment, site 
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maintenance, facilities management, public relations. actuarial services, and cheque 
processing. 
6.4 Respondents' Perception of Internal Audit 
6.4.1 Internal Audit as a `Core' Activity: In order to establish how the internal audit 
function is perceived, the participants were firstly asked whether they consider the function to 
be `core'. 97 (58.8%) respondents answered YES and 68 (41.2%) said NO. From those 
respondents who said that internal audit is a core activity 54 were from the public sector and 
43 from the private sector. 35 respondents from the public sector and 33 from the private 
sector believe that internal audit is not a core activity. 
Table 6.13: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Yes 97 58.8 58.8 58.8 
No 68 41.2 41.2 100.0 
Total 165 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.14: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? /Sectors 
Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 54 43 97 
No 35 33 68 
Total 89 76 165 
Table 6.15: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V Total 
Yes 76 10 4 7 97 
No 44 8 8 3 5 68 
Total 120 18 12 10 5 165 
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6.4.2 Internal Audit as an `Essential' Activity: The respondents were then asked to indicate 
whether they consider internal audit to be an 'essential actiývitv-'. The results show that the 
clear majority 151 out of 165 (91.5%) consider internal audit to be an essential activity. £\s 
expected, all five Directors who responded to Scenario V (i. e. No Internal Audit Function) do 
not consider internal audit to be neither `Core' nor 'Essential'. 
Table 6.16: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Yes 151 91.5 91.5 91.5 
No 14 8.5 8.5 100.0 
Total 165 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.17: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 83 68 151 
No 6 8 14 
Total 89 76 165 
Table 6.18: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? /Scenarios 
Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V Total 
Yes 114 17 10 10 151 
No 6 1 2 5 14 
Total 120 18 12 10 5 165 
6.4.3 Dealing with Core and Non-Core Activities: The participants in this survey were also 
asked to indicate whether they agree or not with the statement that `all core activities should 
be kept in-house and all non-core activities should be outsourced'. The results as exhibited in 
Tables 6.19,6.20 and 6.21 show that the majority 72.1% (119 out of 165) of the respondents 
disagree with the above statement. Just because an activity is considered to be `non-core' does 
-191- 
not necessarily implies that it should be outsourced. It is up to each organisation individually 
to decide whether it will be better off if it was to obtain the service from a specialised outside 
provider. 
Table 6.19: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities 
Cumulative 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Yes 46 27.9 27.9 27.9 
No 119 72.1 72.1 100.0 
Total 165 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.20: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities/Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 21 25 46 
No 68 51 119 
Total 89 76 165 
Table 6.21: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the 
Non-Core Activities/Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V Total 
Yes 30 7 2 5 2 46 
No 90 11 10 5 3 119 
Total 120 18 12 10 5 165 
6.5 Outsourcing the Internal Audit Function 
6.5.1 The Beginning of Outsourcing the Internal Audit Function: Respondents were asked 
to state when did they start having the internal audit function outsourced. It is evident that the 
clear majority (31 out of 40) of the organisations started outsourcing the internal audit 
function only one to five years ago. This demonstrates that the outsourcing of the internal 
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audit function started to happen not so long ago. This also confirms that although 
`outsourcing' is not really a new phenomenon, since functions such as cleaning and catering 
have been contracted out for many years now. the practice whereby an organisation 
outsources the internal audit function is in fact relatively new. 
Table 6.22: The Beginning of Outsourcing the Internal Audit Function 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Less than a year ago 3 7.5 7.5 7.9- 
1-5 years ago 31 77.5 77.5 85.0 
6- 10 years ago 4 10.0 10.0 95.0 
11 
- 
15 years ago 1 2.5 2.5 97.5 
16 
- 
20 years ago 1 2.5 2.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.23: The Beginning of Outsourcing the Internal Audit 
Function/Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Less than a year ago 2 1 3 
1-5 years ago 21 10 31 
6- 10 years ago 3 1 4 
11 
- 
15 years ago 1 1 
16 
- 
20 years ago 1 1 
Total 28 12 40 
Table 6.24: The Beginning of Outsourcing the Internal Audit 
Function/Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Total 
Less than a year ago 1 2 3 
1-5 years ago 15 9 7 31 
6- 10 years ago 2 2 4 
11 
- 
15 years ago 1 1 
16 
- 
20 years ago 1 1 
Total 18 12 10 40 
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6.5.2 The Presence of an Internal Audit Function Prior to Outsourcing: Respondents 
whose organisations are either fully-outsourcing the internal audit function or they have 
adopted partnering/co-sourcing, were asked as to whether their organisations had an in-house 
internal audit function prior to outsourcing. Table 6.25 below shows that 86.4° o (19 out of ý) 
of the organisations had an internal audit function in-house and then decided to outsource it. 
Only three organisations from the public sector did not have an internal audit function in- 
house prior to outsourcing. Another observation is that all the organisations that have adopted 
partnering/co-sourcing used to have an internal audit function in-house. 
Table 6.25: Did your Organisation have an Internal Audit 
Function Prior to Outsourcing? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Yes 19 86.4 86.4 86.4 
No 3 13.6 13.6 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.26: Did your Organisation have an Internal Audit 
Function Prior to Outsourcing? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 11 8 19 
No 3 3 
Total 14 8 22 
Table 6.27: Did your Organisation have an Internal Audit 
Function Prior to Outsourcing? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario III Scenario IV Total 
Yes 9 10 19 
No 3 3 
Total 12 10 22 
Those respondents who stated that their organisations used to have an in-house internal audit 
function prior to outsourcing were then asked to state how many full-time internal auditors 
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they used to employ. The responses given varied significantly and are exhibited in the three 
tables below. 
Table 6.28: How Many Internal Auditors did your Organisation have 
Prior to Outsourcing? 
Fre uen Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 auditor 3 13.6 15.8 15.8 
2-5 auditors 4 18.2 21.1 36.8 
6- 10 auditors 1 4.5 5.3 42.1 
11 
- 
15 auditors 2 9.1 10.5 52.6 
16 
- 
20 auditors 5 22.7 26.3 78.9 
More than 20 auditors 4 18.2 21.1 100.0 
Total 19 86.4 100.0 
System 3 13.6 
Total 22 100.0 
Table 6.29: How Many Internal Auditors did your Organisation have 
Prior to Outsourcing? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
1 auditor 3 3 
2- 5 auditors 3 1 4 
6- 10 auditors 1 1 
11 
- 
15 auditors 1 1 2 
16 
- 
20 auditors 3 2 5 
More than 20 auditors 4 4 
Total 11 8 19 
Table 6.30: How Many Internal Auditors did your Organisation have 
Prior to Outsourcing? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Cnunt 
Scenarios 
Scenario III Scenario IV Total 
1 auditor 2 1 3 
2- 5 auditors 2 2 4 
6- 10 auditors 1 1 
11 
- 
15 auditors 2 2 
16 
- 
20 auditors 1 4 5 
More than 20 auditors 2 2 4 
Total 9 10 19, 
The same respondents were also invited to reveal what happened to their in-house internal 
auditors when the function was outsourced. Ten said that some of their staff were moved to 
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other parts of their organisation, seven said that some of the staff were made redundant, two 
said that some of them joined the outside service provider, and finally ten organisations gave 
other explanations about the fate of those who were directly affected by the outsourcing 
decision. Some of these explanation were: 
1. Some auditors resigned and subsequently joined other organisations; 
2. In the case of one organisation in the public sector, some of its staff were transferred 
within the civil service; 
3. Some of the staff took early retirement; 
4. In one case all of the staff were transferred to the service provider; 
5. There was no change in staff; and finally, 
6. Some of the staff resigned and were not replaced. 
Figure 6.4: What has Happened to the In-House Internal Auditors when 
the Function was Outsourced 
---- ---------- - -------- 
El Some joined the outside service provider Q Some were made redundant 
0 Some moved to other parts of the organisation   Other 
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6.5.3 The Outsourcing Contract: The respondents were requested to indicate ho«- long is the 
outsourcing contract between their organisations and their respective service providers. Simon 
Domberger (1998) in his book The Contracting Organisation states that from the point of 
view of both the client and the service provider, an optimal contract length would lie 
somewhere between three and seven years. In other words, a typical outsourcing contract 
should be long enough to let the service provider achieve real improvements in service 
delivery, but not so long that it generates complacency and stagnation. From Tables 6.3 1. 
6.32, and 6.33 below it is evident that twenty out of the forty organisations have either a3-4 
years or a5-6 years contract. However, a significant number of organisations have in fact a 
`less than one year' contract. 
Table 6.31: The Length of the Outsourcing Contract 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Less than 1 year 10 25.0 25.0 25.7- 
1-2 years 7 17.5 17.5 42.5 
3-4 years 15 37.5 37.5 80.0 
5-6 years 5 12.5 12.5 92.5 
More than 6 years 3 7.5 7.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.32: The Length of the Outsourcing Contract/Sectors 
Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Less than 1 year 6 4 10 
1- 2 years 4 3 7 
3-4 years 12 3 15 
5- 6 years 4 1 5 
More than 6 years 2 1 3 
Total 28 12 40 
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Table 6.33: The Length of the Outsourcing Contract/Scenarios 
Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Total 
Less than 1 year 7 3 10 
1- 2 years 4 3 7 
3- 4 years 5 5 5 15 
5- 6 years 1 3 1 5 
More than 6 years 1 1 1 3 
Total 18 12 10 40 
In general, there is a belief that the longer the contract the more difficult will be to change 
providers once the initial outsourcing contract expires. In some cases, even if an organisation 
is not completely satisfied with the provider's quality of service, they may still be reluctant 
not to renew the contract because they are set up to deal with that particular provider. After 
providing the service for a significant length of time, it is only natural that the service 
provider would have gained experience, familiarity and knowledge of the way things are done 
within the organisation and also would have acquired a host of other skills the buyer cannot 
simply hire externally from one day to another. Based on this particular belief, respondents 
were asked whether they considered this possibility when they decided about the length of the 
outsourcing contract with their respective providers. The results exhibited in Tables 6.34, 
6.35, and 6.36 clearly show that 75% of the organisations took this possibility into 
consideration. 
Table 6.34: The Longer the Outsourcing Contract the more 
Difficult will be to Switch Between Providers 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Yes 30 75.0 75.0 75.0 
No 10 25.0 25.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
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Table 6.35: The Longer the Outsourcing Contract the more Difficult will be 
to Switch Between Providers/Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 20 10 30 
No 8 2 10 
Total 28 12 40 
Table 6.36: The Longer the Outsourcing Contract the more Difficult will be 
to Switch Between Providers/Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Total 
Yes 11 10 9 30 
No 7 2 1 10 
Total 18 12 10 40 
6.5.4 Factors Affecting the Decision to Outsource the Internal Audit Function: Some of the 
main factors which are generally considered to be the main driving force behind the decision 
to outsource the internal audit function were identified in the survey. The respondents were 
asked to indicate, using a 5-point scale (where 1= Not Relevant, 2= Not Important, 3= 
Important, 4= Very Important, and 5= Extremely Important), how important was each one of 
them in their organisation's decision to outsource the internal audit function. Table 6.37 
reveals that only one factor 
- 
the `access to internal auditors with specialised skills' 
- 
«as 
considered by the majority of the respondents to be extremely important in the decision to 
outsource the internal audit function. According to other responses that were given, a very 
important factor was to `ensure a high quality of service'. Finally, other important factors 
pointed out were the generation of `cost savings' and `the organisation's inability to retain (or 
recruit) people with the necessary skills. 
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Table 6.37: Factors Affecting the Decision to Outsource 
the Internal Audit Function 
N 
Std. 
Valid Mean Median Mode Deviation Variance 
Access to internal auditors 40 4.13 4.00 5 0.91 0.8 3 
with specialised skills 
Ensure high quality of 40 3.63 4.00 4 0.98 0.96 
service 
The organisation's inability 
to retain (or recruit) people 40 3.03 3.00 3a 1.29 1.67 
with the necessary skills 
Cost savings 40 2.70 3.00 3 1.14 1.29 
The judgement of an outside 
contractor is more likely to 40 2.30 2.00 1 1.22 1.50 
be impartial 
The inability of the in-house 
audit function to fulfil the 40 2.28 2.00 1 1.32 1.74 
audit plan on time 
Improve company focus 40 2.28 2.00 1 1.24 1.54 
Support for 40 2.15 2.00 1 1.31 1.72 
global/geographic initiatives 
Share some of the risks of 
business failure, due to poor 40 1.80 2.00 2 0.91 0.83 
control systems, with an 
outside contractor 
The high rate of success 
enjoyed by other 40 1.65 1.00 1 0.80 0.64 
organisations when they 
outsourced their IA 
functions 
Dispose of a function which 40 1.60 1.00 1 0.78 0.61 
is difficult to manage 
The presence of a large 
number of internal audit 40 1.60 1.00 1 0.71 0.50 
providers in the market 
The opportunity to offload 
unproductive or unwanted 40 1.35 1.00 1 0.66 0.44 
employees 
il Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown. 
6.5.5 Audit Areas which are Partially Outsourced: The respondents were asked to identify 
the areas which are partially outsourced by their respective internal audit functions. Among 
the most popular areas which are partially outsourced are computer audits, financial audits, 
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etc. Other areas include systems development audits, validation of agency performance. and 
internal audit work of subsidiaries. 
Figure 6.5: Audit Areas which are Partially Outsourced 
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6.5.6 Have the Organisations with an In-House Internal Audit Function Considered at 
Any Stage to Outsource the Function?: These respondents were asked whether their 
organisations have considered at any stage to outsource the whole or part of their internal 
audit function. Tables 6.38 and 6.39 reveal that more than half (75 out of 120) of them 
actually did so. Out of a total of 75,48 were from the public sector and 27 from the private 
sector. This difference between the two sectors can be explained to some extent by the fact 
that government departments market test, among other functions, their internal audit functions 
on a regular basis. According to Rittenberg and Covaleski (1999), the internal audit 
department lends itself very easily to market testing because it is viewed as a stand-alone 
function for which a readily identifiable external provider is present. 
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Table 6.38: Has your Organisation Considered, At Any Stage, to Outsource 
the Whole or Part of its Internal Audit Function? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Yes 75 62.5 62.5 62.5 
No 34 28.3 28.3 90.8 
1 do not know 11 9.2 9.2 100.0 
Total 120 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.39: Has your Organisation Considered, At Any Stage, to Outsource 
the Whole or Part of its Internal Audit Function? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 48 27 75 
No 13 21 34 
Ido not know 11 11 
Total 61 59 120 
Those who in the previous question stated that their organisations had at some stage 
considered outsourcing the internal audit function, were subsequently asked to indicate 
whether they actually went ahead and outsourced the function but, for one reason or another. 
they decided to bring it back in-house. Their responses are exhibited in Tables 6.40 and 6.41. 
Table 6.40: Have you in the Past Outsourced the IA Function 
and then you Decided to Bring it Back In-House? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes 11 9.2 14.7 14.7 
No 64 53.3 85.3 100.0 
Total 75 62.5 100.0 
System 45 37.5 
Total 120 100.0 
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Table 6.41: Have you in the Past Outsource the IA Function and then you 
Decided to Bring it Back In-House? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 11 11 
No 37 27 64 
Total 48 27 75 
It is evident from the table above, that eleven organisations from the public sector had some 
experience with outsourcing of the internal audit function but at some stage they decided to 
bring the function back in-house. Among the reasons that were put forward to explain their 
decision were: 
1. The quality of the service provider's audit staff worsened as the contract neared its end: 
2. The provider was no longer able to provide the service due to staff shortage. In one case, 
the provider had encountered some difficulties in maintaining existing staff and recruiting 
new one; 
3. The provider's service was of poor quality; 
4. Dissatisfaction with the provider's overall performance; 
5. Provider's lack of understanding of the business; and finally 
6. In an effort to regain once again overall control of the function, it was decided to bring the 
Internal Audit function back in-house. 
6.5.7 Is it Possible that in the Future the Organisations with an In-House Internal Audit 
Function will have the Function Externally Provided?: These respondents were asked to say 
whether they expect that in the near future at least some, if not all, of their organisation's 
internal audit function could be outsourced. 80 (66.7%) said that they will not consider 
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outsourcing the internal audit function and 40 (33.3%) said that they might do so. From those 
who said that they will not consider outsourcing their internal audit function, 43 were from the 
private and the rest from the public sector. 
Table 6.42: If Not at Present, do you Expect that in the Near Future at 
Least Some, if Not All, of your IA Function could be Provided by an 
Outside Service provider? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Yes 40 33.3 33.3 33.3 
No 80 66.7 66.7 100.0 
Total 120 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.43: If Not at Present, do you Expect that in the Near Future at 
Least Some, if Not All, of your IA Function could be Provided by an 
Outside Service provider? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 24 16 40 
No 37 43 80 
Total 61 59 120 
Those forty respondents who stated that in the near future at least some, if not all, of their 
internal audit function could be provided by an outside service provider were then asked to 
indicate which firm(s) could potentially offer internal audit services to their organisation. 
Their responses are exhibited in the Figure 6.6. It is evident that the majority will most 
probably outsource the internal audit function to one of the `big 5' public accounting firms. 
However, a significant number of respondents might still consider the use of a specialised 
internal audit provider. 
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Figure 6.6: Potential Internal Audit Providers 
Other 
ý71 
Specialised intemal audit 
provider 
Local public accounting 
firm 
National public 
accounting firm 
Big five public accounting 
firm 
QPublic 
Private 
6.5.8 What is the Likelihood of Organisations Without an Internal Audit Function to 
Actually Outsource the Function Sometime in the Future?: The five respondents who 
indicated that their organisations do not have internal audit functions, were asked whether 
they will consider having such a function sometime in the near future. Three said NO and two 
said YES. These two respondents were subsequently asked to state whether their 
organisations would consider at some stage the possibility of obtaining internal audit services 
through outsourcing. One respondent stated that this was very unlikely and the other was 
uncertain. 
6.5.9 The Main Factors Influencing the decision to Keep the Internal Audit Function In- 
House: Some of the main factors that may influence the decision to keep the internal audit 
function in-house were identified in this survey. The respondents were asked to indicate using 
a 5-point scale (where I= Not Relevant, 2= Not Important, 3= Important, 4= Very 
Important, and 5= Extremely Important) how important was each one of them in their 
organisation's decision to keep the internal audit function in-house. The results can be found 
in Table 6.44. 
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Table 6.44: Factors Influencing the Decision to Keep 
the Internal Audit Function In-House 
N 
Std. I 
Valid Mean Median Mode Deviation Variance 
Ensure high quality of service 120 4.00 4.00 4 0.83 0.69 
The loss of the constructive/positive 
help provided by the IA function 120 3.80 4.00 4 0.94 0.88 
"The IA provider will not know our 120 3.79 4.00 t 0.89 0.799 
business as well as we do" 
Maintain total control and protect 120 3.77 4.00 3a 0.98 0.9 
confidential information 
Access to internal auditors at all times 120 3.63 4.00 3a 0.97 0.94 
The constant need for internal auditors 120 3.25 3.00 3 0.89 0.79 
with specialised skills 
Cost savings 120 3.14 3.00 3 0.92 0.85 
The IA department serves as a training 
ground and as a springboard for future 120 3.13 3.00 3a 1.12 1.26 
senior managers 
The prospect of compromising 
independence when one firm provides 120 3.00 3.00 1a 1.42 2.02 
both IA and EA 
The difficulty in developing and 
sustaining a strong corporate culture 120 2.88 3.00 3 1.00 1.00 
once functions such as IA are 
outsourced 
Avoid transitional costs and costs 
associated with finding a suitable 120 2.33 2.00 2 0.84 0.71 
internal audit provider 
"Why change something that has 120 2.24 2.00 2 1.07 1.14 
served us so well up to now? " 
Failure of other organisations in the 
industry to successfully outsource their 120 2.17 2.00 2 1.06 1.12 
internal audit functions 
Adverse effect on the morale of the 
remaining employees because of the 120 2.17 2.00 2 0.84 0.71 
constant fear that they will be the 
"next to go" 
The length of time the organisation 120 2.03 2.00 2 0.93 0.86 
had an IA department in-house 
Statutory or legal requirement 120 1.82 1.00 1 1.07 1.14 
a Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown. 
According to the responses given, three very important factors for deciding to keep the 
internal audit function in-house were `to ensure high quality of service'. `the IA service 
provider will not know the organisation's business as well as they do', and finally, if the 
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function is outsourced the organisation will 'lose the constructive/positive help provided by 
the IA function'. Important factors for keeping the internal audit function were 'access to 
internal auditors at all times', the constant need for internal auditors with special skills'. etc. 
6.5.10 `Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment' (TL PE) and Outsourcing: 
Apart from those respondents that have no internal audit function, the rest were asked whether 
they are aware of the `Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment' Legislation. The 
results exhibited in the tables below clearly show that the majority of the respondents (93.811 o) 
are indeed aware of this legislation. It should also be noted that only one out of the forty 
organisations that are currently outsourcing their internal audit function is not familiar with 
TUPE. 
Table 6.45: TUPE Awareness 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Yes 150 93.8 93.8 93.8 
No 10 6.3 6.3 100.0 
Total 160 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.46: TUPE Awareness/Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 87 63 150 
No 2 8 10 
Total 89 71 160 
Table 6.47: TUPE Awareness/Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Total 
Yes 111 17 12 10 150 
No 9 1 10 
Total 120 18 12 10 160 
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There is a belief that organisations are now more than ever willing to use outsourcing in an 
effort to significantly reduce the number of people they employ, and consequently reduce 
their costs, under the cover of TUPE. It can be even argued that TUPE has in fact made the 
decision to use outsourcing much easier since all the rights and obligations of the old 
employer and the contract of employment are automatically transferred to the new employer. 
Those respondents' organisations whose internal audit function has been outsourced were 
therefore asked whether this legislation made their decision to outsource the function easier. 
Thirty five said that TUPE did not make their decision easier and four said that it did. This 
result clearly indicates that in most cases TUPE has no baring on the decision to outsource the 
internal audit function. 
Table 6.48: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the 
Internal Audit Function Easier? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes 4 10.0 10.3 10.3 
No 35 87.5 89.7 100.0 
Total 39 97.5 100.0 
System 1 2.5 
Total 40 100.0 
Table 6.49: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the 
Internal Audit Function Easier? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 3 1 4 
No 24 11 35 
Total 27 12 39 
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Table 6.50: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the 
Internal Audit Function Easier? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Total 
Yes 1 2 1 4 
No 16 10 9 35 
Total 17 12 10 39 
The respondents whose organisations have an in-house internal audit function and who said 
that they are aware of TUPE, were then asked to state if this legislation will make a future 
decision to outsource their internal audit function easier. The answers given by the 
respondents indicate that TUPE will not make such a decision easier. In fact, only 24 out of 
ill respondents stated that TUPE will make such a decision easier. 
Table 6.51: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes 24 20.0 21.6 21.6 
No 87 72.5 78.4 100.0 
Total 111 92.5 100.0 
System 9 7.5 
Total 120 100.0 
Table 6.52: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 11 13 24 
No 49 38 87 
Total 60 51 111 
Although one should expect that TUPE Legislation will have some kind of impact on the 
decision to outsource, not just the internal audit function, but any other function, surprisingl\ 
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the survey results indicate exactly the opposite. The results in fact suggest that. apart from 
four cases, the rest of the respondents' outsourcing decisions were not affected by this 
legislation. Even those organisations that have an in-house internal audit function indicated 
that if in the future they decide to outsource the function, their decision will not be influenced 
by TUPE. 
6.6 The Internal Audit Service Providers 
6.6.1 The Main Service Providers: Having realised the enormous revenue potential of the 
outsourcing market, public accounting firms have started to provide, besides the usual 
external audit and consultancy, a variety of other services which include internal audit. Apart 
from the public accounting firms providing internal audit services, during the last few years 
there has also been a rapid increase in the number of organisations specialising solely in the 
provision of internal audit services. In order to identify the main source(s) of internal audit 
services in the UK, those organisations that are currently outsourcing the internal audit 
function, were requested to indicate which are their current service providers. Their responses 
are exhibited in Tables 6.53,6.54, and 6.55. 
Table 6.53: The Main Service Providers 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Big five public accounting firm 29 72.5 72.5 72.5 
National public accounting firm 6 15.0 15.0 87.5 
Local public accounting firm 1 2.5 2.5 90.0 
Specialised internal audit provider 1 2.5 2.5 92.5 
Other 3 7.5 7.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
-210- 
Table 6.54: The Main Service Providers/Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Big five public accounting firm 18 11 29 
National public accounting firm 5 1 6 
Local public accounting firm 1 1 
Specialised internal audit provider 1 1 
Other 3 3 
Total 28 12 40 
Table 6.55: The Main Service Providers/Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Total 
Big five public accounting firm 12 8 9 29 
National public accounting firm 1 4 1 6 
Local public accounting firm 1 1 
Specialised internal audit provider 1 1 
Other 3 3 
Total 18 12 10 40 
The results clearly show the preference of the organisations that are currently outsourcing the 
internal audit function towards the `Big five public accounting firms'. In fact, 29 out of the 40 
(72.5%) organisation make use of the services of the `Big five public accounting firms'. Only 
one organisation from the public sector is currently using the services of a `specialised 
internal audit provider'. 
6.6.2 How Satisfied the Organisations are with the Quality of the Provider's Service: 
Through the use of a 5-point scale (where 1= Very Dissatisfied, 2= Dissatisfied, 
I= Uncertain, 4= Satisfied, and 5= Very Satisfied), respondents were asked to indicate their 
level of satisfaction with the quality of the provider's service. Table 6.56 shows that the 
majority of the respondents are in general terms satisfied with the quality of the service they 
receive. 
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Table 6.56: Satisfaction With the Quality of the Provided Service 
N 
Std. 
Valid Mean Median `lode Deviation Variance 
Absence of surprises when the 40 4.22 4.00 4 0.58 0. 
final audit report is released 
Internal audit meets professional 40 4.13 4.00 4 0.69 0.47 
standards 
Audit scopes and objectives 40 4.10 4.00 4 0.67 0.45 
Errors disclosed by audit are 40 4.10 4.00 4 0.5 5 0.30 
treated factually and fairly 
Findings are discussed with those 
directly concerned and their help 40 4.08 4.00 4 0.62 0.38 
is utilised in developing proposed 
solutions 
Professionalism of the service 40 4.05 4.00 4 0.85 0.72 
provider 
Appropriate personnel are alerted 
to the fact that an audit is to be 40 4.05 4.00 4 0.60 0.36 
carried out 
Adherence to the audit plan 40 4.03 4.00 4 0.70 0.49 
The number of audit 40 3.98 4.00 4 0.66 0.44 
recommendations 
Accuracy of information 40 3.95 4.00 4 0.68 0.46 
Good inter-personal skills on the 40 3.95 4.00 4 0.60 0.36 
part of the service provider 
Consistency in the way audit 40 3.93 4.00 4 0.94 0.89 
reports are presented 
The scope and objectives are 
clearly communicated to our 40 3.93 4.00 4 0.83 0.69 
managers 
Audits are conducted with 
minimum disruption to normal 40 3.93 4.00 4 0.62 0.38 
activities and with few demands 
on operating personnel 
Clarity and conciseness 40 3.85 4.00 4 0.89 0.80 
Proper treatment of findings 40 3.80 4.00 4 0.88 0.78 
according to relative significance 
Response to the organisation's 
needs within the pre-arranged 40 3.78 4.00 4 1.00 1.00 
time limit 
Time taken to issue the audit 40 3.70 4.00 4 1.07 1.14 
report 
The quality of audit 40 3.70 4.00 4 0.88 0.78 
recommendations 
Provider's level of understanding 
of the operation(s) being audited 40 3.48 4.00 4 1.06 1.131 
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6.6.3 Overall Satisfaction with the Provided Service: The respondents were asked to state 
how satisfied they are overall with the service of their respective providers. In general terns. 
it seems that organisations from both the public and the private sectors are satisfied xNith the 
service they are currently receiving. Just three respondents stated that their organisations are 
either very dissatisfied or dissatisfied with the provided service. 
Table 6.57: Overall Satisfaction with the Provided Service 
_Frequency 
Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Very Dissatisfied 1 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Dissatisfied 2 5.0 5.0 7.5 
Uncertain 7 17.5 17.5 25.0 
Satisfied 21 52.5 52.5 77.5 
Very Satisfied 9 22.5 22.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.58: Overall Satisfaction with the Provided Service/Sectors 
Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Very Dissatisfied 1 1 
Dissatisfied 2 2 
Uncertain 5 2 7 
Satisfied 13 8 21 
Very Satisfied 7 2 9 
Total 28 12 40 
Table 6.59: Overall Satisfaction with the Provided Service/Scenarios 
Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Total 
Very Dissatisfied 1 1 
Dissatisfied 2 2 
Uncertain 3 2 2 7 
Satisfied 10 5 6 21 
Very Satisfied 3 5 1 9 
Total 18 12 10 40 
- 
? 13 
- 
6.6.4 Terminating the Outsourcing of Internal Audit: Those three organisations that were 
not completely satisfied with the provided service they were then asked if they were to 
consider bringing the internal audit function back in-house sometime in the near future. One 
organisation said they will consider it, another said they will not, and finally the third said 
possibly. The thirty organisations that were either satisfied or very satisfied with the provided 
service, were also asked if they would still consider the possibility of bringing the internal 
audit function back in-house. 13 said YES and 17 said NO. Ten of the organisations that said 
YES were from the public sector and three from the private sector. Obviously. the policy of 
`market testing' which is prevalent in the public sector might explain, at least to some extent, 
why ten organisations from the public sector answered YES to this question. 
Table 6.60: Despite being Satisfied With the Provided Service will the 
Organisations Still Consider Bringing the Function Back In-House? 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes 13 32.5 43.3 43.3 
No 17 42.5 56.7 100.0 
Total 30 75.0 100.0 
System 10 25.0 
Total 40 100.0 
Table 6.61: Despite being Satisfied With the Provided Service will the 
Organisations Still Consider Bringing the Function Back In-House? /Sectors 
Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 10 3 13 
No 10 7 17 
Total 20 10 30 
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Table 6.62: Despite being Satisfied With the Provided Service will the 
Organisations Still Consider Bringing the Function Back In- 
House? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Total 
Yes 7 2 4 13 
No 6 8 3 17 
Total 13 10 7 30 
Those who answered YES to the previous question, were also invited to state the reasons that 
might influence their decision to bring the function back in-house. Some of the reasons 
mentioned were: 
1. The use of partial outsourcing was a temporary measure in order to deal with a short-term 
shortage of staff; 
2. Having an in-house internal audit function will enhance their ability to respond promptly 
to emerging needs; 
3. When in-house personnel build-up their knowledge of how to audit the organisation's 
information systems, the organisation will cease using the services of an outside provider; 
4. They will consider bringing the function in-house so that the Group Chief Internal Auditor 
to be able to properly control the entire group's audit programme; 
S. To ensure the provision of high quality internal audit; 
6. The inability of the provider to match service/cost to requirement; 
7. The organisation in one case was undergoing a merger and the partner organisation had an 
in-house internal audit function. A decision will be taken in the near future as to whether 
to keep an in-house internal audit function or to consider outsourcing. 
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8. The provider's service is under regular review and if the organisation becomes dissatisfied 
at any one point with it, the service will be brought back in-house: 
9. If the organisation is successful in recruiting auditors with the necessary skills. then they 
will bring the function back in-house. 
6.6.5 The Use of a Single Provider for Both Internal and External Audit: Participants in the 
survey who are currently outsourcing the internal audit function were asked whether they use 
the same provider for both internal and external audit services. Contrary to the view which 
says that is normal practice for organisations to outsource internal auditing to the same firm 
that does the external audit (Verschoor and Farrell, 1996), the survey has found that apart 
from six organisations from the private sector the rest of the organisations are using two 
separate audit providers. 
Table 6.63: Does your Organisation Use the Same Provider for Both 
Internal and External Audit? 
Cumulative 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Yes 6 15.0 15.0 15.0 
No 34 85.0 85.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.64: Does your Organisation Use the Same Provider for 
Both Internal and External Audit? /Sectors 
Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 6 6 
No 28 6 34 
Total 28 12 40 
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Table 6.65: Does your Organisation Use the Same Provider for Both 
Internal and External Audit? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Total 
Yes 2 2 2 6 
No 16 10 8 34 
Total 18 12 10 40 
6.6.6 The Issue of `Independence': Because `independence' is an issue of paramount 
importance when outsourcing the internal audit function, respondents were asked whether at 
the time they chose their service providers, they did consider the compromise of independence 
that may occur as a result of one provider assuming the dual role of the internal and external 
auditor. The table below shows that 27 out of 40 (67.5%) actually did so at the time. 
Table 6.66: Was the Potential Compromise of Independence Considered at 
the Provider Selection Process? 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes 27 67.5 67.5 67.5 
No 9 22.5 22.5 90.0 
was not involved in the 
selection of the provider 4 
10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.67: Was the Potential Compromise of Independence Considered at 
the Provider Selection Process? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 17 10 27 
No 8 1 9 
was not involved in the 
selection of the provider 
3 1 4 
Total 28 12 40 
-? 17- 
Table 6.68: Was the Potential Compromise of Independence Considered at 
the Provider Selection Process? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario II Scenario Ill Scenario IV Total 
Yes 13 7 7 27 
No 5 2 2 9 
I was not involved in the 
selection of the provider 3 1 4 
Total 18 12 10 40 
When those twenty seven respondents who stated in the previous question that they, did 
consider the potential compromise of independence were subsequently asked if they agree that 
independence is actually compromised when using the same provider for both services, 
seventeen answered YES and ten answered NO. Apart from one organisation, the rest of the 
seventeen organisations are using two separate providers. 
Table 6.69: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When Using 
One Provider for Both Services? 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes 17 42.5 63.0 63.0 
No 10 25.0 37.0 100.0 
Total 27 67.5 100.0 
System 13 32.5 
Total 40 100.0 
Table 6.70: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When Using 
One Provider for Both Services? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes 12 5 17 
No 5 5 10 
Total 17 10 27 
-? 18- 
Table 6.71: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised When Using 
One Provider for Both Services? /Scenarios Crosstabulation 
Count 
Scenarios 
Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Total 
Yes 8 2 7 17 
No 5 5 10 
Total 13 7 7 27 
6.7 Organisations With No Internal Audit Function 
6.7.1 Will they Consider the Possibility of having an Internal Audit Function in the 
Future?: The respondents were asked to say whether their organisation will consider the 
possibility of having an internal audit function sometime in the near future. From a total of 
five respondents, two said YES they will consider it and the rest said NO. All five 
organisations without an internal audit function were from the private sector. 
Table 6.72: Will they Consider having an Internal Audit Function in the 
Future? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Yes 2 40.0 40.0 40.0 
No 3 60.0 60.0 100.0 
Total 5 100.0 100.0 
6.7.2 Some of the Factors that have Influenced these Organisations Against having an 
Internal Audit Function: Respondents were asked to identify the main factors that have 
influenced their organisations in deciding not to have an internal audit function. Some said 
that internal audit is a function undertaken by their accounting department while another said 
that the size of their organisation renders an internal audit function unnecessary. 
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Figure 6.7: Factors that have Influenced the Organisations Without an 
Internal Audit Function Against having Such a Function 
------ -- -------- --- -- --- -- --- 
Other 
IA is one of the functions 
undertaken by the accounting 
department 
High cost 
Not necessan 
Not a legalrequiremen 
Size ofthe organisation 
C 
Other factors that were put forward in order to explain the reasons for not having an internal 
audit function were: 
1. One organisation claimed that a centrally imposed internal audit function would be directly 
against the accepted group culture; 
2. A centralised internal audit function was not considered appropriate because is a 
diversified group; 
3. Each division and the Finance Director are responsible for their own level of internal 
control; 
4. Small number of employees in the organisation, therefore internal audit is not necessary; 
and finally 
5. No value for money from having such a function within the organisation. 
-220- 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
6.7.3 What is the Likelihood of these Organisation Establishing an In-House Internal 
Audit Function in the Near Future?: The two respondents who previously indicated that 
their respective organisations will consider having an internal audit function, were then asked 
to state what is the likelihood of establishing an internal audit function in-house in the near 
future. One stated that it was very unlikely and another was uncertain. 
6.7.4 Are these Organisations Aware of Any Internal Audit Service Providers?: The 
respondents were asked to state whether they are aware of any service providers to which their 
respective organisations could potentially outsource the internal audit function. Both 
respondents answered YES. These two respondents were subsequently asked to identify 
potential providers of internal audit services. Once again the respondents showed their 
preference toward the `big five public accounting firms'. Only one of them indicated that they 
might consider making use of the services of a `specialised internal audit provider' 
6.8 Conclusion 
Outsourcing, unlike other management techniques that made their brief appearance over the 
years, is extensively used both in the private and the public sectors. However, it seems that 
while organisations are willing to outsource functions such as cleaning, catering, information 
technology, and security, they are not so keen when it comes to outsourcing the internal audit 
function. Instead, they would rather have this function under their own roof. The data 
description phase, which is a typical procedure in any data analysis project, provided the 
necessary means in order to present the collected data in a comprehensible manner, through 
the use of tables and figures. Apart from being an important activity, the descriptive analysis 
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also provided a very useful initial insight as to the nature of the responses obtained. The next 
step will be to determine whether there are any statistically significant differences bet-, een the 
responses given by the directors from the two sectors, and also to test a number of formulated 
hypotheses. 
- 
1ý l? ') 
- 
Chapter VII.. 
Hypotheses Testing 
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7.1 Introduction 
The data description phase unveiled some important findings. Among other things it has 
been found that outsourcing, unlike other management techniques that made their brief 
appearance over the years, is widely used both in the private and in the public sector. 
However, while organisations are willing to outsource functions such as cleaning. catering. 
and information technology, they are not so keen when it comes to outsourcing the internal 
audit function. Instead, they would rather have this function tacked in under their own roof. 
It has also been found that internal audit is extensively used with the clear majority of the 
survey participants either having an internal audit function in-house or employing the 
services of an outside service provider. 
Having completed the data description phase, the next step is to determine, using a 
combination of parametric and non-parametric statistical tests, whether there are any 
significant differences between the responses given by the directors from the private sector 
from those given by the public sector. This comparison will be performed in conjunction 
with the testing of the formulated hypotheses which should enable the researcher to 
statistically validate some, or even all, of the research questions. 
7.2 Statistical Tests 
The statistical tests which are carried out in this chapter are based on the following two 
assumptions: (1) The answers from the organisations which responded to the questionnaire 
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are independent; and (2) The sample obtained is randomly selected from the population 
under investigation. 
In order to compare the two groups (i. e. public and private sector) on a variable which is 
measured on a nominal scale, the two-sample chi-square (x, ) test is used. Probably the 
most widely used of all non-parametric tests, the x2 will enable the researcher to determine 
whether there is a relationship or association between two categorical variables. The test is 
based on a comparison of observed versus expected frequencies. If the observed frequencies 
depart significantly from the expected frequencies, it will be concluded that that the two 
groups differ along the variable of interest. If on the other hand, the discrepancies between 
observed and expected frequencies are small and not significant, then it will be concluded 
that there are no evidence of differences between the groups under investigation. The best 
way to see this is by means of a rxc contingency-table (where r is the number of rows and c 
is the number of columns), that is the cross-tabulation obtainable from tabulating the group 
variable against the characteristic of interest. When using the chi-square test the researcher 
needs to be aware of the one important restriction that exists. The restriction is that the two- 
sample chi-square test is valid only if no more than 25% of the cells have expected frequency 
of less than five, and no cell has an expected frequency of less than one. If this restriction is 
violated, then the Fisher's exact test should be used instead. 
Another two statistical tests that will be employed in order to analyse the collected data are 
the Mann-Whitney U test and the t-test for independent samples. The Mann-WN'hitney- I'
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test is very useful when there are two groups to be compared on a variable which is measured 
on an ordinal scale while the t-test for independent samples is going to be used whenever 
there are two groups to be compared on a variable measured on an interval'ratio scale. 
-\11 
the above tests will be carried out at a 0.05 significance level. The collected data will be 
statistically analysed using the computer software package SPSS 9.0. 
7.3 Hypotheses Testing 
Hi: `Core' activities should always kept in-house and all `non-core' activities should be 
outsourced. 
Most of the literature on the subject of outsourcing states that every organisation should 
decide which of its existing in-house activities give it competitive advantage over its 
competitors and which do not. If the organisation is successful in finding a suitable provider 
who could provide a high-quality cost-effective service, the outcome of this practice should 
be to outsource all those activities that do not provide any competitive advantage (i. e. the 
non-core activities). The disposal of non-core activities should free management time from 
peripheral tasks and allow concentration on what really matters. 
Outsourcing, however, should never be considered for core activities. The general feeling is 
that these activities should always have a prominent and secure place inside every- 
organisation. To outsource core activities, according to Brown (1997), is to hand over the 
things which made the organisation what it is 
- 
and which help the organisation generate its 
profit. How to deal with core and non-core activities is an issue that warrants further 
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investigation, therefore the survey participants were asked to indicate whether they a, 
-, 
ree or 
not with the statement that all core activities should be kept in-house and all non-core 
activities should be outsourced. At first, a chi-square test will be performed for each of the 
two sectors separately and then for both of them together in order to establish whether the 
differences in the answers they have given are statistically significant. Finally, a chi-square 
test along with a t-test will be carried out in order to compare the answers of the respondents 
from the public sector from those of the private sector. 
Public Sector: 
Table 7.1: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the Non- 
Core Activities (Frequency Table for the Public Sector) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 21 44.5 
-23.5 
No 68 44.5 23.5 
Total 89 
Table 7.2: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the Non- 
Core Activities (Chi-Square Test for the Public Sector) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 24.820 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
000 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 44.5. 
The value of x2 =24.820 with one degree of freedom and p=0.000 indicates that the 
difference between those respondents who answered YES and those respondents who 
answered NO is highly significant (p<0.05). The frequency table above shows that 21 
respondents from the public sector agree that all core activities should be kept in house and 
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all non-core activities should be outsourced while the majority (68 out of 89) disagree with 
this practice. 
Private Sector: 
Table 7.3: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the Non- 
Core Activities (Frequency Table for the Private Sector) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 25 38.0 
-13.0 
No 51 38.0 13.0 
Total 76 
Table 7.4: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the Non- 
Core Activities (Chi-Square Test for the Private Sector) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 8.895 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
003 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 38.0. 
Once again the value ofX2 =8.895 with one degree of freedom and p=0.003 indicates that the 
difference between those who answered YES and those respondents who answered NO is 
significant (p<0.05). The frequency table above shows that 25 respondents from the private 
sector agree that all core activities must be kept in house and all non-core activities should be 
outsourced compared to more than half (51 out of 76) of the respondents who actually 
disagree with this practice. 
Both Sectors: 
Table 7.5: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the Non- 
Core Activities (Frequency Table for Both Sectors) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 46 82.5 
-36.5 
No 119 82.5 36.5 
Total 165 
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Table 7.6: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the Non- 
Core Activities (Chi-Square Test for Both Sectors) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 32.297 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
000 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 82.5. 
The results for the chi-square test for both sectors further supports the conclusion that there 
is a significant difference between those who agree and those who disagree with the wad- one 
should handle `core' and `non-core' activities. The value of x2 =32.297 with one degree of 
freedom and p=0.000 indicates that this difference is in fact quite significant (p<0.05). 
Chi-Square Test Comparing the Two Sectors: 
Table 7.7: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the Non- 
Core Activities/Sectors Crosstabulation 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes Count 
Expected Count 
21 
24.8 
25 
21.2 
46 
46.0 
No Count 
Expected Count 
68 
64.2 
51 
54.8 
119 
119.0 
Total Count 
Expected Count 
89 
89.0 
76 
76.0 
165 
165.0 
Table 7.8: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the Non- 
Core Activities (Chi-Square Test) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.76311 1 
. 
184 
Continuity Correction a 1.331 1 
. 
249 
Likelihood Ratio 1.760 1 
. 
185 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 
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. 
124 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.752 1 
. 
186 
N of Valid Cases 165 
a. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
21.19. 
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As mentioned earlier, the minimum expected frequency for every cell of the contingency 
table should be no less than five. In this case the smallest expected frequency was 21.19. and 
therefore this requirement is satisfied. The value of the `Pearson chi-square' in this case is 
1.763. Since the p-value of 0.184 is greater than 0.05 it can be concluded that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the two sectors with respect to their attitude 
towards dealing with core and non-core activities. 
T-Test Comparing the Mean Answers Given by the Two Sectors: 
Table 7.9: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the Non- 
Core Activities/Sectors (Group Statistics) 
Std. Error 
Sector N Mean td. Deviation Mean 
Public 89 1.76 
. 
43 4.53E-02 
Private 76 1.67 
. 
47 5.43E-02 
Table 7.10: Keep All Core Activities In-House and Outsource All the Non- 
Core Activities (T-Test) 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Sig. Mean Std. Error Difference 
F Si. t df (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 6.796 . 010 1.327 163 . 186 9.30E-02 7.01 E-02 -4.54E-02 . 
23 
Equal variances 
not assumed 1.316 152.695 . 190 9.30E-02 7.07E-02 -4.66E-02 . 
23 
The Levene's test, featured in the table above, indicates whether the variances are 
statistically different. If the p-value given alongside the F-value is less than 0.05 then it has 
to be assumed that the variances are not equal and therefore the figures of the 'equal 
variances not assumed' row need to be used for the t-test. If on the other hand the p-value is 
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more than 0.05 then it has to be assumed that the variances are roughly equal and as a result 
the `equal variances assumed' row should be used for the t-test. In the case above the p-value 
for the Levene's test is 0.010 therefore the results in the 'equal variances not assumed' row 
are used. The value for the t-test along with the p-value of 0.190 indicates that the mean 
answers of the two sectors are not significantly different (p>0.05). 
Conclusion for Hi: 
Table 7.11: Summary Table of Statistics for Hi 
Question " ;. Sectors Type P-Value Significant/Non- 
of Test Significant 
Public [_2 0.000 Significant Private 2 0.003 Significant 
Do you agree that all 
core activities should Both 2 0.000 Significant 
be kept in-house and Sectors 
all non-core activities 
should be outsourced? 
Comparison 2 0.184 Non-Significant 
Comparison t-test 0.190 F Non-Significant 
From the statistical tests and the descriptive analysis of the collected data it is concluded that 
Hi has to be rejected. It appears that the trend towards outsourcing everything but one's core 
activities, a practice which, according to Goodwin (1996), has arisen out of necessity during 
the recession, is no longer the preferred course of action. In fact, many organisations are now 
having second thoughts and are actually questioning the wisdom of their earlier sweeping 
approach to surrender to outside service providers whole business activities. Goodwin also 
claims that although the use of outsourcing is still blossoming 
-a view also supported by the 
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survey results - organisations are now becoming more cautious about which areas of their 
business they could potentially hand over to outside service providers. No longer are all non- 
core activities regarded as potential candidates for outsourcing. In fact. in many cases careful 
consideration has replaced previously hurried decisions. 
As organisations become more aware of what outsourcing is all about and what it entails, 
they are increasingly becoming more cautious as to how they implement it and more 
selective in terms of which activities they outsource. Organisations are constantly learning 
from their own past mistakes and the mistakes of others. Of course, there are still those who 
insist that they can actually outsource specific functions that only recently would have been 
regarded as too integral to their primary business to be entrusted to a third party. Saunders et 
al (1997), for example, made a reference to the work of William King who has suggested 
situations where it is even advisable to outsource core activities. One of these situations is 
when an organisation might wrongly classify a function as a core activity when, in fact, it is 
merely a support activity. 
At the end of the day, it is up to each organisation to judge for itself which activities its 
imperative to have in-house and which it can safely entrust to a third party without placing 
the future of the organisation into unnecessary risk. Of course, no one is forcing 
organisations to start outsourcing all of their non-core activities here and no%\'. The final 
decision as to what activities an organisation has to keep in-house and what activities to 
outsource should be the result of careful deliberation, rather than fad or fashion. 
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H2: Internal auditing while `essential' is not considered to be a `core' activity. 
In an effort to focus on their core activities, many organisations have decided to outsource. 
among other activities, the internal audit function. However. different perceptions exist as to 
whether internal audit is a core activity, and according to the conventional wisdom it should 
be kept within the organisational boundaries, or whether it is essential but not core and it can, 
as a result, handed over to outside service providers. Hence, the survey participants were 
asked to state how they perceive the internal audit function. 
Is Internal Audit an `Essential' Activity?: 
It is important to start over by examining whether internal audit is perceived to be an 
`essential' activity. The descriptive analysis of the survey results has shown that 160 
organisations out of a total of 165 organisations either have an in-house internal audit 
function or they employ the services of an outside service provider, demonstrating to some 
extent how essential internal audit is. Furthermore, the fact that service providers view 
internal auditing as an attractive area for growth confirms once again the importance of 
internal auditing as an essential activity. If big public accounting firms are willing to 
dedicate so many resources and so much effort in order to be able to provide an excellent 
quality of service to their clients this suggests that they too have realised the tremendous rise 
in the popularity of internal audit. In order to establish whether internal audit is actually 
considered to be an essential activity or not, the participants' views on the subject were 
requested. 
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Public Sector: 
Table 7.12: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? 
(Frequency Table for the Public Sector) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 83 44.5 38.5 
No 6 44.5 
-38.5 
Total 89 
Table 7.13: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? 
(Chi-Square Test for the Public Sector) 
Statistics 
Chi-Squares 66.618 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
000 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 44.5. 
The X2 value of 66.62 with p=0.000 indicates that there is a statistically significant 
difference (p<0.05) between those who consider internal audit be an `essential' activity and 
those who do not. A quick glance at the table exhibiting the observed frequencies reveals that 
83 respondents form the public sector considers the function to be essential and only 6 
respondents do not. 
Private Sector: 
Table 7.14: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? 
(Frequency Table for the Private Sector) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 68 38.0 30.0 
No 8 38.0 
-30.0 
Total 76 
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Table 7.15: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? (Chi-Square Test for the Private Sector) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 47.368 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
000 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 38.0. 
Once again, the 
, 
r2 value of 47.368 with one degree of freedom and p=0.000 indicates that 
there is a statistically significant difference (p<0.05) between those who consider internal 
audit be an `essential' activity and those who do not. Similarly to the respondents from the 
public sector, the respondents from the private sector also consider internal audit to be an 
`essential' activity. In fact, out of a total of 76 respondents, 68 answered YES to the question 
`Is internal audit an essential activity? ' and only 8 of them answered NO. 
Both Sectors: 
Table 7.16: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? 
(Frequency Table for Both Sectors) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 151 82.5 68.5 
No 14 82.5 
-68.5 
Total 165 
Table 7.17: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? 
(Chi-Square Test for Both Sectors) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 113.752 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
000 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 82.5. 
Placing together the responses provided by the survey participants from the two sectors, it 
can be concluded that there is a statistically significant difference (p<0.05) between those 
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who consider internal audit to be an 'essential' activity and those who do not. From the 
results it is clearly evident that the majority thinks that internal audit is actually an 'essential' 
activity. 
Chi-Square Test Comparing the Two Sectors: 
Table 7.18: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? /Sectors 
Crosstabulation 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes Count 
Expected Count 
83 
81.4 
68 
69.6 
151 
151.0 
No Count 
Expected Count 
6 
7.6 
8 
6.4 
14 
14.0 
Total Count 
Expected Count 
89 
89.0 
76 
76.0 
165 
165.0 
Table 7.19: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? 
(Chi-Square Test) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
2-sided 
Exact Sig. 
1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 
. 
756 1 
. 
385 
Continuity Corrections 
. 
347 1 
. 
556 
Likelihood Ratio 
. 
754 1 
. 
385 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 
414 
. 
277 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 752 1 . 386 
N of Valid Cases 165 
a. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
6.45. 
The value of the `Pearson chi-square' in this case is 0.756. Since the p-value of 0.385 is 
greater than 0.05 it has to be concluded that there is no statistically significant difference 
between the two sectors with respect to their perception on whether or not internal audit is an 
essential activity. As previously stated, the majority of respondents from both sectors agree 
that internal audit is an 'essential' activity. 
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T-Test Comparing the Mean Answers Given by the Two Sectors: 
Table 7.20: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? /Sectors 
(Group Statistics) 
Std. Error 
Sector N Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Public 89 1.07 
. 
25 2.67E-02 
Private 76 1.11 
. 
31 3.54E-02 
Table 7.21: Is Internal Audit an Essential Activity? 
(T-Test) 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Sig. Mean Std. Error Difference 
F Sig. t df (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 
3.030 
. 
084 
-. 
866 163 
. 
388 
-3.78E-02 4.37E-02 -. 12 4.84E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed -. 
853 144.698 
. 
395 
-3.78E-02 4.44E-02 
-. 
13 4,99E-02 
The t-test shows that the mean answers given by the two sectors are not significantly 
different (p>0.05). The majority of respondents from both sectors agree that internal audit is 
in fact an `essential' activity. 
Is Internal Audit a `Core' Activity?: 
Having being asked whether they consider internal audit to be an `essential' activittiy. 
participants were also asked to state whether they regard it to be a `core' actin its as «ell. 
There is no doubt that in recent years the enormous growth witnessed in the use of 
outsourcing has led to the rise in the popularity of the concept of `core' activities. It has often 
been said that for most organisations while internal audit is considered to be an 'essential' 
activity it is not `core' and as a result it prevents management from concentrating on what 
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they can do best. Based on this logic, some organisations are pursuing outsourcing as a 
means of relieving themselves from `essential' activities like internal audit which are not 
critical to their core business. The question which still remains unanswered is whether 
internal audit, apart from `essential, is also a `core activity. 
Public Sector: 
Table 7.22: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? 
(Frequency Table for the Public Sector) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 54 44.5 9.5 
No 35 44.5 
-9.5 
Total 89 
Table 7.23: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? 
(Chi-Square Test for the Public Sector) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 4.056 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
044 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 44.5. 
The chi-square test reveals that there is a statistically significant difference (p<0.05) between 
those respondents from the public sector who consider internal audit to be a `core' activit`, 
and those who do not. The majority of respondents from this sector consider internal audit to 
be a `core' activity. 
Private Sector: 
Table 7.24: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? 
(Frequency Table for the Private Sector) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 43 38.0 5.0 
No 33 38.0 
-5.0 
Total 76 
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Table 7.25: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? 
(Chi-Square Test for the Private Sector) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 1.316 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
251 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 38.0. 
Unlike the test results for the public sector, the chi-square test results for the private sector 
show that the difference between those who agree with the view that internal audit is a 'core' 
activity and those who disagree is not statistically significant (p>0.05). Although the 
difference of opinion between the respondents from the private sector is not that significant. 
nevertheless the majority still considers the function to be 'core'. One reason which can be 
put forward as an explanation as to why more respondents from the public rather than from 
the private sector consider the internal audit to be a `core' activity is the presence of the 
Directives to Housing Associations made by The Housing Corporation in 1995 making 
internal audit mandatory. Furthermore, most government departments recognised the 
importance of having an internal audit function long before many private sector 
organisations did. In fact, some of the larger government departments initiated the use of 
internal audit in the early years of the 20`h century, and today very few, if any, government 
departments operate without some form of internal audit. On the other hand, the need for an 
internal audit function in the private sector has only recently been established following 
some highly publicised cases (e. g. Maxwell, Barings Bank, etc. ) and as a result of the 
pressure exerted by the Board of Directors generated mainly by the Cadbury proposals. The 
increased emphasis on, and awareness of, corporate governance and related public reporting 
has put the role of internal audit into sharper focus. 
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Both Sectors: 
Table 7.26: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? 
(Frequency Table for Both Sectors) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 97 82.5 14.5 
No 68 82.5 
-14.5 
Total 165 
Table 7.27: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? 
(Chi-Square Test for Both Sectors) 
Statistics 
Chi-Squares 5.097 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
024 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 82.5. 
Overall, there is a statistically significant difference (p<0.05) between those respondents who 
perceive internal audit to be a `core' activity and those who do not. Although it is evident 
that the majority of respondents perceive internal audit to be a core activity, there is 
nevertheless a quite significant number of respondents who do not agree with this view. 
Chi-Square Test Comparing the Two Sectors: 
Table 7.28: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? /Sectors 
Crosstabulation 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes Count 
Expected Count 
54 
52.3 
43 
44.7 
97 
97.0 
No Count 
Expected Count 
35 
36.7 
33 
31.3 
68 
68.0 
Total Count 
Expected Count 
89 
89.0 
76 
76.0 
165 
165.0 
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Table 7.29: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? (Chi-Square Test) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 
. 
284 1 
. 
594 
Continuity Correction a 
. 
140 1 
. 
708 
Likelihood Ratio 
. 
284 1 
. 
594 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 
636 
. 
354 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
. 
282 1 
. 
595 
N of Valid Cases 165 
a. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
31.32. 
The value of the `Pearson chi-square' in this case is 0.284. Since the p-value is more than 
0.05 it has to be concluded that there is no statistically significant difference between the two 
sectors with respect to their attitude on whether or not internal audit is considered to be a 
core activity. For the majority of organisations in both sectors internal audit is a core activity. 
T-Test Comparing the Mean Answers Given by the Two Sectors: 
Table 7.30: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? /Sectors 
(Group Statistics) 
Std. Error 
Sector N Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Public 89 1.39 
. 
49 5.21 E-02 
Private 76 1.43 
. 
50 5.72E-02 
Table 7.31: Is Internal Audit a Core Activity? (T-Test) 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Sig Mean Std. Error Difference 
. F Si q. t df (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 1.033 . 311 -. 530 163 . 597 -4.10E-02 
7.73E-02 
-. 
19 
. 
11 
Equal variances 
not assumed -. 529 158.181 . 597 -4.10E-02 7.74E-02 -. 
19 
. 
11 
The t-test has found that the difference in the mean answers given by the participants from 
the two sectors is not statistically significantly (p>0.05). 
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Conclusion for H2: 
Table 7.32: Summary Table of Statistics for H2 
Question Sectors Type of P-Value Significant/Non- 
Test Significant 
Public 
x2 0.000 Significant 
Private 
x2 0.000 Significant 
Is internal audit an Both 2 0.000 Significant 
`essential' activity? Sectors 
Comparison 2 0.385 Non-Significant 
Comparison t-test 1  0.388 Non-Significant 
Public x2 0.044 Significant 
Private x2 0.251 Non-Significant 
Is internal audit a Both F x2 0.024 Non-Significant 
`core' activity? Sectors 
Comparison 2 0.594 Non-Significant 
Comparison t-test 0.597 Non-Significant 
Deciding whether an activity qualifies as `core' or not, is proving to be less than a 
straightforward process. Primarily, the problem arises from the fact that there is no clear 
basis for identifying them, nor an established way of developing them over time. The failure 
to find a universally agreed upon definition, further adds to the problem. People usually 
perceive as their core activities whatever was primary to their business from the outset. But 
there are so many organisations nowadays where their original business disappeared a long 
time ago and they are now a completely different business entity. Organisations must 
therefore be prepared to systematically re-assess what they consider to be their core 
activities. 
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At the end of the day organisations have to decide whether internal audit is an 'essential' 
activity? The one answer which is also supported by the survey findings is YES. It seems 
that internal audit is at last gaining the recognition it deserves for the value it can bring to an 
organisation. Organisation have come to realise how important is to have an internal audit 
function whether this is maintained in-house or alternatively it is provided by an outside 
service provider. The other important question that also requires an answer is whether 
internal audit is a `core' activity? One has to be extremely cautious when answering this 
particular question considering the ongoing debate as to what constitutes a `core' activity. 
Although to a certain extent the survey results suggest that internal audit is a `core activity. 
the exceptionally high number of respondents, particularly from the private sector, stating 
that internal audit is `non-core' suggests that the survey results have to be treated with 
utmost care. Due to the small size of the sample and in line with what has been written in a 
number of publications, it has to be concluded that while internal audit is considered to be an 
`essential' activity it is not regarded as `core', therefore, it will be appropriate under these 
circumstances to accept this hypothesis. 
H3: Cost savings are the most important consideration in the decision to outsource 
internal auditing. 
On numerous occasions it has been written in the literature that the most common rationale 
for outsourcing is cost savings. However, it seems that there is a considerable controversy as 
to whether outsourcing is actually cost-effective. While cost containment may be one of the 
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reasons behind the decision to use outsourcing. its importance as a decision criterion has 
recently diminished. The descriptive analysis of the survey results has revealed that factors, 
like the quality of service, and the access to internal auditors with specialist skills are in fact 
considered to be more important than potential cost savings in the decision to outsource the 
internal audit function. 
It appears that many firms have not realised the anticipated cost savings from outsourcing 
their internal audit function. Acciani (1995), in fact, goes as far as to claim that outsourcing 
will almost certainly cost companies more than to retain the internal audit function in-house. 
It is quite possible that organisations can end up paying more to the service provider in the 
long-run. More surprising, according to Verschoor and Farrell (1996), is the fact that many 
internal auditing outsourcing agreements project no cost savings at all. Will it be therefore 
correct for someone to claim that cost savings is really a primary consideration when it 
comes to outsourcing the internal audit function? 
Table 7.33: The Importance of `Cost Savings' in the Decision to Outsource 
the Internal Audit Function (Frequency Table) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Not Relevant/Not Important 17 20.0 
-3.0 
Important/Very Important/Extremely Important 23 20.0 3.0 
Total 40 
Table 7.34: The Importance of `Cost Savings' in the Decision to Outsource 
the Internal Audit Function (Chi-Square Test) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 
. 
900 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
343 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 20.0. 
-244- 
The Chi-square test indicates that there is no statistically significant difference (p---o 
. 
0ý 
between those respondents who regard cost savings to be a very-i'extremelý 
-/important factor 
in the decision to outsource the internal audit function and those who place it in the not 
relevant/not important category. 
Table 7.35: The Importance of `Cost Savings' in the Decision to Outsource 
the Internal Audit Function/Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Not Relevant 5 2 7 
Not Important 7 3 10 
Important 10 3 13 
Very Important 5 3 8 
Extremely Important 1 1 2 
Total 28 12 40 
Table 7.36: The Importance of `Cost Savings' in the Decision to Outsource 
the Internal Audit Function (Mean Ranks) 
Sector N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Public 28 19.98 559.50 
Private 12 21.71 260.50 
Total 40 
Table 7.37: The Importance of `Cost Savings' in the Decision to Outsource 
the Internal Audit Function (Mann-Whitney U Test) 
Statistics 
Mann-Whitney U 153.500 
Wilcoxon W 559.500 
Z 
-. 
442 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
658 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed a 673 Sig. )] . 
a. Not corrected for ties. 
The mean rank for each of the two sectors indicates that there is a slight difference in terms 
of how important they consider the factor `cost savings' in their decision to outsource the 
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internal audit function. Respondents from the private sector consider cost savings to be more 
important than their counterparts from the public sector. However, the Mann-Whitney U test 
(U=153.500 and p=0.658) reveals that the difference between the two sectors is not 
statistically significant (p>0.05). 
Conclusion for H3: 
Table 7.38: Summary Table of Statistics for H3 
Question Type of Mean Rank P-Value Significant/Non- 
Test Significant 
How important was the Mann- Public Sector 
factor `cost savings' in the Whitney 19.98 0.658 Non-Significant 
decision to outsource the U Private Sector 
internal audit function? Test 21.71 
The descriptive along with the statistical analysis of the results suggest that this hypothesis 
should be rejected. Eventhough potential cost savings are recognised as an important factor 
in the decision to outsource internal auditing, other factors are considered to be far more 
important. 
Although in an outsourcing arrangement the two parties involved expect that at least some 
cost savings will arise, this expectation does not always materialise. Theoretically the move 
from an in-house internal audit function to outsourcing should be cost neutral because the 
same work will still be performed using the same employees due to the emergence of the 
legislation known as the Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment (TUPE). TUPE 
which requires the outside provider taking over a function to retain the people working in 
that particular function and provide them with the same terms of employment, has made it 
more difficult for the providers to come up with significant cost savings at least III the tirst 
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few years of the outsourcing engagement. This legislation has turned out to be a significant 
obstacle in the service providers' efforts to promote their outsourcing services on the basis of 
cost savings. Instead, they had to turn to other areas like efficiency, effectiveness, and the 
quality of their audit work in an effort to successfully promote their sen-ices. 
In some cases it is even possible that an organisation outsourcing the internal audit function 
can end up incurring a higher cost. It has been often claimed that outside service providers 
usually lowball their initial proposals and that they begin to escalate their fees upwards soon 
after the contract is agreed. On the other hand, it is also not far from the truth to assert that an 
outsourcing decision might significantly trim costs because by buying the services at a 
market rate the organisation can avoid paying the premium employment costs, such as profit- 
sharing, bonuses and pension schemes, and it can also replace the fixed staffing and 
overhead costs of permanent employees with the variable cost of an outsourcing 
arrangement. 
There is no doubt that every time an organisation contemplates the possibility of outsourcing 
not just the internal audit function, but any other function, `cost' considerations are bound to 
arise. Eventually the organisation will have to decide whether it is more cost-beneficial to 
develop internal audit skills in-house or alternatively acquire them from a competent service 
provider from outside. Still, the final decision to outsource the internal audit function or not 
should never be based on cost grounds alone. Other factors like the quality of service should 
also be given the necessary consideration. 
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H4: There is a relationship between the size of an organisation and its decision to 
outsource internal auditing. 
It is usually claimed that one of the main determinants in the decision to outsource any 
business activity is the size of the organisation. The chances are that small organisations are 
more likely to consider outsourcing due to their limited financial muscle. In such 
organisations the need for a full-time in-house internal audit function may not be that high 
therefore outsourcing can be a better and a more viable alternative. Raynor (1992), on the 
other hand, claims that even medium-sized and larger organisations that can afford to be self- 
sufficient are finding outsourcing to be an attractive alternative. While small organisations 
can benefit from the economies of scale provided by outsourcing, large organisations benefit 
by contracting out what are usually ill-managed peripheral activities. Whether there is some 
kind of association between the size of an organisation and its decision to outsource the 
internal audit function is an issue which is examined below. `Size' in this study is measured 
in accordance to the number of people each one of the organisations currently employs. The 
`number of employees' was the only uniform metric that could be used in order to have an 
accurate indication of the size, given the large diversity of operations of the organisations 
that made up the sample. Organisations were divided into the following three categories: 
Table 7.39: Organisational Size in 
Terms of the Number of Employees 
Size Number of Employees 
Small Under 5,000 
Medium 5,000 
- 
10,000 
Large More than 10.000 
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Table 7.40: Current Provision of Internal Audit/Size 
Crosstabulation 
Size 
Small Medium Large Total 
Internal Audit Count 54 17 49 120 
Function In-House Expected Coun 61.5 15.0 43.5 120.0 
Internal Audit Count 28 3 9 40 
Function Outsourced Expected Coun 
20.5 5.0 14.5 40.0 
Total Count 82 20 58 160 
Expected Coun 82.0 20.0 58.0 160.0 
Table 7.41: Current Provision of Internal Audit/Size 
(Chi-Square Test) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
2-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.507a 2 
. 
023 
Likelihood Ratio 7.688 2 
. 
021 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 6.567 1 . 010 
N of Valid Cases 160 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 5.00. 
The Chi-square test above has revealed that there is an association between the size of an 
organisation and its decision to outsource the internal audit function. The value of the 
`Pearson chi-square' in this case is 7.507. Since the p-value of 0.023 is less than 0.05 it can 
be concluded that there is a statistically significant association between the two. The 
crosstabulation demonstrates that more `small' organisations outsource the internal audit 
function (the observed frequency of 28 is greater than the expected frequency of 20.5). On 
the other hand, `large' organisations show their preference towards an in-house internal audit 
function (the observed frequency of 49 is greater than the expected frequency of 433-5). 
Similarly, `medium' sized organisations also prefer an in-house internal audit function. One 
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can easily detect that the general feeling is that `small' organisations, as compared to 'large' 
ones, are more likely to consider outsourcing the internal audit function. 
Conclusion for Ha: 
Table 7.42: Summary Table of Statistics for H4 
Question Type of Test P-Value Significant/Non- 
Significant 
is there a relationship 
between the size of the x2 0.023 Significant 
organisation and the decision 
to outsource the internal audit 
function? 
The results from this survey are in line with the prevailing thought that small organisations 
are more likely to outsource the internal audit function, therefore, this hypothesis has to be 
accepted. In fact, out of the total of forty organisations that are currently outsourcing the 
internal audit function, twenty-eight were in the `small' size category. So size, inevitably, 
does matter in the decision to outsource the internal audit function. 
Although this survey has found that the outsourcing of the internal audit function is inversely 
related to the size of the institution, it has to be said that small organisations in particular are 
the ones that really stand to benefit the most from buying-in this type of service. Establishing 
and maintaining an effective and competent internal audit function in-house might not be 
feasible for small organisations. At times, these organisations might even choose not to have 
an internal audit function if the costs involved are too prohibitive, or if they have neither the 
resources nor the in-house expertise to undertake the task adequately themselves. The use of 
outsourcing under these circumstance could well be the right option. Service providers are 
capable of providing a high-quality service at a reasonable price by amortising training costs 
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over a number of customers. Due to the advent of outsourcing. an internal audit service can 
now become a reality even for organisations of a small size. 
H5: There is a relationship between the diversity of operations of an organisation and 
its decision to outsource internal auditing. 
One of the arguments that is frequently set forth in support of outsourcing of the internal 
audit function is that it helps international and multinational firms to achieve a cost-effective 
audit coverage of their overseas locations. Instead of having to incur the high expenses 
associated with flying and accommodating audit staff in a foreign country. having to 
encounter the foreign language and cultural barrier that may inhibit the success of a 
travelling audit team, an organisation can alternatively employ the services of a local service 
provider who is no doubt fluent in the local language and more familiar with the local 
culture, customs, laws and overall setting. 
Although at the technical level, public sector audit is similar to the audit performed 
anywhere in the private sector, there is however one striking difference. The main difference 
arises from the underlying need in the public sector to take into consideration political 
influences. According to Jones and Bates (1990), in a clash between political `policies and 
economic ` rationale', `policies' usually take priority in the public sector. Auditors without 
any experience in the public sector may be in for a shock. Unless their recommendations 
relate to clear-cut cases of inadequate control, improper accounting or fraud they may well 
find that considerable debate ensues among management and politicians. Therefore, special 
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skills and experience are necessary on the part of the outside provider in order to cam* out an 
audit assignment successfully. 
Table 7.43: Current Provision of Internal Audit/Diversity of Operations 
Crosstabulation y 
Current provision of Internal 
Audit 
Internal Audit Internal Audit 
Function Function 
In-House Outsourced Total 
National Count 14 6 20 
Expected Count 15.0 5.0 20.0 
International Count 24 2 26 
Expected Count 19.5 6.5 26.0 
Multinational Count 21 4 25 
Expected Count 18.8 6.3 25.0 
Govt Depts/Agencies/NDPBs/Nl Count 47 20 67 
Depts Expected Count 50.3 16.8 67.0 
Housing Federation Members Count 14 8 22 
Expected Count 16.5 5.5 22.0 
Total Count 120 40 160 
Expected Count 120.0 40.0 160.0 
Table 7.44: Current Provision of Internal Audit/Diversity of Operations 
(Chi-Square Test) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.856a 4 
. 
097 
Likelihood Ratio 8.900 4 
. 
064 
Linear-by-Linear 2 466 1 
. 
116 Association . 
N of Valid Cases 160 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 5.00. 
The value of the `Pearson chi-square' in this case is 7.856 and p=0.097. Since the p-value is 
less than 0.05 it means that there is no significant association between the diversity of 
operations and the decision to outsource the internal audit function. 
- 
252 
- 
Conclusion for Hs: 
Table 7.45: Summary Table of Statistics for H5 
Question Type of P-Value Significant/Non- 
Test Significant 
is there a relationship between 
the diversity of operations of an x2 0.097 Non-Significant 
organisation and its decision to 
outsource the internal audit 
function? 
While many organisations operate at a national level, the major corporations need to 
continue to expand both within and outside the country's borders in order to create the 
operating efficiencies that underpin profitability. Although one should expect that with the 
current trend towards globalisation and the associated difficulties for multinational 
organisations with centralised resources to provide internal audit coverage should have 
influenced the decision to outsource the function the survey results show that this is not the 
case. Similarly, in the public sector the decision to outsource the internal audit function is not 
associated with the type of organisation (i. e. government department, agency, housing 
association, etc). The result from the statistical test suggests that the diversity of operations 
has no effect on the decision to outsource internal auditing, therefore this hypothesis has to 
be rejected. 
H6: Legal rulings can affect the decision to outsource internal auditing. 
The biggest human resource issue that affects employers in any outsourcing decision is the 
legal rights of employees as defined under the Transfer of Undertakings Protection of 
Employment (TUPE) legislation. Every function considered for outsourcing has people 
performing the work and although everyone would agree that people are not only an integral 
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part of each function but also one of the most valuable resources of an organisation. they are 
most of the times the last consideration. One can rightly expect that the appearance of TUPF 
on the outsourcing stage will inevitably make the outsourcing decision much easier since the 
directly affected employees should now be transferred to the service provider along with all 
their rights, powers, duties, and liabilities. 
The introduction of TUPE has contributed towards the removal of the anxiety that was 
caused to the employees by the widespread use of outsourcing and has safeguarded, to a 
certain extent, their jobs. Moreover, organisations can now avoid the risk of any expensive 
litigation resulting from an outsourcing decision since the service providers pitching for 
outsourcing contracts are now obliged to soak the costs of existing employees. Since TUPI- 
could in practice safeguard the interests of the employees, organisations contemplating the 
use of outsourcing will have one less issue to worry about. 
Organisations that have Outsourced the Internal Audit Function: 
Public Sector: 
Table 7.46: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision 
to Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(Frequency Table for the Public Sector) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 3 13.5 
-10.5 
No 24 13.5 10.5 
Tota 1 27 
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Table 7.47: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision 
to Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(Chi-Square Test for the Public Sector) 
Statistics 
Chi-Squarea 16.333 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
000 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 13.5. 
According to the chi-square test there is a significant difference (p<0.05) between those 
respondents who answered YES and those who answered NO. The majority of organisations 
(24 out of 27) from the public sector indicated that TUPE did not make their decision to 
outsource the internal audit function any easier. 
Private Sector: 
Table 7.48: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision 
to Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(Frequency Table for the Private Sector) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 1 6.0 
-5.0 
No 11 6.0 5.0 
Total 12 
Table 7.49: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision 
to Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(Chi-Square Test for the Private Sector) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 8.333 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
004 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 6.0. 
Once again, the chi-square test has revealed that a significant difference (p<0.0i) exists 
between the respondents who answered YES and those who answered NO. 
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Both Sectors: 
Table 7.50: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision 
to Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(Frequency Table for Both Sectors) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 4 19.5 
-15.5 
No 35 19.5 15.5 
Total 39 
Table 7.51: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision 
to Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(Chi-Square Test for Both Sectors) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 24.641 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
000 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 19.5. 
When the responses from the two sectors were put together, the chi-square test showed that 
there is significant difference (p<0.05) between those who said that TUPE made their 
decision to outsource the internal audit function easier and those who said that it did not. 
Thirty-five out of a total of thirty-nine said that this legislation had no effect on their 
outsourcing decision. 
Chi-Square Test Comparing the Two Sectors: 
Table 7.52: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision 
to Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? /Sectors 
Crosstabulation 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes Count 
Expected Count 
3 
2.8 
1 
1.2 
4 
4.0 
No Count 
Expected Count 
24 
24.2 
11 
10.8 
35 
35.0 
Total Count 
Expected Count 
16- 
27 
27.0 
12 
12.0 
39 
39.0 
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Table 7.53: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision 
to Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(Chi-Square Test) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
2-sided 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 
. 
07011 1 
. 
792 
Continuity Correction a 
. 
000 1 1.000 
Likelihood Ratio 
. 
072 1 
. 
788 
Fishers Exact Test 1,000 640 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
. 
068 1 
. 
794 
N of Valid Cases 39 
a. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
1.23. 
Since 50% of the cells have an expected frequency of less than 5, the appropriate statistical 
test in this case is the Fisher's Exact Test. This gives p=1.000 for a 2-tailed test which 
indicates that there is no significant difference between the answers provided by the two 
sectors. 
T-Test Comparing the Mean Answers Given by the Two Sectors: 
Table 7.54: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision 
to Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? /Sectors 
(Group Statistics) 
Std. Error 
Sector N Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Public 27 1.89 
. 
32 6.16E-02 
Private 12 1.92 
. 
29 8.33E-02 
Table 7.55: Did TUPE Make your Organisation's Decision 
to Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? (T-Test) 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Si Mean Error Std Difference g. 
. 
F Sig. t df (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances 274 604 
- 
257 37 
. 
798 
-2.78E-02 
. 
11 
-. 
25 19 
assumed 
. . . 
Equal variances 268 
- 
367 23 
. 
791 
-2.78E-02 . 10 -. 24 
19 
not assumed . . 
The t-test also reveals that there is no significant difference of opinion between the 
respondents from the public sector and those from the private sector. 
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organisations with an In House Internal Audit Function: 
Public Sector: 
Table 7.56: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to 
Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(Frequency Table for the Public Sector) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 11 30.0 
-19.0 
No 49 30.0 19.0 
Total 60 
Table 7.57: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to 
Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(Chi-Square Test for the Public Sector) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 24.067 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
000 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 30.0. 
The chi-square test for the public sector reveals that there is a significant difference (p<0.05) 
between the respondents who think that TUPE will make a future decision to outsource the 
internal audit function easier and those who do not. 
Private Sector: 
Table 7.58: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to 
Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(Frequency Table for the Private Sector) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 13 25.5 
-12.5 
No 38 25.5 12.5 
Total 51 
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Table 7.59: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to 
Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(Chi-Square Test for the Private Sector) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 12.255 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
000 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 25.5. 
It seems that once again respondents from the private sector share similar views with those 
from the public sector. The chi-square test for the private sector reveals that there is a 
statistically significant difference (p<0.05) between the respondents who answered YES and 
those who answered NO. 
Both Sectors: 
Table 7.60: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to 
Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(Frequency Table for Both Sectors) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 24 55.5 
-31.5 
No 87 55.5 31.5 
Total 111 
Table 7.61: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to 
Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(Chi-Square Test for Both Sectors) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 35.757 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
000 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 55.5. 
The combined responses given by the participants from the two sectors lead to the 
conclusion that there is a significant difference (p<0.05) between those who believe that 
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TUPE will make a future decision to outsource the internal audit function easier and those 
who do not. 
Chi-Square Test Comparing the Two Sectors: 
Table 7.62: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes Count 
Expected Count 
11 
13.0 
13 
11.0 
24 
24.0 
No Count 
Expected Count 
49 
47.0 
38 
40.0 
87 
87.0 
Total Count 
Expected Count 
60 
60.0 
51 
51.0 
111 
111.0 
Table 7.63: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? (Chi-Square Test) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 
. 
833 1 
. 
361 
Continuity Correction a 
. 
464 1 
. 
496 
Likelihood Ratio 
. 
831 1 
. 
362 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 
488 
. 
247 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 826 1 
. 
364 
N of Valid Cases 111 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
11.03. 
The value of the `Pearson chi-square' in this case is 0.833. Since the p-value is greater than 
0.05 it has to be concluded that there is no significant difference between the responses 
provided by the two sectors. 
T-Test Comparing the Mean Answers Given by the Two Sectors: 
Table 7.64: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to Outsource the Internal 
Audit Function Easier? /Sectors (Group Statistics) 
Std. Error 
Sector N Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Public 60 1.82 
. 
39 5.04E-02 
Private 51 1.75 
. 
44 6.16E-02 
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Table 7.65: Will TUPE Make a Future Decision to 
Outsource the Internal Audit Function Easier? 
(T-Test) 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Sig. Mean Std. Error Difference 
F Si q. t df (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances _ 
assumed 
3.276 
. 
073 
. 
908 109 
. 
366 7.16E-02 7.88E-02 
-8.47E-02 
. 
23 
Equal variances 
not assumed . 
899 100.943 
. 
371 7.16E-02 7.96E-02 
-8.63E-02 
. 
23 
The t-test results show once again that there is no significant difference (p>0.05) between the 
mean answers given by the respondents from the two sectors. 
Conclusion for H6: 
Table 7.66: Summary Table of Statistics for H6 
Organisations that have Outsourced the Internal Audit Function 
Question Sectors Type P-Value Significant/Non- 
of Test Significant 
Public '- 0.000 Significant 
Private 0.004 Significant 
Did TUPE Make your 
Organisation's Decision Both z 0.000 Significant 
to Outsource the Internal Sectors 
Audit Function Easier? 
Comparison Fisher's 0.640 Non-Significant 
test 
F-Comparison-] l t-test 0.798 Non-Significant 
Organisations with an In-House Internal Audit Function 
F Public 0.000 Significant 
Private x' 0.000 Significant 
Will TUPE Make a 
Future Decision to Both xz 0.000 Significant 
Outsource the Internal Sectors 
Audit Function Easier? 
Comparison '- 0.361 Non-Significant 
Comparison t-test 0.366 Non-Significant 
- 
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It is evident from the responses given that TUPE had no influence on the decision to 
outsource the internal audit function. Furthermore, even the majority of organisations with an 
in-house internal audit function have indicated that if in the future they decide to outsource 
the internal audit function their decision will not be made any easier because of TUPE. 
Consequently this hypothesis has to be rejected. 
It seems that other factors are ranked ahead of TUPE in the decision to outsource the internal 
audit function. Nevertheless, the truth of the matter is that this legislation has made an 
outsourcing decision less painful at least for the staff directly involved. The advent of TUPE 
has contributed immensely towards the reduction of the anxiety caused by the constant threat 
of unemployment which has been coupled in recent years with the dramatic disappearance of 
the sense of having `a job for life'. At least now employees know that they are more likely to 
have a job even after their function is taken over by the outside provider. 
H7: There is a relationship between the length of time an organisation had an in-house 
internal audit function and its decision to outsource the function. 
It is not far-fetched to argue that the longer an organisation has an internal audit function in- 
house the more difficult it will be for them to consider any form of outsourcing. Having an 
in-house internal audit team for a long period of time has significant advantages, mainly 
because in many organisations the value of the internal audit function goes well beyond the 
direct services that it provides. A long-standing in-house internal audit department is bound 
to be staffed with a number of auditors who have had a long career with the organisation. 
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Their background knowledge of the organisation's operations could be an irreplaceable 
source of information. If required, management can count on them to go the extra mile in 
order to safeguard their own wellbeing and that of their organisation. One can expect that 
normally these organisations will be having second thoughts when it comes to outsourcing 
such dedicated and loyal employees. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to examine whether 
organisations will still outsource the internal audit function regardless of the number of years 
they had the function in-house. 
Table 7.67: The Length of Time an Organisation had an In-House Internal 
Audit Function/Current Provision of Internal Audit 
Crosstabulation 
Count 
Current provision of Internal 
Audit 
Internal Audit Internal Audit 
Function Function 
In-House Outsourced Total 
1-5 years 21 4 25 
6- 10 years 22 11 33 
11 
- 
15 years 14 2 16 
16 
- 
20 years 10 3 13 
More than 20 years 53 17 70 
Total 120 37 157 
Table 7.68: The Length of Time an Organisation had an In-House Internal 
Audit Function/Current Provision of Internal Audit 
(Group Statistics) 
Std. Error 
N Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Internal Audit Function 
120 43 4 1.60 
. 
15 In-House 
. 
Internal Audit Function 
37 4 49 1.57 
. 
26 Outsourced 
. 
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Table 7.69: The Length of Time an Organisation had 
an In-House Internal Audit Function (T-Test) 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Sig. Mean Std. Error Difference 
F Sig. t df (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed . 
002 
. 
969 
-. 
177 155 
. 
860 
-5.32E-02 
. 
30 
-. 
65 
. 
54 
Equal variances 
not assumed -. 
179 60.783 
. 
859 
-5.32E-02 
. 
30 
-. 
65 
. 
54 
The t-test has revealed that there is no significant association (p>0.05) between the length of 
time an organisation had an in-house internal audit function and the decision to outsource the 
function. 
Conclusion for H7: 
Table 7.70: Summary Table of Statistics for H 
Question Type P-Value Significant/Non- 
of Test Significant 
Is there a relationship between the 
length of time an organisation had an t-test 0.860 Non-Significant 
in-house internal audit function and its 
LLecision to outsource the function? 
From the survey results it can be concluded that this hypothesis should be rejected. The 
length of time an organisation has an in-house internal audit function plays no part in the 
outsourcing decision. The psychological contract between the employer and the employ in 
terms of a reasonably permanent employment, which characterised past decades, is nmN'here 
to be found today (Cooper, 1997). Today, if management believes that the interests of the 
organisation are best served by outsourcing not only the internal audit function but any other 
function then they will proceed to do so no matter the number of years they 
had the function 
in-house. It is not surprising, therefore, that employees nowadays do not regard their 
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employment as secure. However. with the advent of TL PE. the breadth and depth of 
familiarity the auditors had with the organisation's operations and with fellow employees 
will not entirely disappear once the function is outsourced. Audit work will be performed in 
a similar manner because the outside service provider will be using predominantly the same 
staff as previously. Management and the board will therefore know from the outset the 
calibre and internal audit training and skills of the individuals actually doing the audit work. 
H8: The many alternative sources of supply in the market can influence the decision to 
outsource internal auditing. 
The number of new organisations specialising solely in the provision of internal audit work 
is on the rise. In addition, established providers, particularly the `big 5 public accounting 
firms', are expanding their existing offerings in an effort to further develop the outsourcing 
of the internal audit into a lucrative revenue source. Both new and old providers are working 
towards capturing a bigger slice of the expanding outsourcing market. The aggressive 
promotion of their `extended audit services' along with their recently acquired ability to 
handle bigger and more complex pieces of work has created a healthy competition in the 
market with the client standing to benefit from lower prices and better quality of service. 
It is true that organisations that are currently considering outsourcing the internal audit 
function have more choice of service providers than ever before. In fact, Rittenberg and 
Covaleski (1999) claim that one of the reasons that make internal audit an ideal candidate for 
outsourcing is the presence of many alternative providers of audit services. Similarltiy, Clark 
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(2000) argues that outsourced internal auditing owes its development to the broader range of 
providers in the marketplace. Providers range from what he calls 'one person bands' through 
to the very large firms of accountants, and down again to specialist niche firms. 
Table 7.71: How Important were the `Many Alternative Sources of Supply' 
in your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the Internal Audit 
Function? /Sectors Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Not Relevant 15 6 21 
Not Important 9 5 14 
Important 4 1 5 
Total 28 12 40 
Table 7.72: How Important were the `Many Alternative Sources of Supply' 
in your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the Internal Audit Function? 
(Mean Ranks) 
Sector N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Public 28 20.48 573.50 
Private 12 20.54 246.50 
Total 40 
Table 7.73: How Important were the `Many Alternative Sources of Supply' 
in your Organisation's Decision to Outsource the Internal Audit Function? 
(Mann-Whitney U Test) 
Statistics 
Mann-Whitney U 167.500 
Wilcoxon W 573.500 
Z 
-. 
016 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
987 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed 988a 
Sig. )] 
a. Not corrected for ties. 
The Mann-Whitney test indicates that there are no statistically significant differences 
(P>0.05) between the mean answers provided by the respondents from the two sectors. 
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While the mean rank for the public sector is 20.48, for the private sector is 20.54. The 
respondents from both sectors believe that the number of providers in the market is not 
relevant in the decision to outsource the internal audit function. 
Conclusion for H8: 
Table 7.74: Summary Table of Statistics for Hs 
Question Type of 
Test 
Mean Rank P-Value Significant/ 
Non-Significant 
How Important were the `Many Mann- Public Sector 
Alternative Sources of Supply' Whitney 20.48 0.987 Non-Significant 
in your Organisation's U Private Sector 
Decision to Outsource the Test 20.54 
Internal Audit Function? 
Although one should expect that the presence of many potential alternative sources of supply 
in the wings would make the decision to outsource the internal audit function much easier, 
the survey results show that this is not the case. The majority of organisations do not 
perceive the presence of a large number of internal audit providers in the market as an 
important or even a relevant factor in the decision to outsource the function. Therefore, this 
hypothesis has to be rejected. 
The fact that still remains is that there is an increasing acceptability of internal audit as a 
function that can be outsourced. If this was not true, a market would not have existed for the 
outside service providers that now specialise in the provision of internal audit services. The 
outsourcing boom has brought a host of new firms in the market selling their internal audit 
services that some organisations no longer want to perform or they are unable to perform for 
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themselves for whatever reason. As long as there are organisations willing to consider 
outsourcing their internal audit function, there will always be a large number of potential 
providers in the field rising to the challenge to satisfy this demand. 
H9: The quality of the internal audit service will be adversely affected if the internal 
audit function is outsourced. 
The quality of the service is a major concern when outsourcing the internal audit function 
and should be the main priority above any potential cost-savings. Internal audit services 
offered by reputable professionals always come with a reasonable assurance of quality. 
Service providers, and particularly the `big 5' public accounting firms, use as one of their 
selling points to potential clients the quality of their service. The main criticism of these 
firms has always been, however, that they are using their external audit staff to perform 
internal audit work during their non-busy periods of the year. 
In an effort to banish this perception and in order to bolster their internal audit capabilities, 
public accounting firms have over recent years deployed a large number of internal audit 
professionals 
- 
with first-hand experience of the intricacies of running a value-added internal 
audit service 
- 
into senior positions within their internal audit divisions. Whether this 
practice has something to do with the enormous revenue potential, which Rittenberg and 
Covaleski (1999) claim to be 2-3 times the revenue currently generated by financial 
statement audits, does not take anything away from the fact that this is a positive move on 
the part of the providers to improve their quality of service. In order to establish how 
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satisfied the organisations are with the provided service, a 5-point scale was used where 
1= Very Dissatisfied, 2= Dissatisfied, 3= Uncertain, 4= Satisfied, and 5= Very Satisfied. 
Table 7.75: Satisfaction With the Quality of the 
Provided Service (Statistics) 
N 
Valid Mean Median Mode 
Adherence to the audit plan 40 4.03 4.00 4 
Provider's level of understanding of the 
operation(s) being audited 40 3.48 4.00 4 
Audits are conducted with minimum 
disruption to normal activities and with few 40 3.93 4.00 4 
demands on operating personnel 
Professionalism of the service provider 40 4.05 4.00 4 
Internal audit meets professional standards 40 4.13 4.00 4 
Response to the organisation's needs within 
the pre-arranged time limit 40 3.78 4.00 4 
The scope and objectives of each audit are 
clearly communicated to our managers 40 3.93 4.00 4 
Good inter-personal skills on the part of the 
service provider 40 3.95 4.00 4 
Appropriate personnel are alerted to the fact 
that an audit is to be carried out 
40 4.05 4.00 4 
Findings are discussed with those directly 
concerned and their help is utilised in 40 4.08 4.00 4 
developing proposed solutions 
Errors disclosed by audit are treated factually 
and fairly 40 4.10 4.00 4 
Audit scope and objectives 40 4.10 4.00 4 
Accuracy of information 40 3.95 4.00 4 
Consistency in the way audit reports are 
presented 40 3.93 4.00 4 
Clarity and conciseness 40 3.85 4.00 4 
Time taken to issue the audit report 40 3.70 4.00 4 
Proper treatment of findings according to 
relative significance 40 
3.80 4.00 4 
Absence of surprises when the final audit 
report is released 40 
4.22 4.00 4 
The number of audit recommendations 40 3.98 4.00 4 
The quality of audit recommendations 40 3.70 4.00 4 
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Table 7.76: Satisfaction With the Quality 
of the Provided Service 
(Mean Ranks) 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Sum Sum 
Mean of Mean of 
N Rank Ranks N Rank Ranks N 
Adherence to the audit plan 28 20.43 572.00 12 20.67 248.00 40 
Provider's level of understanding of the 
operation(s) being audited 
28 19.84 555.50 12 22.04 264.50 40 
Audits are conducted with minimum 
disruption to normal activities and with 28 21.57 604.00 12 18.00 216.00 40 
few demands on operating personnel 
Professionalism of the service provider 28 20.25 567.00 12 21.08 253.00 40 
Internal audit meets professional 28 20.52 574.50 12 20.46 245.50 40 
standards 
Response to the organisation's needs 28 19 84 555.50 12 22.04 264.50 40 
within the pre-arranged time limit . 
The scope and objectives of each audit 
are clearly communicated to our 28 20.23 566.50 12 21.13 253.50 40 
managers 
Good inter-personal skills on the part of 28 20.75 581.00 12 19.92 239.00 40 
the service provider 
Appropriate personnel are alerted to the 28 20.50 574.00 12 20.50 246.00 40 
fact that an audit is to be carried out 
Findings are discussed with those 
directly concerned and their help is 28 20.63 577.50 12 20.21 242.50 40 
utilised in developing proposed 
solutions 
Errors disclosed by audit are treated 28 21.50 602.00 12 18.17 218.00 40 factually and fairly 
Audit scope and objectives 28 20.95 586.50 12 19.46 233.50 40 
Accuracy of information 28 19.29 540.00 12 23.33 280.00 40 
Consistency in the way audit reports ar 28 21.39 599.00 12 18.42 221.00 40 
presented 
Clarity and conciseness 28 22.13 619.50 12 16.71 200.50 40 
Time taken to issue the audit report 28 22.13 619.50 12 16.71 200.50 40 
Proper treatment of findings according 28 21.86 612.00 12 17.33 208.00 40 to relative significance 
Absence of surprises when the final 28 19.86 556.00 12 22.00 264.00 40 
audit report is released 
The number of audit recommendations 28 20.66 578.50 12 20.13 241.50 40 
The quality of audit recommendations 28 19.61 549.00 12 22.58 271.00 40 
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Table 7.77: Satisfaction With the Quality of the 
Provided Service (Mann-Whitney U Test) 
Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon Asymp. Sig. Exact Sig. 
U W Z (2-tailed) 2' 1-tailed Si 
. Adherence to the audit plan 166.000 572.000 
-. 
071 
. 
943 965a 
Provider's level of understanding of the 
operation(s) being audited 149.500 555.500 -. 572 
. 
567 590a 
Audits are conducted with minimum 
disruption to normal activities and with 138.000 216.000 
-1.212 
. 
225 
. 
389a 
few demands on operating personnel 
Professionalism of the service provider 161.000 567.000 
-. 
227 
. 
820 
. 
8508 
Internal audit meets professional a 
standards 
167.500 245.500 
-. 
018 
. 
986 
. 
988 
Response to the organisation's needs a 
within the pre-arranged time limit 
149.500 555.500 
-. 
595 
. 
552 
. 
590 
The scope and objectives of each audit 
are clearly communicated to our 160.500 566.500 
-. 
238 
. 
812 
. 
827a 
managers 
Good inter-personal skills on the part of a 
the service provider 
161.000 239.000 
-. 
244 
. 
807 
. 
850 
Appropriate personnel are alerted to the a 
fact that an audit is to be carried out 
168.000 246.000 
. 
000 1.000 1.000 
Findings are discussed with those 
directly concerned and their help is a 
utilised in developing proposed 
164.500 242.500 
-. 
128 
. 
898 
. 
919 
solutions 
Errors disclosed by audit are treated a 
factually and fairly 
140.000 218.000 
-1.136 
. 
256 
. 
422 
Audit scope and objectives 155.500 233.500 
-. 
429 
. 
668 
. 
716a 
Accuracy of information 134.000 540.000 
-1.242 
. 
214 
. 
328a 
Consistency in the way audit reports ar a 
presented 143.000 221.000 -. 799 . 424 . 475 
Clarity and conciseness 122.500 200.500 
-1.482 
. 
138 
. 
182a 
Time taken to issue the audit report 122.500 200.500 
-1.499 
. 
134 
. 
182a 
Proper treatment of findings according t a 
relative significance 130.000 208.000 -1.210 . 
226 
. 
273 
Absence of surprises when the final a 
audit report is released 150.000 556.000 -. 666 . 506 . 
610 
The number of audit recommendations 163.500 241.500 
-. 
169 
. 
866 
. 
896a 
The quality of audit recommendations 143.000 549.000 
-. 
825 
. 
409 
. 
475a 
a. Not corrected for ties. 
It is clear from the table above that there is no statistically significant difference between the 
responses given by the participants from the two sectors. In general terms, the majority of the 
respondents indicated that they are satisfied with the quality of the service the`' currently 
receive. 
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Conclusion for H9: 
Table 7.78: Summary Table of Statistics for H9 
Question Type of P-Values Significant/ýion- 
Test Significant 
Was the quality of the internal audit Mann- 
service adversely affected when the Whitney All the p-values Non-Significant 
function was outsourced? U are above 0.05 
Test 
The mean ranks suggest that all the organisations that are currently outsourcing the internal 
audit function are in general terms satisfied with the quality of the provided service. Since 
the quality of the externally provided internal audit service is of a satisfactory standard, this 
hypothesis should be rejected. 
Despite all the valid efforts of the service provider and despite all the goodwill in the world, 
it is only natural that from time to time some complaints will be heard from clients who had 
high initial expectations in terms of the quality of service, but their expectations were never 
met. In today's highly competitive market for the provision of internal audit services, 
providers cannot afford to be complacent or slack when it comes to their quality of service, 
not even for a minute. They have to keep abreast with all the latest technological 
advancements and always maintain skilful and trained people on staff otherwise they could 
end-up loosing their clients. The descriptive analysis of the survey results has revealed that 
the second most important reason for outsourcing the internal audit function is to 'ensure a 
high quality of service', therefore, if a provider is found or appears to have been 
compromising or tampering with the quality of his/her service, then not only he/she will be 
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in danger of loosing his/her existing clients, but he/she will also be running the risk of 
damaging his reputation beyond repair. 
Hio: Independence is compromised when public accounting firms take on the dual role 
of the internal and external auditor. 
The most logical provider of outsourced internal audit services is a public accounting firm 
and from what the survey results has shown it appears that this practice represents a 
significant trend. An organisation ideally should have one provider acting as the internal 
auditor and another providing external audit. Having, however, one firm performing both 
activities it generates a troublesome ethical dilemma, as the benefits associated with 
outsourcing are countered by the perception of compromised independence. 
This perception of compromised independence is not entirely unfounded since public 
accounting firms have been often been accused of using their external audit staff to perform 
internal audit work during their off-peak seasons. Although this practise allows public 
accounting firms to smooth their work load and provide an alternative and profitable activity 
to engage their staffs all year round, in such circumstances the common checks and balances 
that exist between internal and external audit would be eliminated. In an effort to gain public 
confidence, public accounting firms have recently employed many professionally qualified 
internal auditors and they have also erected organisational walls in order to separate the tit o 
areas of their service. Whether they were successful in doing so, is an issue which examined 
below. 
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Public Sector: 
Table 7.79: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised 
When Using One Provider for Both Services? 
(Frequency Table for the Public Sector) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 12 8.5 3.5 
No 5 8.5 
-3.5 
Total 17 
Table 7.80: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised 
When Using One Provider for Both Services? 
(Chi-Square Test for the Public Sector) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 2.882 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
090 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 8.5. 
The chi-square test for the public sector reveals that there is no statistically significant 
difference (p>0.05) between the respondents who agree that independence is compromised 
when using one provider for both services and those who disagree. Nevertheless, the 
majority of respondents believe that independence is actually compromised when one service 
provider assumes the both roles. 
Private Sector: 
Table 7.81: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised 
When Using One Provider for Both Services? 
(Frequency Table for the Private Sector) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 5 5.0 
.0 
No 5 5.0 
.0 
Total 10 
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Table 7.82: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised 
When Using One Provider for Both Services? 
(Chi-Square Test for the Public Sector) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 
. 
000 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 1.000 
a- 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 5.0. 
The p-value of 1 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between those 
who agree and those who disagree. As it can be seen from the results from the chi-square 
test, the respondents from the private sector are equally divided. Half of them believe that 
independence is compromised when using the same provider for both services and the other 
half disagrees. 
Both Sectors: 
Table 7.83: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised 
When Using One Provider for Both Services? 
(Frequency Table for Both Sectors) 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes 17 13.5 3.5 
No 10 13.5 
-3.5 
Total 27 
Table 7.84: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised 
When Using One Provider for Both Services? 
(Chi-Square Test for Both Sectors) 
Statistics 
Chi-Square a 1.815 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. 
. 
178 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 13.5. 
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The value of the chi-square test of 1.815 for both sectors together reveals that there is no 
statistically significant difference (p>0.05) between the respondents .,,, ho agrcc that 
independence is compromised when using one provider for both services and those who 
disagree. Although the majority believe that independence is compromised the difference 
with those who disagree is not statistically significant. 
Chi-Square Test Comparing the Two Sectors: 
Table 7.85: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised 
When Using One Provider for Both Services? /Sectors 
Crosstabulation 
Sector 
Public Private Total 
Yes Count 
Expected Count 
12 
10.7 
5 
6.3 
17 
17.0 
No Count 
Expected Count 
5 
6.3 
5 
3.7 
10 
10.0 
Total Count 
Expected Count 
17 
17.0 
10 
10.0 
27 
27.0 
Table 7.86: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised 
When Using One Provider for Both Services? (Chi-Square Test) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.144 1 
. 
285 
Continuity Correction a 
. 
432 1 
. 
511 
Likelihood Ratio 1.134 1 
. 
287 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 
415 
. 
255 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.102 1 
. 
294 
N of Valid Cases 27 
a. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
3.70. 
The X' value of 0.285 and the p-value of 0.285 indicates that there is no statisticallý 
significant difference (p>0.05) between the responses provided by the participants from the 
two sectors. 
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T-Test Comparing the Mean Answers Given by the Two Sectors: 
Table 7.87: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised 
When Using One Provider for Both Services? /Sectors 
Crosstabulation (Group Statistics) 
Std. Error 
Sector N Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Public 17 1.29 
. 
47 
. 
11 
Private 10 1.50 
. 
53 
. 
17 
Table 7.88: Do you Agree that Independence is Compromised 
When Using One Provider for Both Services? (T-Test) 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Sig. Mean Std. Error Difference 
F Sig. t df (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances 1 890 181 
-1.052 25 
. 
303 
-. 
21 
. 
20 
-. 
61 
. 
20 
assumed . . 
Equal variances 
-1 020 17.254 
. 
322 
-. 
21 
. 
20 
-. 
63 
. 
22 
not assumed . 
The t-test above shows once again that there is no statistically significant difference (p>0.05) 
between the mean answers given by the respondents from the two sectors. 
Conclusion for Hio: 
Table 7.89: Summary Table of Statistics for Hio 
Question Sectors Type P-Value Significant/Non- 
of Significant 
Test 
Public 
- 
0.090 Non-Significant 
Private ' 1.000 Non-Significant 
Do you agree that independence 
is compromised when using one Both 2 0.178 Non-Significant 
provider for both services? Sectors 
Comparison 2 0.285 Non-Significant 
Comparison t-test 0.303 Non-Significant 
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It was almost inevitable that the growth in the number of situations in which outside service 
providers perform both the internal and external audit for the same client would haN e raised 
questions about the potential compromise of independence. Aldhizer and Cashell (199o) 
claim that given that a public accounting firm's revenue from providing internal audit 
services could be up to ten times higher than their accounting and auditing services. and 
given that the service is likely to be provided on an ongoing basis year after year, the firm 
may unconsciously become biased in the client's favour. They also add that even if the 
auditor is able to maintain complete objectivity, the public appearance of independence may 
be harmed. The position of possibly `auditing one's own work' may be perceived, according 
to Rouse (1996), as lacking the appearance of independence, if not lacking independence in 
fact. On the other hand, Barr and Chang (1993) argue that outside internal audit providers are 
more likely to be independent than in-house staff, whose livelihood may depend on keeping 
their managers happy. 
It seems that despite all the assurances given by the service providers, there continuous to be 
some concern about having the same provider performing both audits. Nevertheless, the 
survey results have revealed that there is a significant number of people who do not share 
this concern and still insist that it is quite acceptable for a public accounting firm to Wear 
both hats 
- 
the hat of the internal auditor and the hat of the external auditor - simultaneously. 
Public accounting firms, as mentioned earlier, have taken a lot of steps lately towards 
ensuring that independence is not compromised when they provide both services to the same 
client. The results from the statistical tests performed along with the small size of the sample 
lead to the conclusion that this hypothesis has to be rejected. 
- 
"78 
- 
7.4 Conclusions 
Table 7.90: Summary Table of Acceptance/Rejection of the Research 
Hypotheses 
Research Hypotheses Accepted/Rejected 
HI: 
`Core' activities should always kept in-house and all Rejected 
`non-core' activities should be outsourced. 
H2: Internal auditing while `essential' is not considered to Accepted 
be a `core' activity. 
H3: Cost savings are the most important consideration in Rejected 
the decision to outsource internal auditing. 
Ha: There is a relationship between the size of an Accepted 
organisation and its decision to outsource internal auditing. 
Hs: There is a relationship between the diversity of 
operations of an organisation and its decision to outsource Rejected 
internal auditing. 
H6: Legal rulings can affect the decision to outsource Rejected 
internal auditing. 
H7: There is a relationship between the length of time an 
organisation had an in-house internal audit function and its Rejected 
decision to outsource the function. 
H8: The many alternative sources of supply in the market Rejected 
can influence the decision to outsource internal auditing. 
H9: The quality of the internal audit service will be Rejected 
adversely affected if the internal audit function is 
outsourced. 
Hio: Independence is compromised when public accounting 
firms take on the dual role of the internal and external Rejected 
auditor. 
The rationale behind outsourcing is quite simple, with an organisation disposing of a 
traditionally in-house activity to an outside party, which then assumes the responsibility of 
providing the service for a fee over a certain period of time. At times it is even quite 
tempting with all the promises of cost-savings and better quality of service, and it is often 
applicable to a wide variety of in-house activities ranging from cleaning and catering to 
information technology and even internal audit. Nevertheless, it is not a universal panacea 
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and therefore organisations must evaluate each activity on its own merit since outsourcing, 
can easily turn into a nightmare scenario whereby costs exceed v, -hat the client-organisation 
thought they would be, the quality of service diminishes over time, and the responsiv cness to 
changing market conditions is slow or even non-existent. Organisations can find themselves 
locked-up into a contract where there is no easy way out. However, when outsourcing is used 
correctly and for the right activities it can prove to be a worthwhile solution. 
If an organisation has caught the outsourcing bug and has outsourced man}, other activities, it 
is not inconceivable to assume that the next function in the queue to receive the outsourcing 
treatment would be the internal audit function. As organisations are looking for ways to 
reduce those activities which do not add value, internal audit is one of those functions which 
are increasingly coming under intense scrutiny, and if it is found guilty of not contributing 
towards the all-important shareholder value then the function is often outsourced. Pmwcll 
(1997) claims that internal auditing is a transferable skill which can be developed through 
qualification, training and experience and which is not integral to any specific organisation. 
therefore it can be procured on an `as needed basis'. This study, however, suggests that 
despite the fact that outsourcing is used on a wide scale today, internal audit is still regarded 
to be a predominantly in-house activity. 
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Chapter VIII.. 
Summary, Conclusions and Areas 
for Further Research 
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8.1 Summary 
Apart from conducting a comprehensive literature review on the subject of outsourcing in 
general, and that of internal audit in particular, this thesis also examined in detail the 
different outsourcing alternatives, and the possible advantages and disadvantages resulting 
from an outsourcing decision. In addition, the thesis reported on the findings of a postal 
survey which, among other things, identified the main factors acting as the powerful driver 
behind the decision to outsource the internal audit function, the extend of outsourcing of 
internal auditing, how the function is perceived by Finance and Audit Directors in the UK 
public and private sectors, and the likely impact an outsourcing decision may have on 
auditors' independence and the quality of the internal audit service. 
The literature review revealed that on numerous occasions it has been questioned with some 
justification whether an organisation would not be better off if it was to concentrate on its 
core business and let others run its peripheral activities. This practice, which is by no means 
anything new despite the widespread public attention it has received over the past decade. 
allows organisations to restrict themselves in doing only those tasks for which they are best 
suited and where they have high levels of skills and experience, allowing specialist service 
providers to handle the rest of their activities. 
Despite still being considered by some as fundamentally internal to one's business, the 
internal audit function is increasingly targeted for outsourcing. In an age largely dominated 
b personal computers, the internet, the development and use of new financial instruments 
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(e. g. currency derivatives), internal auditors occasionally find themselves having to audit 
complex activities. Having to employ internal auditors who possess all the technical 
knowledge and skills necessary to cope with this wide array of increasingly complex 
activities might be impractical and will certainly cost far too much. Linder these 
circumstances, some organisations may find it more efficient and even more economical to 
ask for assistance from the outside. In fact this argument is supported by the survey results 
which indicate that the most important factor for outsourcing the internal audit function has 
been the ` access to internal auditors with specialised skills'. 
The future existence and prevalence of outsourcing will very much depend on the success 
of current outsourcing engagements. The quality of the provided service, particularly, for 
activities like internal audit, is one of the main factors contributing towards a successful 
outsourcing engagement. Since the survey results have shown that organisations are, in 
general terms, satisfied with the quality of the provided service, it is very likely that. unless 
the quality of the service deteriorates significantly over the coming years, the majority of 
organisations that are currently outsourcing the function are likely to continue doing so in 
the future. A good quality of service should be more or less expected from service providers 
who compete in a market where there is what is generally regarded as cut-throat 
competition. Although in the past public accounting firms have been severely criticised for 
assigning external audit staff to perform internal audit work, it seems that this tendency has 
been abandoned long time ago. Having realised the sizeable revenue to be made from the 
provision of internal audit services, public accounting firms have taken the necessary steps 
towards improving the quality of their service. The reason behind this move is that a 
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possible compromise in the quality of service can really happen once. for once the quality is 
jeopardised, the loss of reputation may prove to be catastrophic for the service provider. 
This research has found evidence that further suggest that the outsourcing of the internal 
audit function is set to continue, as supported by one third of the organisations with an in- 
house internal audit function, indicating that in the near future at least some, if not all, of 
their internal audit function could be provided by an outside service provider. What is also 
noteworthy is their choice of possible service providers. Despite showing their preference 
towards acquiring the services of one of the `big five' public accounting firms, a significant 
number of organisations may still consider the use of a `specialised internal audit provider' 
At present, only one organisation out of the forty that are outsourcing the internal audit 
function is making use of the services of a `specialised internal audit provider'. 
As mentioned in another part of this thesis, outsourcing the internal audit function is likely 
to generate a number of concerns that do not usually arise when outsourcing other activities. 
One of these concerns which is destined to surface when considering the possibility of 
outsourcing the internal audit function is that of auditors' independence. In particular. the 
use of the same provider for both the internal and external audit services inevitably raises 
questions regarding the possibility of compromising independence. The survey results have 
dispelled the widely held myth that independence is compromised when using one audit 
provider. More precisely, it has been shown that although the majority of organisations that 
are currently outsourcing the internal audit function use two separate audit providers, not all 
of them believe that independence is compromised in any way when using one provider. 
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8.2 Conclusions 
Having progressively outsourced so many activities in recent years. and with the 
outsourcing trend looking set to continue well into the future, it was only a matter of time 
until the internal audit function was to find itself the next in the queue to receive the 
outsourcing `treatment'. However, while the decision to hand over to outside service 
providers support activities like building security, cleaning and catering, might be taken 
with some degree of ease, the decision to outsource functions such as internal audit should 
be taken with great caution since such a decision could have long-lasting implications. 
Five objectives were introduced at the beginning of this research and all five of them were 
eventually accomplished: 
1. The first objective was to determine whether cost-savings were the main determinant 
in the decision to outsource the internal audit function or whether other factors were 
more important. While cost considerations are undoubtedly an important element of the 
decision-making, cost is only one factor, and according to the survey results, is not the 
most important one. It seems that organisations today are no longer looking for explicit 
cost-savings so much as they used to but instead are predominantly seeking to have 
`access to internal auditors with specialised skills' and also to `ensure a high quality of 
service'. One can come to the conclusion that while a decision to outsource functions 
like cleaning and catering that are clearly non-core and have a low degree of complexity 
or integration with other functions or systems, might be based on cost-grounds alone, in 
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the decision to outsource the internal audit function cost-savings may take a back seat 
while a variety of other considerations will be expected to play a more prominent role. 
2. The second objective was to find out whether the size of the organisation can affect 
the decision to outsource the internal audit function. It has been frequently stated that 
all organisations, irrespective of their size, can effectively make use of outsourcing. 
While this argument is logical, survey findings suggest that small organisations, as 
compared to medium and large ones, are more likely to consider outsourcing primarily 
due to the limited resources they usually have at their disposal. This is not to imply that 
small organisations do not or should not have an in-house internal audit function. 
Although they often do have such a function in-house, it is more likely that these 
organisations would prefer to invest their sometimes limited funds into areas that will 
hopefully provide them with a significant financial return on their investment. It would 
therefore be in the organisations' best interest to seek the assistance of an outside 
service provider. For them, outsourcing should be regarded as a good, if not one of the 
best, alternatives. Eventhough some medium-sized and larger organisations are finding 
outsourcing to be an attractive preposition, the general view, at least in the UK. is that 
the majority of these organisations would rather have the internal audit function under 
their own roof 
3. The third objective was to ascertain whether independence is compromised when 
public accounting firms take on the dual role of internal and external auditor. With 
the public accounting firms dominating the market for the provision of audit services, 
the issue of auditor's independence was certain to come up. The truth is that there are no 
specific rules to prevent a service provider from wearing the hats of both the internal 
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and external auditor simultaneously. Although the surrey- results demonstrated that 
independence is not compromised, at the end of the day, it is up to each organisation to 
exercise sound judgement and discretion and to decide for itself whether independence 
is actually impaired or not when using the same provider. The moral question that 
follows is: Should an auditor wear both hats? Eventhough evidence suggest that 
sometimes organisations outsourcing the internal audit function tend to hire their own 
external auditors, this practice should be avoided where possible. It might cost the 
organisation more to have two separate providers, but at least in this way independence 
is safeguarded. 
4. Whether the length of time the organisation had an internal audit department in- 
house will influence the decision to consider outsourcing or not, will be the fourth 
objective of this research. One should expect that having an internal audit function in- 
house for a considerable period of time will prove to be a serious obstacle in the 
decision to use outsourcing, mainly due to the value internal auditing brings to an 
organisation which usually extends well beyond the direct service it provides. However. 
the survey results have shown that this factor had no influence on the decision-making. 
In fact it has been found that internal audit departments were outsourced irrespective of 
the length of their presence in their respective organisations. 
S. The fifth and final objective was to examine if it was correct to argue that Internal 
Auditing while essential is not considered to be a core activity. Eventhough there are 
no rules requiring organisations to perform internal audit in the first place, the survey 
results clearly indicate that such an activity is considered by the majority of participants 
to be essential. However, the same participants also stated that the function is not 
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regarded as core. This result does not necessarily implies that the less core a function is 
the more appropriate outsourcing becomes. Admittedly, it is more likely that an 
organisation will consider outsourcing an activity which is non-core rather than one 
which is core, but this does not entail the outsourcing of all of the non-core activitics. 
Each non-core activity should be considered on its own merit before an outsourcing 
decision is taken. 
While certain activities can be easily supplied by an outside service provider, as the amount 
of outsourcing undertaken in an organisation escalates year after year, decisions as to which 
activities to outsource become gradually more difficult. There can be no doubt that as long 
as outsourcing initiatives approach alarmingly closer to the organisation's core and to 
activities which are at the centre of its future success, the risks involved will he 
compounded. One thing that needs to be made clear, however, is that there is no textbook 
approach which can be used every time an organisation decides to outsource a specific 
function. It is up to each organisation to decide which activities are of paramount 
importance, and according to the conventional wisdom should remain within the 
organisational boundaries, and which are of low strategic value and consequently they 
become legitimate candidates for outsourcing. The key to making outsourcing work is to 
identify the areas that really need it, and even then complete relinquishment of control over 
those areas should be avoided. 
Stories of how outsourcing has failed to meet expectations in terms of cost-savings. 
flexibility, and improved quality of service have made their appearance from time toi time. 
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The majority of these failures should be largely attributed to what can only be described as 
unrealistic expectations. Outsourcing is too often looked upon as a method of getting rid of 
a problematic area. However, if the main cause of the problem is internal and systematic. 
outsourcing a task as a last resort can offer no cure. Nevertheless, it seems that the periodic 
negative publicity and reported problems have not in any way dampened the current 
corporate enthusiasm surrounding outsourcing. In fact, the survey results have shown that 
many organisations are presently entrusting the provision of a variety of activities to the 
eagerly awaiting hands of the specialised service providers. 
Eventhough the outsourcing trend is set to continue well into the future, one can never 
accurately predict for how long and to what extent. However, given the recent rise in the 
perceived value of internal audit, one can safely say that some organisations, either because 
of their small size or because they cannot afford to have an in-house internal audit function, 
will be tempted to consider the use of outsourcing. This assumption can be further 
supported by the public accounting firms' actions over the last few years. If there was no 
demand for the provision of internal audit services then there would have been no effort on 
their part to create specialised departments dedicated solely in the provision of internal 
audit services, they would not have recruited so many professionally qualified internal 
auditors, and finally they would not have invested large amounts of money for the 
promotion of a service that had no future potential. There is, therefore, no doubt that the 
practice of outsourcing the internal audit function is likely to continue into the future, but as 
for how long and to what extend remains to be seen. 
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8.3 Areas for Further Research 
While this research effort was successful in generating some interesting findings. further 
research into this areas will probably produce some more. In particular, there is the 
potential to extend the research outside the UK context examined in this thesis. Moreover, 
the research hypotheses developed in this thesis could be tested in the future utilising a 
larger sample and more empirical analysis. 
One question that also needs to be addressed by a future research is how achievable are 
projected cost-savings when outsourcing the internal audit function. The proposition that 
outsourcing automatically brings cost-savings, it has not always been supported. In fact, it 
has been even suggested in the literature that outsourcing the internal audit function could 
in fact lead to an increase in costs. A calculation of the costs involved in an outsourcing 
arrangement 
- 
both production and transaction costs 
- 
along with a verification as to 
whether outsourcing could generate cost savings, should therefore be the focal point of a 
future research effort. The claim that service providers lowball their initial proposal in order 
to win over new clients and then they start to escalate their fees soon after, should also be 
investigated. 
The practice of outsourcing the internal audit function to large public accounting firms 
appears to represent a significant trend, as reflected by the large number of participants w6 o 
reported in the survey that their organisations are using one of these firms as their sett icy 
provider. This research effort dealt with the issues only from the perspective of those inside 
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the organisations, therefore, a future research could be directed towards the providers of 
internal audit services. Their views on issues like the potential compromise of independence 
should be investigated. In particular, it will be useful to establish how the public accounting 
firms feel about outsourcing engagements involving existing clients and whether it is 
acceptable or not to assign the same staff to both engagements. Furthermore, it «-ill be also 
interesting to find out if there is some reluctance on the part of the service providers to 
accept invitations to tender internal audit services due to the application of the TUPI 
legislation. 
Could the decision to outsource a particular activity generate a negative cultural impact? If 
the activity is integral to what the organisation does, like for example research and 
development for a car or a personal computer manufacturer, then the most probable 
outcome is that the corporate culture will be negatively affected. On the other hand, a 
negative cultural impact is unlikely to occur if the activity to be outsourced is something 
like cleaning and catering. Nevertheless, one should ask how many and which activities an 
organisation can afford to outsource without undermining its overall corporate culture. It is 
almost inevitable that the more activities an organisation farms out, the weaker the culture 
that holds the organisation together becomes. Further research into this area will probably 
provide some important findings. 
In addition, outsourcing requires the organisation to enter a contractual commitment for the 
provision of the services, which may in itself be something of a cultural shock. especially if 
it represents a departure from the way things have been done traditionall`'. In order for an 
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organisation to go ahead and support an outsourcing decision, its corporate culture must be 
open to change. Future research should, therefore, concentrate on finding whether the 
organisations that have already outsourced the internal audit function have done so because 
it is consistent with their culture. There is no doubt that each service provider will bring 
along his own culture, and unless there is a cultural fit, it is quite possible that there will be 
some difficulties, particularly in the development of a single and strong corporate culture, 
necessary so that all the parts of the organisation can move in a similar direction. It will he 
therefore interesting to find out whether any effort was made on the part of the 
organisations during the selection process to establish if the provider had a compatible 
culture. 
Inevitably an outsourcing decision will affect many people in the organisation. Once the 
outsourcing contract has been agreed-upon and signed, the service provider will take 
responsibility of the directly affected staff as recommended by the TUPE legislation, but it 
is equally, if not more, important that the rest of the staff are kept informed on how 
outsourcing will affect them. It is conceivable, that outsourcing may, at times, lead to low 
morale and reduced performance of the remaining staff Naturally, the remaining employees 
who escaped the initial outsourcing thrust will be concerned about the safety of their own 
Positions in the organisation, which in turn may affect their motivation and subsequent 
performance. The permanent job insecurity along with the absence of the safety and 
security of organisational structures, which in the past provided training, development and 
careers, further adds to the problem. Even those who previously felt secure in their 
Positions may lose faith in the organisation and consequently withdraw their support if they 
-292- 
believe that their employer is not providing the necessary support for displaced empft \ cc,. 
A research into how the employees not directly affected by, the outsourcing initiative were 
treated, and in what ways their fears about their future were alleviated, will no doubt reveal 
new ways as to how best to inform and reassure them of their 
future well-being. 
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APPENDIX I 
dd/mm/ 1999 
Name of the Director of Finance/Audit Director 
Name of the Organisation 
Address 
City/Post Code 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am currently studying for a PhD at City University Business School under the super\ ision of 
Professor Georges Selim. As part of my research, I am distributing this questionnaire to a sample of 
Finance Directors and Audit Directors in the UK in order to obtain their views on the subject of 
`outsourcing the internal audit function'. 
Outsourcing, "the practice whereby a firm is contracted to perform one or more business 
. 
functions 
that traditionally have been performed inside the organisation ", has been around for some time now. 
In fact organisations have been outsourcing certain functions 
- 
such as cleaning and catering 
- 
for 
decades. What is relatively new, however, is the fact that organisations are now outsourcing: 
functions such as internal auditing which they would not have considered doing in the past. 
Outsourcing internal audit is not like outsourcing any other function. The decision to outsource the 
internal audit function may have much more serious and lasting implications for the adopting 
organisation. It is these implications, along with the factors that can affect the decision to consider 
outsourcing, which I wish to investigate through this questionnaire. 
Could you please spare 10 
- 
15 minutes from your valuable time to respond to only one of the five 
different questionnaires that accompany this letter, which best fits your organisation. All responses 
will be kept strictly confidential. The results of this survey will be used as statistical summaries 
which cannot be associated with any organisation. If you would like to receive a copy of the principal 
findings of this survey, please complete the request for results section in the questionnaire. Finally. I 
would be most grateful if you could return the completed questionnaire by 18/06/99 using the self- 
addressed envelope provided. 
Thank you for your help in this survey 
Aristodemos Yiannakas 
CITY 
University 
BUSINESS C1400L 
0A. cy' ý ýii! r 
Tý 1/ý 
Research concentrating on the factors 
affecting the decision to outsource the 
internal audit function and the impact 
such a decision will have on the 
adopting organisation 
Researcher: Aristodemos Yiannakas 
May 1999 
i Glossary of terms used in the questionnaire 
Terms Description 
Core activity One of a limited number of functions that provides its 
owner with a strategic advantage over its competitors. It 
evolves slowly through collective learning and 
information sharing, and it cannot be easily imitated or 
transferred to others. 
Co-sourcing* A team approach involving the service provider and the 
existing in-house internal audit department to provide 
expertise in areas that internal audits have difficulties in 
building for themselves. 
Essential activity An indispensable activity. 
Full-Outsourcing Internal audit is performed entirely by an outside service 
provider. The organisation may still retain an internal 
audit director in order to oversee the relationship. serve 
as a liaison with management, and perform special 
projects. 
In-house An internal audit department is maintained inside the 
organisation without any help from the outside. 
Internal Auditing An independent and objective assurance and consulting 
activity guided by a philosophy of adding value to 
improve the operations of the organisation. It assists an 
organisation in accomplishing its objectives by bringing a 
systematic and disciplined approach to evaluate and 
improve the effectiveness of the organisation's risk 
management, control, and governance processes. 
International Firm A company that has considerable sales abroad. 
Multinational Firm A company that has an integrated global philosophy, with 
considerable production/sales sites abroad. 
Non-Core activity An activity which does not contribute directly to creating 
a product or delivering a service. 
Non-Essential activity A dispensable activity. 
Outsourcing The practice whereby a firm is contracted to perform one 
or more business functions that traditionally have been 
performed inside the organisation. 
Outside Service Provider A person or firm, independent of the organisation, who 
has special knowledge, skill, and experience in a 
particular discipline. 
Partial-Outsourcing Only parts of the in-house internal audit function are 
outsourced. 
Partnering** In-house internal auditors work as one with the provider 
sharing goals, knowledge and objectives. 
Choose one of the following that best descr 
audit services within your organisation: 
Internal audit function maintained in-house 
Internal audit function partially outsourced 
Internal audit function fully outsourced 
Partnering / Co-sourcing 
No internal audit function at present 
ibes the current provision of internal 
(Please use the o questionnaire) 
(Please use the '' questionnaire) 
(Please use the o questionnaire) 
(Please use the o questionnaire) 
(Please use the '' questionnaire) 
IMY, 
(ý-l 0 L)) e irn 12 1R (a) ý 
The following 
answered by all 
questions should be 
those who at present 
have an internal audit function in-house 
1. Besides internal audit, has your organisation outsourced any of its other functions' (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 2) 
If yes, what function(s) has your organisation outsourced? (Tick more than one box if 
necessary) 
Q Catering/Cleaning Q Security 
Q Distribution/Transportation 
Q Accounting 
Q Marketing/Advertising 
Q Product development/Design 
Q Human Resource Management 
Q Legal 
Tax 
Q Information Technology 
Q Payroll 
Q Warehousing 
Q Finance 
2. Do you agree with the statement that all core activities should be kept in-house and 
all non-core activities should be outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
3. Do you consider internal audit to be a core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
0 No 
4. Do you consider internal audit to be an essential activity? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 5) 
If yes, do you agree with the statement that although internal audit is essential, it is 
not considered to be a core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
5. How long have you had an internal audit function in your organisation? (Tick the 
appropriate box below) 
Q Under 1 year Q 6-10 years 
- 
16 
- 
20 years 
Q1-5 years Q 11 
- 
15 years More than 20 years 
Vehicle Fleet Management 
Other function(s), please state 
6. How many internal auditors does your organisation currently employ? (Tick the 
appropriate box below) 
Q1 auditor Q6- 10 auditors 
- 
16 
- 
20 auditors 
Q2-5 auditors Q 11 - 15 auditors Q More than 20 auditors 
7. The following table identifies some of the main factors that can influence the decision 
to keep the internal audit function in-house. Indicate using a number from 1 to 5 how 
important each one of the cited factors was in your organisation's decision to keep the 
function in-house. The level of importance will be measured using a 5-point scale 
where. 
12345 
Not Not Important Very Extremely 
Relevant Important Important Inloortailt 
Factor Factors Affecting The Decision to Keep The Level of 
No. Internal Audit Function In-House lm ortance 
1. Access to internal auditors at all times 
2. The constant need for internal auditors with special skills 
3. Cost savings 
4. Maintain total control and protect confidential information 
5. Ensure high quality of service 
6. The prospect of compromising independence when the 
same public accounting firm takes on the dual role of the 
internal and external auditor 
7. Failure of other organisations in the industry to successfully 
outsource their internal audit functions 
8. "Why change something that has served us so well up to 
now? " 
9. Avoid transitional costs and costs associated with finding a 
good internal audit provide. 
10. Adverse effect on the morale of the remaining employees 
because of the constant fear that they will be the `next to o7 
11. The length of time the organisation had an internal audit 
department in-house 
12. "The internal audit service provider will not know our 
business as well as we do" 
13. The internal audit department serves as a training ground 
and as a springboard for future senior managers. 
14. The loss of the constructive/positive help provided by the 
internal audit function 
15. The difficulty in developing and sustaining a strong 
corporate culture once functions such as internal audit are 
outsourced 
16. Statutory or legal requirement 
i 
- 
11 
- 
8. Has your organisation considered, at any stage, outsourcing the whole or part of its 
internal audit function? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 9) 
QI do not know (Continue with Question 9) 
If yes, has your organisation in the past outsourced either fully or partly its internal 
audit function and then decided to bring it back in-house`? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 9) 
If yes, what was the main reason(s) for bringing the internal audit function back in- 
house? (Please specify) 
9. If not at present, do you expect that in the near future at least some, if not all, of your 
internal audit function could be provided by an outside service provider" (Tick the 
appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 10) 
If yes, which of the following firms might potentially offer internal audit service to 
your organisation? (Tick more than one if necessary) 
Q Big five public accounting firms 
Q National public accounting firms 
Q Local public accounting firms 
Q Specialised internal audit providers 
11 Other, please state 
10. Are you aware of the Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment 
Regulations (TUPE) whereby the contractor is required to take over the staff currently 
doing the job on existing terms and conditions? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 11) 
If yes, do you expect that TUPE will make a future decision to outsource the internal 
audit function much easier? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
- 
111 
- 
11. Please complete the following table. (Note: If you are filling the Request for Results 
Section at the end of this page, you do not have to complete the table below 
Sector 
Which of the following best 
describes your organisation? (Tick the appropriate box below) I 
Please provide the following 
information about your organisation. I 
Q National Number of employees 
Private Q International Turnover 
Q Multinational Market capitalisation 
Q Government Department 
i 
Number of employees 
Public Q Government Agency Total budget 
Q Housing Federation Member 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please return the completed 
questionnaire using the enclosed envelope. 
Request for Results 
All responses will be kept strictly confidential. The results of this survey will be 
presented as statistical summaries which cannot be associated with any organisation. In 
order to receive a complimentary copy of the principle findings of this survey, please 
attach your business card OR provide the ollowing information: 
of the person completing this questionnaire 
Position of the person completing this questionnaire 
Company name 
Company address 
Telephone number 
IE-mail 
-1V- 
L 
r>c'(elm (0111ll f(o I[I[ 
The following questions should be 
answered by all those who at present 
are partially outsourcing a segment(s) 
of their internal audit function 
,I 
Besides internal audit, has your organisation outsourced any of its other functions? 
(Tick the appropriate box below) 
El Yes (Continue below) 
El No (Continue with Question 2) 
If yes, what function(s) has your organisation outsourced? (Tick more than one box if 
necessary) 
Q Catering/Cleaning Q Security 
Q Distribution/Transportation 
Q Accounting 
Q Marketing/Advertising 
Q Product development/Design 
Q Human Resource Management 
Q Vehicle Fleet Management 
Q Other function(s), please state 
0 Legal 
Li Tax 
Q Information Technology 
Q Payroll 
Warehousing 
Q Finance 
2. Do you agree with the statement that all core activities should be kept in-house and 
all non-core activities should be outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
3. Do you consider internal audit to be a core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
4. Do you consider internal audit to be an essential activity? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 5) 
If yes, do you agree with the statement that although internal audit 
is essential, it is 
not considered to be a core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
5. How long have you had an internal audit function in your organisation? 
(Tick the 
appropriate box below) 
Q Under 1 year Q 6-10 years Q 16 - 20 years 
Q1-5 years Q 11 - 15 years Q More than 
20 years 
-1- 
jý 
6. How many full-time internal auditors does your organisation currently employee'? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q1 auditor Q6- 10 auditors Q 16 
- 
20 auditors 
Q2-5 auditors Q 11 
- 
15 auditors Q More than 20 auditors 
7. When did your organisation start having a segment(s) of its internal audit function 
partially outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Less than a year ago Q6- 10 years ago Q 16 
- 
20 years ago 
Q1-5 years ago Q 11 
- 
15 years ago 17 More than 20 \'ears ago 
8. Which of the following areas are partially outsourced by your organisation's internal 
audit function? (Tick more than one box if necessary) 
Q Computer audits Q Financial audits Q Tax audits 
Q Quality assurance audits Q Project management audits iJ Audit of payroll 
Q Health and safety audits Q Environmental audits Q Contracts audit 
Q Cash management audits Q Foreign transactions audits Q Pension audits 
Q Compliance Work Q Value for money audits 
Q Other, please state 
9. What is the length of the outsourcing contract between your organisation and the 
internal audit provider? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Less than 1 year Q1-2 years Q3-4 years 
Q5-6 years Q More than 6 years (Please specify ) 
10. When you decided about the length of the outsourcing contract, did you consider the 
fact that the longer the contract the more familiar the provider will become with your 
organisation, making it very difficult, as a result, to switch to a new provider when 
the initial contract expires? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
11. To which of the following firms is your organisation partially outsourcing a 
segment(s) of its internal audit function? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Big five public accounting firm Q Local public accounting firm 
Q National public accounting firm Q Specialised internal audit provider 
Q Other, please state 
12. Does your organisation use the same provider for both the internal and external 
audits? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
-11- 
13. When you selected your internal audit provider, did you consider the potential 
compromise of independence that might occur when the same public accounting firm 
assumes the dual role of the internal and external auditor? (Tick the appropriate bo\ below) 
Yes (Continue below) 
G' No (Continue with Question 14) 
QI was not involved in the selection of the provider (Continue with Question 14) 
If yes, do you agree that independence is compromised when the same public 
accounting firm assumes the dual role of the internal and external auditor? (Tick the 
appropriate box below) 
11 Yes 
Q No 
14. The following table identifies some of the main factors that can influence the decision 
to partially outsource a segment(s) of the internal audit function. Indicate using a 
number from 1 to 5 how important each one of the cited factors was in your 
organisation's decision to partially outsource a segment(s) of the internal audit 
function. The level of importance will be measured using a 5-point scale where: 
12345 
Not Not Important Very Extremely 
Relevant Important Important Important 
Factor 
No. 
Factors Affecting The Decision to Partially Outsource 
a Segment(s) of The Internal Audit Function 
Level of 
Importance 
1. Cost savings 
2. Access to internal auditors with specialised skills 
3. Improve company 
4. Dispose of a function that is difficult to manage 
5. Ensure high quality of service 
6. Share some of the risks of business failure, due to poor control 
systems, with an outside contractor 
7. The high rate of success enjoyed by other organisations in your 
sector when they outsourced their internal audit functions 
8. Theopportunity to offload unproductive or unwanted employees 
9. The presence of a large number of internal audit providers in the 
market 
10. The inability of the in-house audit function to fulfil the audit plan 
on time 
11. The judgement of an outside contractor is more likely to be 
impartial 
12. Support for global/geographic initiatives 
13. The organisation's inability to retain (or recruit) people with the 
necessary skills 
- 
111 
- 
15. In the light of your experience, please use a number from 1 to 5 to show how satisfied 
is your organisation with the quality of the internal audit service that is currently 
supplied by the outside service provider. The level of satisfaction will be measured 
using a 5-point scale where: 
1 
Very 
Dissatisfied 
2 
Dissatisfied 
345 
Uncertain Satisfied Very 
Sat Isfled 
Statement 
No. 
Quality Metrics Level of 
Satisfaction 
Audit Perform an ce 
1. Adherence to the audit plan 
2. Provider's level of understanding of the operation(s) 
being audited 
3. Audits are conducted with minimum disruption to 
normal activities and with few demands on operating 
personnel 
4. Professionalism of the service provider 
5. Internal audit meets professional standards 
6. Response to the organisation's needs within the pre- 
arranged time limit 
Internal Audit Provider/Auditees Relations 
I. The scope and objectives of each audit are clearly 
communicated to our managers 
2. Good inter-personal skills on the part of the service 
provide 
3. Appropriate personnel are alerted to the fact that an 
audit is to be carried out 
4. Findings are discussed with those directly concerned 
and their help is utilised in developing proposed 
solutions 
5. Errors disclosed by audit are treated factually and fairly 
Audit Re orts 
1. Audit scope and objectives 
2. Accuracy of information 
3. Consistency in the way audit reports are presented 
4. Clarity and conciseness 
5. Time taken to issue the audit report 
6. Proper treatment of findings according to relative 
significance 
7. Absence of surprises when the final audit report is 
released 
8. The number of audit recommendations 
9. The quality of audit recommendations 
-iv- 
16. Overall, how satisfied is your organisation with the internal audit service currently 
provided by the outside service provider? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
El Very dissatisfied (Continue with Question 17) 
Q Dissatisfied (Continue with Question 17) 
Q Uncertain (Continue with Question 19) 
Q Satisfied (Continue with Question 18) 
Q Very satisfied (Continue with Question 18) 
17. If your organisation is not completely satisfied with the service it currently receives. do you anticipate that in the near future it will consider bringing the function back in- 
house? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue with Question 19) 
Q No (Continue with Question 19) 
Q Possibly (Continue with Question 19) 
18. Despite being satisfied with the service it currently receives, will consideration be 
given to bringing the function back in-house? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 19) 
If yes, what are the reasons that might influence your decision to bring the function 
back in-house? (Please state) 
19. Are you aware of the Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Emploj'Inc'ni 
Regulations (TUPE) whereby the contractor is required to take over the staff currently 
doing the job on existing terms and conditions? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 20) 
If yes, did TUPE make your organisation's decision to outsource the internal audit 
function much easier? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
- 
IV' 
- 
20. Please complete the following table. (Note: If you are filling the Request for Results 
Section at the end of this page, you do not have to complete the table beloi ) 
Sector 
Which of the following best 
describes your organisation? 
(Tick the appropriate box below) 
Please provide the following 
information about your organisation. 
Q National Number of employees 
Private Q International Turnover 
Q Multinational Market capitalisation 
Q Government Department Number of employees 
Public Q Government Agency Total budget 
Q Housing Federation Member 
Request for Results 
All responses will be kept strictly confidential. The results of this survey will be 
presented as statistical summaries which cannot be associated with any organisation. In 
order to receive a complimentary copy of the principle findings of this survey, please 
attach your business card OR provide the following infornlation- 
ame of the person completing this questionnaire 
sition of the person completing this questionnaire 
Company name 
Company address 
Telephone number 
IE-mail 
vi- 
cJ)crý'1 co) ýJ11ýýý 
The following 
answered by all 
questions should be X 
those who at present 
are fully outsourcing their internal 
audit function 
V 
Besides internal audit, has your organisation outsourced any of its other functions. " (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 2) 
If yes, what function(s) has your organisation outsourced? (Tick more than one box if 
necessary) 
Q Catering/Cleaning Q Security 
Q Distribution/Transportation 
Q Accounting 
Q Marketing/Advertising 
Q Product development/Design 
Q Human Resource Management 
Q Vehicle Fleet Management 
Q Other function(s), please state 
Legal 
Tax 
Q Information Technology 
Q Payroll 
Q Warehousing 
Q Finance 
2. Do you agree with the statement that all core activities should be kept in-house and 
all non-core activities should be outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box belo\\ ) 
Q Yes Q No 
3. Do you consider internal audit to be a core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes Q No 
4. Do you consider internal audit to be an essential activity? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 5) 
If yes, do you agree with the statement that although internal audit is essential. it is 
not considered to be a core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes Q No 
5. When did your organisation start having its entire internal audit function fully 
outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Less than a year ago Q 6- 10 years ago Q 16 - 20 years ago 
Q 1-5 years ago Q 11 
- 
15 years ago Q More than 20 years ago 
6. Did your organisation have an internal audit function prior to full-outsourcing? (Tick 
the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 7) 
-1- 
If yes, how long have you had an internal audit function prior to full-outsourcin<<' (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Under 1 year Q6- 10 years 1 16 - 20 years 
Q1-5 years Q 11 
- 
15 years More than _'(' years 
How many internal auditors (full-time equivalents) did your organisation have prior 
to full-outsourcing? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q1 auditor Q6- 10 auditors Q 16 
- 
20 auditors 
11 2-5 auditors El 11 
- 
15 auditors F' -lore than 20 auditors 
What happened to the former in-house internal auditors when the function was fully 
outsourced? (Tick more than one if necessary) 
Q Some joined the outside service provider 
Q Some were made redundant 
Q Some moved to other parts of the organisation 
Q Other, please state 
7. Are you aware of the Transfer of Undertakings Protection Qf Employment 
Regulations (TUPE) whereby the contractor is required to take over the staff currently 
doing the job on existing terms and conditions? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) Q No (Continue with Question 8) 
If yes, did TUPE make your organisation's decision to outsource the internal audit 
function much easier? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes Q No 
8. What is the length of the outsourcing contract between your organisation and the 
internal audit provider? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Less than 1 year Q1-2 years Q3-4 years 
Q5-6 years Q More than 6 years (Please specify ) 
9. When you decided about the length of the outsourcing contract, did you consider the 
fact that the longer the contract the more familiar the provider will become with your 
organisation, making it very difficult, as a result, to switch to a new provider when 
the initial contract expires? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes Q No 
10. To which of the following firms is your organisation fully outsourcing its internal 
audit function? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Big five public accounting firm Q Local public accounting firm 
Q National public accounting firm 
Q Other, please state 
0 Specialised internal audit provider 
- 
11 
- 
11. Does your organisation use the same provider for both the internal and external 
audits? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes 
- 
No 
12. When you selected your internal audit provider, did you consider the potential 
compromise of independence that might occur when the same public accounting firm 
assumes the dual role of the internal and external auditor? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
D Yes (Continue below) 
_ No (Continue with Question 13) 
DI was not involved in the selection of the provider (Continue with Question 1 3) 
If yes, do you agree that independence is compromised when the same public 
accounting firm assumes the dual role of the internal and external auditor? (Tick the 
appropriate box below) 
Q Yes Q No 
13. The following table identifies some of the main factors that can influence the decision 
to fully outsource the internal audit function. Indicate using a number from I to 5 how 
important was each one of the cited factors in your organisation's decision to fully 
outsource the internal audit function. The level of importance will be measured using 
a 5-point scale where: 
1 2 34 5 
Not Not Important Very Extremely 
Relevant Important Imoortant Important 
Factor 
No. 
Factors Affecting The Decision to Fully Outsource 
The Internal Audit Function 
Level of 
Importance 
1. Cost savings 
2. Access to internal auditors with specialised skills 
3. Improve company focus 
4. Dispose of a function that is difficult to manage 
5. Ensure high quality of service 
6. Share some of the risks of business failure, due to poor control 
systems, with an outside contractor 
7. The high rate of success enjoyed by other organisations in your 
sector when they outsourced their internal audit functions 
8. Theopportunity to offload unproductive or unwanted employees 
9. The presence of a large number of internal audit providers in the 
market 
10. The inability of the in-house audit function to fulfil the audit plan 
on time 
11. The judgement of an outside contractor is more likely to be 
impartial 
12. Support for global/geographic initiatives 
13. 
1 
The organisation's inability to retain (or recruit) people with the 
 necessary skills 
-111- 
14. In the light of your experience, please use a number from Ito 5 to show how satisfied is your organisation with the quality of the internal audit service that is currently 
supplied by the outside service provider. The level of satisfaction will be measured 
using a 5-point scale where: 
1 
Very 
Dissatisfied 
2 
Dissatisfied 
345 
Uncertain Satisfied Ven 
Statement 
No. 
Quality Metrics Level of 
Satisfaction 
Audit Perform an ce 
1. Adherence to the audit plan 
2. Provider's level of understanding of the operation(s) 
being audited 
3. Audits are conducted with minimum disruption to 
normal activities and with few demands on operating 
personnel 
4. Professionalism of the service provider 
5. Internal audit meets professional standards 
6. Response to the organisation's needs within the pre- 
arranged time limit 
Internal Audit Provider/Auditees Relations 
1. The scope and objectives of each audit are clearly 
communicated to our mangers 
2. Good inter-personal skills on the part of the service 
provide 
3. Appropriate personnel are alerted to the fact that an 
audit is to be carried out 
4. Findings are discussed with those directly concerned 
and their help is utilised in developing proposed 
solutions 
5. Errors disclosed by audit are treated factually and fairly_ 
Audit Reports 
1. Audit scope and objectives 
2. Accuracy of information 
3. Consistency in the way audit reports are presented 
4. Clarity and conciseness 
5. Time taken to issue the audit report 
6. Proper treatment of findings according to relative 
significance 
7. Absence of surprises when the final audit report is 
released 
8. The number of audit recommendations 
9. The quality of audit recommendations 
-1V- 
15. Overall, how satisfied is your organisation with the internal audit currently provided by the outside service provider? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Very dissatisfied (Continue with Question 16) 
ý Dissatisfied (Continue with Question 16) 
Q Uncertain (Continue with Question 18) 
Q Satisfied (Continue with Question 17) 
Q Very satisfied (Continue with Question 17) 
16. If your organisation is not completely satisfied with the service it currently receives, do you anticipate that in the near future it will consider bringing the function back in- 
house? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes (Continue with Question 18) 
Q No (Continue with Question 18) 
Q Possibly (Continue with Question 18) 
17. Despite being satisfied with the service it currently receives, will consideration be 
given to bringing the function back in-house? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
-` 
No (Continue with Question 18) 
If yes, what are the reasons that might influence your decision 
back in-house? (Please state) 
to bring the function 
18. Please complete the following table. (Note: If you are filling the Request for Results 
Section at the next page, you do not have to complete the table below) 
Which of the following best Please provide the following 
Sector describes your organisation? 
(Tick the appropriate box below) 
information about your organisation. 
Q National Number of employees 
Private Q International Turnover 
Q Multinational Market capitalisation 
Q Government Department Number of employees 
Public Q Government Agency Total budget 
Q Housing Federation Member 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please return the completed 
questionnaire using the enclosed envelope. 
-v- 
Request for Results 
All responses will be kept strictly confidential. The results of this survey will be 
presented as statistical summaries which cannot be associated with an\- organisation. In 
order to receive a complimentary copy of the principle findings of this survey, please 
attach your business card OR provide the ollowing information- 
(Name of the person completing this questionnaire 
Position of the person completing this questionnaire 
lCompany name 
lCompany address 
(Telephone number 
IE-mail 
-vi- 
llilÜ 1{ 
The following questions should be 
answered by all those who have 
adopted partnering/co-sourcing 
1. Besides internal audit, has your organisation outsourced any of its other functions' (Tick the appropriate box below) 
El Yes (Continue below) 
0 No (Continue with Question 2) 
If yes, what function(s) has your organisation outsourced? (Tick more than one box if 
necessary) 
0 Catering/Cleaning 
Q Distribution/Transportation 
Q Accounting 
Q Marketing/Advertising 
Q Product development/Design 
Q Human Resource Management 
Q Vehicle Fleet Management 
Q Other function(s), please state_ 
Q Security 
Qi Legal 
Q Tax 
Q Information Technology 
Q Payroll 
Q Warehousing 
Q Finance 
2. Do you agree with the statement that all core activities should be kept in-house and 
all non-core activities should be outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes Q No 
3. Do you consider internal audit to be a core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes Q No 
4. Do you consider internal audit to be an essential activity? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 5) 
If yes, do you agree with the statement that although internal audit is essential, it is 
not considered to be a core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
5. When did your organisation adopt partnering/co-sourcing? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
Q Less than a year ago Q 6- 10 years ago Q 16 - 20 `ears 
Q 1-5 years ago Q 11 - 15 years ago Q More than 20 years ago 
6. Did your organisation have an internal audit function prior to partnering co-sourcing'' 
(Tick the appropriate box below) 
11 Yes (Continue below) Q No (Continue %\ ith Question 7 
If yes, how long have you had an internal 
sourcing? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
El Under 1 year Q 6-10 years 
01-5 years 
audit function prior to partnering co- 
Q 11 
- 
15 years 
16 
- 
20 years 
More than 2(: ) years 
How many internal auditors (full-time equivalents) did your organisation have prior 
to partnering/co-sourcing? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q 1 auditor Q 6- 10 auditors LI 16 
- 
20 auditors 
Q 2 
-5 auditors Q 11 - 15 auditors Q More than 20 auditors 
What happened to the former in-house internal auditors when your organisation 
adopted partnering/co-sourcing? (Tick more than one if necessary) 
Q Some joined the outside service provider 
0 Some were made redundant 
Q Some moved to other parts of the organisation 
Q Other, please state 
F. inplo meat 7. Are you aware of the Transfer of Undertakings Protection (? f 
Regulations (TUPE) whereby the contractor is required to take over the staff currently 
doing the job on existing terms and conditions? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) Q No (Continue with Question 8) 
If yes, did TUPE make your organisation's decision to outsource the internal audit 
function much easier? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes Q No 
8. What is the length of the outsourcing contract between your organisation and the 
internal audit provider? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Less than 1 year Q1-2 years Q3-4 years 
Q5-6 years Q More than 6 years (Please specify ) 
9. When you decided about the length of the outsourcing contract, did you consider the 
fact that the longer the contract the more familiar the provider will become with your 
organisation, making it very difficult, as a result, to switch to a new provider when 
the initial contract expires? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes Q No 
10. To which of the following firms is your organisation partnering/co-sourcing? ( Tick 
the appropriate box below) 
Q Big five public accounting firm 
Q National public accounting firm 
Q Other, please state 
Q Local public accounting firm 
Q Specialised internal audit provider 
-ii- 
11. Does your organisation use the same provider for both the internal and external 
audits? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
ý' Yes 
_ 
No 
12. When you selected your internal audit provider, did you consider the potential 
compromise of independence that might occur when the same public accounting firm 
assumes the dual role of the internal and external auditor? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
E Yes (Continue below) No (Continue with Question 13) 
CI was not involved in the selection of the provider (Continue with Question 13) 
If yes, do you agree that independence is compromised when the same public 
accounting firm assumes the dual role of the internal and external auditor'., (Tick the 
appropriate box below) 
Q Yes Q No 
13. The following table identifies some of the main factors that can influence the decision 
to use partnering/co-sourcing. Indicate using a number from I to 5 how important was 
each one of the cited factors in your organisation's decision to use partnering/co- 
sourcing. The level of importance will be measured using a 5-point scale where: 
12 
Not Not 
Relevant Important 
345 
Important Very Extremely 
Important Important 
Factor 
No. 
Factors Affecting The Decision to 
Use Partnering/Co-Sourcing 
Level of 
Importance 
1. Cost savings 
2. Access to internal auditors with specialised skills 
3. Improve company focus 
4. Dispose of a function that is difficult to manage 
5. Ensure high quality of service 
6. Share some of the risks of business failure, due to poor control 
systems, with an outside contractor 
7. The high rate of success enjoyed by other organisations in your 
sector when they outsourced their internal audit functions 
8. Theopportunity to offload unproductive or unwanted employees 
9. The presence of a large number of internal audit providers in the 
market 
10. The inability of the in-house audit function to fulfil the audit plan 
on time 
11. The judgement of an outside contractor is more likely to be 
impartial 
12. Support for globaUgeographic initiatives 
13. The organisation's inability to retain (or recruit) people with the 
necessary skills 
- 
111 
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14. In the light of your experience, please use a number from 1 to 5 to show how satisfied 
is your organisation with the quality of the internal audit service that is currently 
supplied by the outside service provider. The level of satisfaction will be measured 
using a 5-point scale where: 
1 
Very 
Dissatisfied 
2 
Dissatisfied 
345 
Uncertain Satisfied Very 
Satictiecl 
Statement 
No. 
Quality Metrics Level of 
Satisfaction 
Audit Performance 
1. Adherence to the audit plan 
2. Provider's level of understanding of the operation(s) 
being audited 
3. Audits are conducted with minimum disruption to 
normal activities and with few demands on operating 
personnel 
4. Professionalism of the service provider 
5. Internal audit meets professional standards 
6. Response to the organisation's needs within the pre- 
arranged time limit 
Internal Audit Provider/Auditees Relations 
1. The scope and objectives of each audit are clearly 
communicated to our mangers 
2. Good inter-personal skills on the part of the service 
provide 
3. Appropriate personnel are alerted to the fact that an 
audit is to be carried out 
4. Findings are discussed with those directly concerned 
and their help is utilised in developing proposed 
solutions 
5. Errors disclosed by audit are treated factually and fairly 
Audit Reports 
1. Audit scope and objectives 
2. Accuracy of information 
3. Consistency in the way audit reports are presented 
4. Clarity and conciseness 
5. Time taken to issue the audit re ort 
6. Proper treatment of findings according to relative 
significance 
7. Absence of surprises when the final audit report is 
released 
8. The number of audit recommendations 
9. The quality of audit recommendations 
-1V- 
15, Overall, how satisfied is your organisation with the internal audit service currently 
provided by the outside service provider? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
J Very dissatisfied (Continue with Question 16) 
Dissatisfied (Continue with Question 16) 
Uncertain (Continue with Question 18) 
Ü Satisfied (Continue with Question 17) 
0 Very satisfied (Continue with Question 17) 
16. If your organisation is not completely satisfied with the service it currently receives, 
do you anticipate that in the near future it will consider bringing the function back in- 
house? (Tick the appropriate box below) yv 
Q Yes (Continue with Question 18) 
Q No (Continue with Question 18) 
Q Possibly (Continue with Question 18) 
17. Despite being satisfied with the service it currently receives, will consideration be 
given to bringing the function back in-house? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes (Continue below) 
If yes, what are the reasons 
back in-house? (Please state) 
No (Continue with Question 18) 
that might influence your decision to bring the function 
18. Please complete the following table. (Note: If you are. filling the Request for Results 
Section at the next page, you do not have to complete the table below) 
Sector 
Which of the following best 
describes your organisation? 
(Tick the appropriate box below) 
Please provide the following 
information about your organisation. 
Q National Number of employees 
Private Q International Turnover 
Q Multinational Market capitalisation 
Q Government Department Number of employees 
Public Q Government Agency Total budget 
Q Housing Federation Member 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please return the completed 
questionnaire using the enclosed envelope. 
-V- 
Request for Results 
All responses will be kept strictly confidential. The results of this Sur,, -e\, Nvi Il be 
presented as statistical summaries which cannot be associated with any organisation. In 
order to receive a complimentary copy of the principle findings of this survey, please 
attach your business card OR provide the ollowin information* 
Name of the person completing this questionnaire 
Position of the person completing this questionnaire 
Company name 
Company address 
Telephone number 
IE-mail 
- 
vi 
- 
II 
1IJLD V 
The following questions should be 
answered by all those who at present do 
not have an internal audit function 
Besides internal audit, has your organisation outsourced any of its other functions, (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
D No (Continue with Question 2) 
If yes, what function(s) has your organisation outsourced? (Tick more than one box if 
necessary) 
Q Catering/Cleaning 
Q Distribution/Transportation 
Q Accounting 
Q Marketing/Advertising 
Q Product development/Design 
Q Human Resource Management 
Q Vehicle Fleet Management 
Q Other function(s), please state_ 
Security 
Legal 
D Tax 
Q Information Technology 
Q Payroll 
Q Warehousing 
Q Finance 
2. Do you agree with the statement that all core activities should be kept in-house and 
all non-core activities should be outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
0 No 
3. Do you consider internal audit to be a core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
0 Yes 
Q No 
4. Do you consider internal audit to be an essential activity? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 5) 
If yes, do you agree with the statement that although internal audit is essential. it is 
not considered to be a core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
5. Is your organisation considering the possibility of having an internal audit function 
sometime in the near future? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue with Questions 6,7,8,9 & 10) 
Q No (Continue with Questions 6& 10 only) 
-1- 
6. What are the main factors that have influenced your organisation in deciding not to 
have an internal audit function? (Tick more than one if necessary) 
Q Size of the organisation 
Q Not a legal requirement 
Q Not necessary 
Q High cost 
D Internal audit is one of the functions undertaken by the accounting department 
G' Other, please state 
7. What is the likelihood of your organisation establishing an internal audit function in- 
house sometime in the near future? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q No chance 
C] Very unlikely 
0 Uncertain 
Q Very likely 
Q Extremely likely 
8. What is the likelihood of your organisation engaging into either partial-/full- 
outsourcing/or partnering/co-sourcing of the internal audit function sometime in the 
near future? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q No chance 
0 Very unlikely 
11 Uncertain 
Q Very likely 
Q Extremely likely 
9. Are you aware of any firm to which your organisation could potentially outsource its 
internal audit function? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 10) 
If yes, which of the following firms could potentially offer internal audit service to 
your organisation? (Tick more than one if necessary) 
Q Big five public accounting firm 
Q National public accounting firm 
Q Local public accounting firm 
Q Specialised internal audit provider 
11 Other, please state 
- 
11 
- 
tW- 
10. Please complete the following table. (Note: If yon are filling the Request for Results 
Section at the end of this page, you do not have to complete the table below) 
Sector 
Which of the following best j 
describes your organisation? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Please provide the following 
information about your organisation. 
Q National Number of employees 
Private Q, ' International Turnover 
Q Multinational Market capitalisation 
Government Department Number of employees 
Public Q Government Agency Total budget 
Q' Housing Federation Member 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please return the completed 
questionnaire using the enclosed envelope. 
Request for Results 
All responses will be kept strictly confidential. The results of this survey will be 
presented as statistical summaries which cannot be associated with any organisation. In 
order to receive a complimentary copy of the principle findings of this survey, please 
attach your business card OR provide the following information: 
Name of the person completing this questionnaire 
osition of the person completing this questionnaire 
Company name 
Company address 
Telephone number 
E-mail 
- 
111 
- 
APPENDIX II 
9t' November 1998 
Name of the Director of Finance 
Company Name 
& Address 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am currently studying for a PhD at City University Business School under the supervision of 
Professor Georges Selim. As part of my research, I am distributing this questionnaire to a 
. 
imrk: 
(replace with number) of Finance Directors in the UK in order to obtain their views on the 
subject of `outsourcing the internal audit function'. 
Outsourcing, "the practice whereby a firm is contracted to per form one or more hiisimn. vv 
functions that traditionally have been performed inside the organisation ", may be a relatively 
new term (it is questioned whether outsourcing is a nexý term since it ha heeti in u, ýc for almost 
five years now), but it is hardly a new concept. In fact organisations have been outsourcing 
certain functions 
- 
such as cleaning and catering 
- 
for decades. What is new, however, is the fact 
that organisations are now outsourcing functions such as internal auditing which they would not 
have considered doing in the past. Outsourcing internal audit is not like outsourcing any other 
function. The decision to outsource the internal audit function may have much more serious and 
lasting implications for the adopting organisation. It is these implications, along with the factors 
that can affect the decision to outsource, which vv i; t (replace ýýith I , ýIsh) to investigate 
through this questionnaire. 
Pl(ýise týZý L, (replace with Could you please spare) X (It took the respondent; 10 - 15 minutes toi 
complete the questionnaire) minutes from your valuable time to respond to this questionnaire. 
All responses will be kept strictly confidential. The results of this survey will be used as 
statistical summaries which cannot be associated with any organisation. If you would like to 
receive a copy of the -, ý ý; ýýý ý (replace N\-ith principal) findings of this survey, please complete 
the request forr results section in the questionnaire. Finally, I would be most grateful if you could 
return the completed questionnaire by dd/mm/99 using the self-addressed envelope provided. 
Thank you for your help in this survey. 
Aristodemos Yiannakas 
Glossary of terms used 
in the questionnaire 
Terms Description 
Core activity 
OWriý ý ! Lll cz iii dLe is aU't ýliildve ýý ý'I 11b W111 Liti+ 
evolves slowly through collective learning 
Hrmation shari r. 
Co-sourcing* A team approach involving the service prodder and the 
existing in-house internal audit department to provide 
expertise in areas that internal audits have difficulties in 
building for themselves. 
Essential activity 
Full-Outsourcing Internal audit is performed entirely by someone outside 
the organisation. 
In-house An internal audit department is maintained inside the 
organisation without any help from the outside. 
111,, Andent i .J function cstablisllcLi v, ýlthlll 
: »r«anisation to exanjllle and evaluate its activities a, 
ice to the organisation. Its objective is to assist i 
members of the organi 
-; ýlf 
International Firm A company that has considerable sales abroad. 
aý, ltinal iý ý ý< 1 Firm (Replace A company that has an integrated global philosophy, with 
\v-ith "Global Firm") One considerable production/sales sites abroad. 
participant has pointed out 
that the term "multinational" 
is no longer used. 
Non-Core activity K gut co>>ti ihr ýý: 
a product, or dehv'enng a service 
Non-Essential activity 
Outsourcing The practice whereby a firm is contracted to perform one 
or more business functions that traditionally have been 
performed inside the organisation. 
d 1011, 
has special knox, l p- 
_ 
!ýili_ a_r-ýýi 
rtic°. ' 
Part ial-Out sourcing Only parts of the in-house internal audit function are 
outsourced. 
Partnering* In-house internal auditors work as one with the provider 
sharing goals, knowledge and objectives. 
. 
rotes: *A specific term used by Deloitte & Touche LLP 
**A specific terns used by Ernst & Young 
i 
Request for Results 
All responses will be kept strictly confidential. The results of this survey will be (replace with presented) as statistical summaries which cannot be associated with any 
organisation. In order to receive a replace v% it 1-1 c o>1mpl 1111 111C M as r\) copy of 
the principle findings of this survey, please attach your business card or provide the 
following information: 
Name of the person completing this questionnaire 
Position of the person completing this questionnaire 
Company name 
Company address 
Telephone number 
E-mail 
cre toi put the Rc due t for Result ý e:, been suggested that it migh he 1.1(2t(21- 
section on a separate sheet not attached to the actual questionnaire. 
Introduction: To be completed by all respondents 
1. Which of the following best describes your organisation? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
PRIVATE: 
Q Local 
Q National 
Q International 
IvIultinational (replace with Global) 
Q Other, please state 
PUBLIC: 
. 
ocal Government 
\ýational Health Service 
Education 
2. Choose one of the following that best describes the - 
_: 
t provision of internal audit 
services within your organisation: (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Internal audit function maintained in-house (Scenario I- Please go to page 3) 
Li Internal audit function partially outsourced 
J Internal audit function fully outsourced 
ü Partnering / Co-sourcing 
No internal audit function at present 
(Scenario II 
- 
Please go to page 6) 
(Scenario III 
- 
Please go to page 11) 
(Scenario IV 
- 
Please go to page 16) 
(Scenario V- Please go to page 21) 
- 
11 
- 
Scenario I. The following questions should be answered by all those who at present have an internal audit function in-house. 
has your organisation outsourced any of its functions'' (Tick the appropriate box below) 
ü Yes (Continue below) 
No (Continue with Question 2) 
If yes, what function(s) has your organisation outsourced? (Tick more than one box if 
necessary) 
Catering/Cleaning 
Q Distribution/Transportation 
Q Accounting 
Q Marketing/Advertising 
Q Product development/Design 
Q Human Resource Management 
s C'u. d ýA 
L; 
ii iý. CA ILý Is!. 
,. 
(R, 2pIi1Cc A\ ill 
Q Other function(s), please state 
Security 
Legal 
Tax 
Information Technology 
Payroll 
Warehousing 
Finance 
2. Do you agree with the statement that all core activities should be kept in-house and 
all non-core activities should be outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
El No 
3. Do you consider internal. audit to be a core a non-core rv (Remove the "non- 
core" and change the alternatives to yes or no)? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Core activity - Non-core activity 
4. Do you consider internal audit to be an Essential activity? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 5) 
If yes, do you agree with the statement that although internal audit is Essential, is 
not considered to be a Core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
LJ Yes 
Q No 
5.1, oi 'i (Replace vvith "How") long have you had an internal audit function in your 
organisation? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
C Under 1 year 16- 10 years 16 - 20 years 
11-5 years 
-, 
11 
- 
15 years More than 20 years 
- 
111 
- 
6. How many internal auditors does your organisation currently employ'? (Tick the 
appropriate box below) 
I auditor -6- 10 auditors 16 
- 
20 auditors 
11 2-5 auditors 1 11 - 15 auditors More than 20 auditors 
7. The following table identifies fourteen of the main factors that can influence the 
decision to keep the internal audit function in-house. Indicate using a number from I 
to 5 how important each one of the cited factors was in your organisation's decision 
to keep the function in-house. The level of importance will be measured using a 
5-point scale where: 
12 
Not Not very 
Important Important 
(Not Relevant) (Not Important) 
345 
Uncerid I Very Extremely 
Important Important 
(I 111j)( Cant ) 
Factor Factors Affecting The Decision to Keep The Level of 
No. Internal Audit Function In-House Importance 
1. Access to internal auditors at all times 
2. The constant need for internal auditors with special skills 
3. Cost savings 
4. Maintain total control and protect confidential information 
5. Ensure high quality of service 
6. The prospect of compromising independence when the 
same public accounting firm takes on the dual role of the 
internal and external auditor i rý , iccord w, 
-, 
. 
ýss of the constructive/poi tiy L' 
7. Failure of other organisations in the industry to successfully 
outsource their internal audit functions 
8. "Why change something that has served us so well up to 
now? " 
9. Avoid transitional costs and costs associated with finding a 
good internal audit provider 
10. Adverse effect on the morale of the remaining employees 
because of the constant fear that they will be the `next to o' 
11. The length of time the organisation had an internal audit 
department in-house 
12. "The internal audit service provider will not know our 
business as well as we do" 
13. The internal audit department serves as a training ground 
and as a springboard for future senior managers. 
14. The difficulty in developing and sustaining a strong 
corporate culture once functions such as internal audit are 
outsourced 
-1V- 
8. Has your organisation considered, at any stage, outsourcing , hoý v 
, 
art 0r' its internal audit function? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 9) 
I do not 
If yes, has your organisation in the past outsourced either fully or partly its internal 
audit function and then decided to bring it back in-house? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 9) 
If yes, what was the main reason(s) for bringing the internal audit function back in- 
house? (Please specify) 
9. If not at present, do you expect that in the near future at least some, if not all, of your 
internal audit function v.: i (replace vvitlh could) be provided by an outside 
(replace with service provider)? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 10) 
If yes, which of the following firms could (replace vv ith might) potentially offer 
internal audit service to your organisation? (Tick more than one if necessary) 
Q Big five public accounting firms 
Q National public accounting firms 
Local public accounting firms 
Specialised internal audit providers 
Q Other, please state 
10. Are you aware of the Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Lmppl(ýyment 
Regulations (TUPE) whereby the contractor is required to take over the staff currently 
doing the job on existing terms and conditions? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No 
If yes, do you expect that TUPE will make a future decision to outsource the internal 
audit function much easier? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Ü Yes 
E No 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please return the completed 
questionnaire using the enclosed envelope. 
-v- 
Scenario H. The following questions should be answered by all those who at present 
are partially outsourcing a segment(s) of their internal audit function. 
1. 
`. 
-1 1(1,1 has your organisation outsourced any of functions' (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes (Continue below) 
Ci' No (Continue with Question 2) 
If yes, what function(s) has your organisation outsourced? (Tick more than one box if 
necessary) 
Q Catering/Cleaning 
Q Distribution/Transportation 
Q Accounting 
Q Marketing/Advert ising 
Q Product development/Design 
0 Human Resource Management 
(RLpki,: %vah `". JhiýL I I. ': L \! in. i-.. rnoI 
Q Other function(s), please state 
2. Do you agree with the statement that all core activities should be kept in-house and 
all non-core activities should be outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
E No 
3. Do you consider internal audit to be a core , ,ra non-co' 
. 
(Reº1iov e the , nmn- 
core - and change the alternatives to yes or no)? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Core activity Non-core activity 
4. Do you consider internal audit to be an Essential activity? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 5) 
If yes, do you agree with the statement that although internal audit is Essential. is 
not considered to be a Core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes 
Q No 
5.1 (1)1 hovv (Replace vvith "How"l long have you had an internal audit function in your 
organisation? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
E Under 1 year -6- 10 years 16 - 20 years 
C1-5 years i 11 
- 
15 years More than ?0 years 
-vi- 
Security 
Legal 
Tax 
Information Technology 
Payroll 
Warehousing 
Finance 
6. How many full-time internal auditors does your organisation currently employee", (Tick the appropriate box below) 
C1 auditor 
-6- 10 auditors 
_ 
16 
- 
20 auditors 
Q2-5 auditors 
- 
11 
- 
15 auditors _ More than 20 auditors 
7. When did your organisation start having a segment(s) of its internal audit function 
partially outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
0 Less than a year ago 
_6- 10 years ago - 16 - 20 years ago 
C1-5 years ago 1 11 
- 
15 years ago More than 20 Nears ago 
8. Which of the following areas are partially outsourced by your organisation's internal 
audit function? (Tick more than one box if necessary) 
El Computer audits D Financial audits Tax audits 
Q Quality assurance audits Q Project management audits 
Q Health and safety audits L Environmental audits 
Q Cash management audits Q Foreign transactions audits 
iý (ý 
Q Other, please state 
ý`. ýf 
Audit of payroll 
Contracts audit 
Pension audits 
9. What is the length of the outsourcing contract between your organisation and the 
internal audit provider? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
5-6 years More than 6 years (Please specify ) 
It hals been suuýgested to swap places question 1 with question 10 
10. When you decided about the length of the outsourcing contract, did you consider the 
fact that the longer the contract the more familiar the provider will become with your 
organisation, making it very difficult, as a result, to switch to a new provider when 
the initial contract expires? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
11 To which of the following firms is your organisation partially outsourcing 
segment(s) of its internal audit function? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Big five public accounting firm Local public accounting firm 
Q National public accounting firm QSpecialised internal audit provider 
Q Other, please state 
a 
12. Does your organisation use the same provider for both the internal and external 
audits? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
2 Yes 
Q No 
- 
vii 
- 
13. When you selected your internal audit provider, did you consider the potential 
compromise of independence that might occur when the same public accounting firm 
assumes the dual role of the internal and external auditor? (Tick the appropriate ho\ below) 
Yes (Continue below) 
No (Continue with Question 14) 
1 Was not lIt'vokvcd in 01", OcieC11on of the prod Idee ((` Oillmue \\ Illl QIue"I Ioll 14) 
If yes, do you agree that independence is compromised when the same pubic 
accounting firm assumes the dual role of the internal and external auditor" (Tick the 
appropriate box below) 
D Yes 
Q No 
14. The following table identifies some of the main factors that can influence the decision 
to partially outsource a segment(s) of the internal audit function. Indicate using, a 
number from 1 to 5 how important each one of the cited factors was in your 
organisation's decision to partially outsource a segment(s) of the internal audit 
function. The level of importance will be measured using a 5-point scale where: 
12j45 
Not Not Vcrv Unkýrt', I In Very Extremely 
11nihort, aani hiiportant Important Important 
(Not kelcv i1ý i) ( Not important) LLuit 
Factor Factors Affecting The Decision to Partially Outsource Level of 
No. a Segment(s) of The Internal Audit Function Importance 
1. Cost savings 
2. Access to internal auditors with specialised skills 
3. Improve company focus 
4. (Reel-ce with of) a function that is difficult to 
manage 
5. Ensure high quality of service 
6. Share some of the risks of business failure, due to poor control 
systems, with an outside contractor 
7. The high rate of success enjoyed by other organisations in th 
1ýý rt T, (replace with "your sector") when they outsourced their 
internal audit functions 
8. Theopportunity to offload unproductive or unwanted employees 
9. The presence of a large number of internal audit providers in the 
market 
10. The inability of the in-house audit function to fulfil the audit plan 
on time 
11. The judgement of an outside contractor is more likely to be 
impartial 
12. Support for global/geographic initiatives 
-viii- 
15. Ir 1_º <: it cai ; j; 
, 
i, a- use a number from Ito 5 to show how satisfied 
is your organisation with the quality of the internal audit service that is currently 
supplied by the der (replace k6th outside en-ice roy idrr The level of 
satisfaction will be measured using a 5-point scale where: 
1234 
Very Dissatisfied Uncertain Satisfied Very 
Dissatisfied Cat1rfiPd 
Statement Quality Metrics Level of 
No. Satisfaction 
Audit Performance 
1. Adherence to the audit plan 
2. Provider's level of understanding of the operation(s) being 
audited 
3. he ýý (Replace with 
, 
audits are") conducted with 
minimum disruption to normal activities and with few 
demands on operating personnel 
Professionalisno v'ider 
-ternal audit t Replac, mth "meets. 
. andards (Statements 4&5 should be combined or 
statement 5 should be deleted as the finance director may 
not be aware of the IlA Standards) 
6. Response to the organisation's needs within the pre-arranged 
time limit 
Internal Audit Provider/Auditees Relations 
(Replace vý; ih a> 
yearly communicated to the auditees 
i: Replace with "The scope and objectives of_eacli atuciit are 
clearl communicated to our nýa>>a<<ei_s") 
2. Good inter-personal skills on the part of the service provider 
3. Appropriate personnel were (Replace \ti ith -arc'-) alerted to 
the fact that an audit was(Replace vv-itlh "is") to be carried 
out 
4. Findings --are-? discussed with those 
directly concerned and their help (Replace vv. irh is º 
utilised in developing proposed solutions 
5. Errors disclosed by audit (Replace with treated 
factually and fairly 
Audit Re orts 
1. Audit sco e and objectives 
2. Accuracy of information 
3. Consistency 
4. Clarity and conciseness 
5. Time taken to issue the audit report 
6. Proper treatment of findings according to relative 
significance 
7. Absence of surprises when the final audit report 
(Rep lace with "is") released 
8. The number of audit recommendations 
9. The quality of audit recommendations 
-1X- 
16. Overall, how satisfied is your organisation with the internal audit service that is (remove `'that is'') currently provided by the replace xvith outside 
service provider)? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Cl 
Ü 
Very dissatisfied (Continue below) 
Dissatisfied (Continue below) 
G Uncertain (Continue with Question 17) 
Q Satisfied (Continue with Question 17) 
Q Very satisfied (Continue with Question 17) 
If your organisation is not completely satisfied with the service it currently receives, 
do you anticipate that in the near future it will consider bringing the function back in- 
house? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
Possibly 
The firm will look for another provider 
17. Are you aware of the Transfer of Undertakings Protection (? f E111m'/ov111e! il 
Regulations (TUPE) whereby the contractor is required to take over the staff currently 
doing the job on existing terms and conditions? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No 
If yes, did TUPE make your organisation's decision to outsource the internal audit 
function much easier? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please return the completed 
questionnaire using the enclosed envelope. 
-x- 
Scenario III: The following questions should be answered by- all those who at 
present are fully outsourcing their internal audit function. 
! has your organisation outsourced any of its other functions? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
1 Yes (Continue below) 
D No (Continue with Question 2) 
If yes, what function(s) has your organisation outsourced? (Tick more than one box if 
necessary) 
Catering/Cleaning Security 
Q Distribution/Transportation 
Q Accounting 
Q Marketing/Advertising 
Q Product development/Design 
Q Human Resource Management 
iG iii Iw''4; 5('i! c l, wce (I R placcvýitlt Achjd Ilýýt \[an. ý ýýniý7ýi ý 
Q Other function(s), please state 
2. Do you agree with the statement that all core activities should be kept in-house and 
all non-core activities should be outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes 
11 No 
3. Do you consider internal audit to be a core or a non-' (Refllov e the - noºn- 
core and change the alternatives to yes or no)? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Core activity Non-core activity 
4. Do you consider internal audit to be an Essential activity? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
7J Yes (Continue below) 
El No (Continue with Question 5) 
If yes, do you agree with the statement that although internal audit is Essential. , is 
not considered to be a Core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
5. When did your organisation start having its entire internal audit function 
fully 
outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Less than a year ago 16- 10 years ago 
- 
16 
- 
20 
`ears ago 
1-5 years ago 1 11 
- 
15 years ago More than 20 years ago 
Legal 
Tax 
Information Technology 
Payroll 
Warehousing 
Finance 
-xi- 
6. Did your organisation have an internal audit function prior to full-outsourcing" (Tick 
the appropriate box below) 
E Yes (Continue below) 
- No (Continue with Question 7) 
If yes, how many full-time internal 
_ti (replace with internal auditors hill-tinme 
equivalents)) did your organisation have prior to full-outsourcing? (Tick the 
appropriate box below) 
Q1 auditor Q 6-10 auditors 16 - 20 auditors 
Q2-5 auditors Q 11 
- 
15 auditors More than 20 auditors 
What Has (renmove "has'I) happened to the former in-house internal auditors when the 
function was fully outsourced? (Tick more than one if necessary) 
Q Some joined the outside contractor 
Q Some were made redundant 
Q Some moved to other parts of the organisation 
Q Other, please state 
7. Are you aware of the Transfer of Undertakings Protection of I; nrýýlcýi iýrý»t 
Regulations (TUPE) whereby the contractor is required to take over the staff currently 
doing the job on existing terms and conditions? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) Q No (Continue with Question 8) 
If yes, did TUPE make your organisation's decision to outsource the internal audit 
function much easier? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes Q No 
8. What is the length of the outsourcing contract between your organisation and the 
internal audit provider? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
id1 Ali , Less than i year 4'. L << 
C5-6 years More than 6 years (Please specify ) 
It has been suggested to swap places question 8 \` ith question 9 
9. When you decided about the length of the outsourcing contract, did you consider the 
fact that the longer the contract the more familiar the provider will become with your 
organisation, making it very difficult, as a result, to switch to a new provider when 
the initial contract expires? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes Il No 
10. To which of the following firms is your organisation fully outsourcing 
its internal 
audit function? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Big five public accounting firm Q Local public accounting 
firm 
Q National public accounting firm Q Specialised internal audit provider 
Other, please state 
- 
xii 
- 
11. Does your organisation use the same provider for both the internal and external 
audits? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes 
- 
No 
12. When you selected your internal audit provider, did you consider the potential 
compromise of independence that might occur when the same public accounting firm 
assumes the dual role of the internal and external auditor? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
- 
No (Continue with Question 13) 
1 was noi involved in the selection ihr t! 1 
,. 
t 
'I '. ., 
If yes, do you agree that independence is compromised when the same public 
accounting firm assumes the dual role of the internal and external auditor'? (Tick the 
appropriate box below) 
Yes I No 
13. The following table identifies some of the main factors that can influence the decision 
to fully outsource the internal audit function. Indicate using a number from I to 5 how 
important was each one of the cited factors in your organisation's decision to fully 
outsource the internal audit function. The level of importance will be measured using 
a 5-point scale where- 
1234{ 
y'I( ý `,, )t ver. lI,: 
_,; ' Very I: ytremeIv 
Important Important 
(Not IZ, 2Icv: mtl (Not I nnortant) Imnortantl 
Factor Factors Affecting The Decision to Fully Outsource Level of 
No. The Internal Audit Function Importance 
1. Cost savings 
2. Access to internal auditors with specialised skills 
3. Improve company focus 
4. `", ý %_>' ý (replace ýýit1ý -Dispose of) a function that is difficult to 
manage 
5. Ensure high quality of service 
6. Share some of the risks of business failure, due to poor control 
systems, with an outside contractor 
7. The high rate of success enjoyed by other organisations in rlh 
, <<_. ýý (z-eplace with "your sector'-) when they outsourced their 
internal audit functions 
8. Theopportunity to offload unproductive or unwanted employees 
9. The presence of a large number of internal audit providers in the 
market 
10. The inability of the in-house audit function to fulfil the audit plan 
on time 
11. The judgement of an outside contractor is more likely to be 
impartial 
12. Support for loball eo ra hic initiatives 
-xiii- 
14.1 n the {ýIt- d) 
-' 
., 
- 
pi ; use a number from 1 to 5 to show how satisfied is your organisation with the quality of the internal audit service that is currently 
supplied by the id 
_r 
(replace with outside serer ice )rov ider )The level of 
satisfaction will be measured using a 5-point scale where: 1234 
Very Dissatisfied Uncertain Satisfied Very 
Dissatisfied 
_.: _ý _ 
Statement Quality Metrics 
a uJ iicu 
Level of No. Satisfaction 
Audit Performance 
1. Adherence to the audit plan 
2. Provider's level of understanding of the operation(s) being 
audited 
3. ý. ý M_cIEý (Replace with -, audits are) conducted with 
minimum disruption to normal activities and with few 
demands on operating personnel 
rofessionalismn of th, 
i-nal audit irret ýýýý. I 
tidards (Statements 4&5 should be combined or 
statement 5 should be deleted as the finance director may 
not be aware of the IIA Standards) 
6. Response to the organisation's needs within the pre-arranged 
time limit 
Internal Audit Provider/Auditees Relations 
.. i (RepHHie, 2 v 0th _, 11-C 
cdearly communicated to the auditees 
(Replace with "The scope and objectives_ofeach. wdit_ arc 
clean y communicated to our manaýýers') 
2. Good inter-personal skills on the part of the service provider 
3. Appropriate personnel were (Replace with -_-are) alerted to 
the fact that an audit was(Replace with _is_) to be carried 
out 
4. Findings 
, 
tier 
. 
t, epl ce vv itll -'arediscussed with those 
directly concerned and their help (Replace with l "Is") 
utilised in developing proposed solutions 
5. Errors disclosed by audit 
.!. re (Replace with are") treated factually and fairly 
Audit Reports 
1. Audit scope and objectives 
2. Accuracy of information 
3. Consistency 
4. Clarity and conciseness 
5. Time taken to issue the audit re ort 
6. Proper treatment of findings according to relative 
significance 
7. Absence of surprises when the final audit report 
(Replace with "is"") released 
8. The number of audit recommendations 
9. The quality of audit recommendations 
- 
xiv 
- 
15. Overall, how satisfied is your organisation with the internal audit service that is (remove `-that is) currently provided by the j :, ` ntr ýt T (relilace %ýith outside 
service rovider)? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Very dissatisfied (Continue below) 
Dissatisfied (Continue below) 
Uncertain 
Q Satisfied 
Q Very satisfied 
If your organisation is not completely satisfied with the service it currently receives, 
do you anticipate that in the near future it will consider bringing the function back in- 
house? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
Possibly 
The firm will look for another provider 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please return the completed 
questionnaire using the enclosed envelope. 
Scenario IV., The following questions should be answered bI all those who have 
adopted partnering/co-sourcing. ' 
1. Besides internal audit. has your organisation outsourced any of its ' functions'' (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 2) 
If yes, what function(s) has your organisation outsourced? (Tick more than one box if 
necessary) 
D Catering/Cleaning Security 
Q Distribution/Transportation 
Q Accounting 
Q Marketing/Advertising 
Q Product development/Design 
Human Resource Management 
;: i ýy fý11 'sý ä I"1('F' ( Rq)h chid' I lc, 2t \ (ana_ýmwt 
Q Other function(s), please state 
2. Do you agree with the statement that all core activities should be kept in-house and 
all non-core activities should be outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box helo« 
11 Yes 
0 No 
3. Do you consider internal audit to be a core ur ai mi-corn ... (Rcluo\ c tIl(-, Iw I]- 
core" and change the alternatives to yes or no)? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Core activity - Non-core activity 
4. Do you consider internal audit to be an Essential activity? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 5) 
If yes, do you agree with the statement that although internal audit is Essential. is 
not considered to be a Core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
11 No 
Legal 
Tax 
Information Technology 
Payroll 
Warehousing 
Finance 
5. When did your organisation adopt partnering/co-sourcing? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
Less than a year ago 
1-5 years ago 
6- 10 years ago 
1 11 
- 
15 years ago 
16 
- 
20 years 
More than 20 ears ago 
- 
XV1 
- 
6. Did your organisation have an internal audit function prior to partnering "co-sourcing" (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes (Continue below) 
- No (Continue with Question 7) 
If yes, how many 1; (o: '-, -1, -i-11, 
- 
ecLuivalents)) did your organisation have prior to partnering/co-sourcing? (Tick the 
appropriate box below) 
D1 auditor 
- 
6-10 auditors 16 
- 
20 auditors 
El 2-5 auditors 1 11 
- 
15 auditors - More than 20 auditors 
What ý: (remove "has") happened to the former in-house internal auditors when 
your organisation adopted partnering/co-sourcing? (Tick more than one if necessary) 
Q Some joined the outside contractor 
Q Some were made redundant 
Q Some moved to other parts of the organisation 
Q Other, please state 
7. Are you aware of the Transfer of Undertakings Protection of L in1Vo1"»>e'irt 
Regulations (TUPE) whereby the contractor is required to take over the staff currently' 
doing the job on existing terms and conditions? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) Q No (Continue with Question 8) 
If yes, did TUPE make your organisation's decision to outsource the internal audit 
function much easier? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes Q No 
8. What is the length of the outsourcing contract between your organisation and the 
internal audit provider? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
I-es cars 
5-6 years 
_ 
More than 6 years (Please specify 
It has been suggested to swap places question 8 with question 9 
9. When you decided about the length of the outsourcing contract, did you consider the 
fact that the longer the contract the more familiar the provider will become with your 
organisation, making it very difficult, as a result, to switch to a new provider when 
the initial contract expires? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes Ej No 
10. To which of the following firms is your organisation partnering/co-sourcing' (Tick 
the appropriate box below) 
Big five public accounting firm 
- 
Local public accounting firm 
Q National public accounting firm Specialised internal audit provider 
u Other, please state 
- 
xvii 
- 
11. Does your organisation use the same provider for both the internal and external 
audits? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes No 
12, When you selected your internal audit provider, did you consider the potential 
compromise of independence that might occur when the same public accounting firm 
assumes the dual role of the internal and external auditor? (Tick the appropriate bo\ below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) No (Continue with Question L)) 
I was not involved in the selection of the Or0v idei 
If yes, do you agree that independence is compromised when the same public 
accounting firm assumes the dual role of the internal and external auditor' (Tick: the 
appropriate box below) 
Q Yes^ No 
13. The following table identifies some of the main factors that can influence the decision 
to use partnering/co-sourcing. Indicate using a number from 1 to 5 how important was 
each one of the cited factors in your organisation's decision to use partnering/co- 
sourcing. The level of importance will be measured using a 5-point scale where- 
2, 
_, 
45 
Not Not ver (Jno") 11! Very I: ýircýnclý 
important Important 
i Not RClCv, mt (Not Ii portant) (Important 
Factor 
No. 
Factors Affecting The Decision to 
Use Partnering/Co-Sourcing 
Level of 
Importance 
1. Cost savings 
2. Access to internal auditors with specialised skills 
3. Improve company focus 
4, °, !' (Rep 1 cc w ith _Di pos _ý c q- a function that is difficult to 
manage 
5. Ensure high quality of service 
6. Share some of the risks of business failure, due to poor control 
systems, with an outside contractor 
7. The high rate of success enjoyed by other organisations in 
(replace with "your sector") when they outsourced their 
internal audit functions 
8. Theopportunity to offload unproductive or unwanted employees 
9. The presence of a large number of internal audit providers in the 
market 
10. The inability of the in-house audit function to fulfil the audit plan 
on time 
H. The judgement of an outside contractor is more likely to be 
impartial 
12. Support for loball eo ra hic initiatives 
The of-j, 
-i ýSý3ý)oil ýý fsst , dht\ to retain 
(or r; 
ikECessar\ sl"-_ 
- 
xviii 
- 
14. (ý }ý i- () , it ai ýt e. ,l e<ýe use a number from Ito 5 to show how satisfied is your organisation with the quality of the internal audit service that is currently- 
supplied by the (replace with outside s rv ice i)roýv idler-) The level of 
satisfaction will be measured using a 5-point scale where: 
1234c 
Very Dissatisfied Uncertain Satisfied ý'eR 
Dissatisfied 
Statement Quality Metrics Level of No. Satisfaction 
Audit Performance 
1. Adherence to the audit plan 
2. Provider's level of understanding of the operation(s) being 
audited 
3. (Relplace v, ah - Au-1 t arg> conducted with 
minimum disruption to normal activities and with few 
demands on operating personnel 
4 t iafessionam _e servi 
internal au' (Replace --meets" 
'-andards (Statements 4&5 should be combined or 
statement 5 should be deleted as the finance director m i\ 
not be aware of the IIA Standards) 
6. Response to the organisation's needs within the pre-arranged 
time limit 
Internal Audit Provider/Auditees Relations 
(Replace vv itll lr: -, ) 
A early communicated to the auditees 
(Replace with "The scope and objectiýyes_of each audit are 
clearly communicated to our mana >ers") 
2. Good inter-personal skills on the part of the service provider 
3. Appropriate personnel were (Replace vý itll _are-') alerted to 
the fact that an audit was(Replace with "is") to be carried 
out 
4. Findings H<e  (Replace with "are') discussed with those 
directly concerned and their help (Replace with "is") 
utilised in developing proposed solutions 
5. Errors disclosed by audit 
- 
(R place vvlth --aro, ý') treated 
factually and fairly 
Audit Reports 
1. Audit scope and objectives 
2. Accuracy of information 
3 Consistency 
. 4. Clarity and conciseness 
5. Time taken to issue the audit re ort 
6. Proper treatment of findings according to relative 
significance 
7. Absence of surprises when the final audit report 
(Replace with "is") released 
8. The number of audit recommendations 
9. The quality of audit recommendations 
-xix- 
15. Overall, how satisfied is your organisation with the internal audit service that is (remove that is_ý) currently provided by the (rel)-lac.. ). "t 1 out"i; ±e 
service provider)? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Very dissatisfied (Continue below) 
E Dissatisfied (Continue below) 
ý' Uncertain 
Q Satisfied 
D Very satisfied 
If your organisation is not, completely satisfied with the service it currently receives, 
do you anticipate that in the near future it will consider bringing the function back in- 
house? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes Q Possibly 
0 No The firm will look for another provider 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please return the completed 
questionnaire using the enclosed envelope. 
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Scenario V. " The following questions should be answered by all those who at present do not have an internal audit function. 
1. Besides internal aucht. has your organisation outsourced any of its functions' (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 2) 
If yes, what function(s) has your organisation outsourced? (Tick more than one box if 
necessary) 
El Catering/Cleaning 
- Security 
Q Distribution/Transportation 
Q Accounting 
Q Marketing/Advertising 
Q Product development/Design 
Q Human Resource Management 
; -I, \l a; l"ftc`ll.; f);.; ±_ (Repla, "c %vI0 \ 211icl, ! Lct \1 In; i 'ýnfL1it I 
G Other function(s), please state 
Legal 
Tax 
Information Technology 
Payroll 
Warehousing 
Finance 
2. Do you agree with the statement that all core activities should be kept in-house and 
all non-core activities should be outsourced? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
U Yes 
Q No 
3. Do you consider internal audit to be a core or ai n ii-i or s- ;_ýi, (Rey me the -non- 
core" and change the alternatives to yes or no)? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Core activity Non-core activity _Ij 
4. Do you consider internal audit to be an Essential activity? (Tick the appropriate box 
below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No (Continue with Question 5) 
If yes, do you agree with the statement that although internal audit is Essential. 
is not 
considered to be a Core activity? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes 
11 No 
5. Is your organisation considering the possibility of having an internal audit 
function 
sometime in the near future? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
LI Yes (Continue with Questions 6,7,9 & 9) 
Q No (Continue with Question 6 only) 
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6. What are the main factors that have influenced your organisation in deciding nol to have an internal audit function? (Tick more than one if necessary) 
El Size of the firm 
Q Not a legal requirement 
Q Not necessary 
Q High cost 
Q Internal audit is one of the functions undertaken by the accounting depurinient 
0 Other, please state 
7. What is the likelihood of your organisation establishing an internal audit function in- 
house sometime in the near future? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
0 No chance Q Uncertain Extremely likel-\ 
Q Very unlikely D Very likely 
8. What is the likelihood of your organisation engaging into either partial- tull- 
outsourcing/or partnering/co-sourcing of the internal audit function sometime in the 
near future? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q No chance Q Uncertain Q Extremely likely 
Q Very unlikely Q Very likely 
9. Are you aware of any firm to which your organisation could potentially outsource its 
internal audit function? (Tick the appropriate box below) 
Q Yes (Continue below) 
Q No 
If yes, which of the following firms could potentially offer internal audit service to 
your organisation? (Tick more than one if necessary) 
Q Big five public accounting firm Q Local public accounting firm 
Q National public accounting firm Q Specialised internal audit provider 
Q Other, please state 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please return the completed 
questionnaire using the enclosed envelope. 
-xxii- 
hik, 
mk- 
lam- 
APPENDIX III 
dd/mm/ 1999 
Name of the Director of Finance/Audit Director 
Name of the Organisation 
Address 
City/Post Code 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Recently I mailed you a set of questionnaires asking for your participation in an important surrey 
. 
As 
I mentioned in my first letter, I am currently studying for a PhD at City University Business School 
under the supervision of Professor Georges Selim. As part of my research, I am distributing this 
questionnaire to a sample of Finance Directors and Audit Directors in the UK in order to obtain their 
views on the subject of `outsourcing the internal audit 
, 
function '. 
If you have already returned the questionnaire, please consider this letter as a "Thank You" for your 
valuable help. If you have not had a chance to do so as yet, may ( repeat my request for your help by 
asking you to complete the questionnaire and return it to me by the 5`h of July using the self- 
addressed envelope provided. The success of my PhD depends entirely on receiving a good response 
to my questionnaire, hence my second request for help. 
As I mentioned in my first letter, it will not take you more than 10 
- 
15 minutes to answer the 
questionnaire that best fits your organisation. I have to assure you once again that all responses will 
be kept strictly confidential. The results of this survey will be used as statistical summaries which 
cannot be associated with any organisation. Finally, if you would like to receive a copy of the 
principal findings of this survey, please complete the request for results section in the questionnaire. 
My sincere thanks for your help. 
Aristodemos Yiannakas 
